NEW WORLD ORDER. : LUSENET : Vietnamese American Society : One Thread

Bush (father ) tuyen bo New world order hoi 1991 va Bush (son) tiep-tuc truyen thong nay den ngay hom nay -2004.

The gioi co the bi cai tri boi tu ban My ? Xin thua rang : - No ! absolute No.

Tay -phuong , Nga , Tau ,Nhat va cac nuoc A chau co the can Dollar cua My ,nhung khong can su co-van toi cao cua My [ nho cac co-van My ma VNCH sach quan chay nhu vit khap the gioi -lich su 1975 da chung minh ] Su xa-lay cua My o Trung-Dong ( Iraq -Afghan ....] cung la nhung su bao-dong cho nhung mam mong chien-tranh da va dang va se lan rong xay ra khap noi.

The gioi khong an-toan nua . When is the third World War ? That's the Time matter ! [ The chien thu ba chi con la van de thoi-gian ]

Khi My dap pha o ong (killer bee's nest named terrorists ) thi van khong bat duoc con ong Chua Bin Ladin ma lam dan ong bay tan loan khap the gioi -Malai,Indo, Pakistan , Au Chau , Nga So....

Nhu vay NEW ORDER ORDER phai chang la tro cuoi cua nguoi My thich khoi hai ???

-- chi-bua (, October 16, 2004





NGAY HOM NAY Nhung dieu ten chi-bua noi da sai hoan toan.



MY CO THE PHAI DUNG CHIEN TRANH: NHUNG MUC DICH KHONG PHAI DE CHIEM DOAT (CAN HIEU 180 do nguoc lai nhung gi tuyen truyen: loi nhuan dau hoa...thong tri)

Cho du bon khung bo chua bi diet 100% nhung do la ca mot XU THE TIEN TRINH, NHAN DAN--chinh o nhung nuoc dao hoi va cac nuoc tren toan the gioi T/G se dat den TU CHU, TU DO, TU VAN DONG cung voi MY se thuc hien TOAN THANG TU DO__NHAN CHU__CHO TOAN THE GIOI. DAY MOI LA THOI KY BAT DAU cua HANH PHUC TOAN CAU.


KHONG CO AM LAM SAO CO DUONG. Ngay mai, am se la nhung dac thu nuoi duong, nhuong nhin, chu khong phai la nhung luc den toi nhu ngay hom nay










-- SU THAT (, October 16, 2004.

It is written and recorded as a creed in many scripts, tapes, and scrolls of the Jihad and other active military groups of islam that it is the mission of the Islamic order to kill and destroy any demographic advancement that the Islamic world considers possible threats to the existence of the Islamic order, namely, the western advancement, especially that of the United States of America.

How did this come about? Histories tell us the brutal stories of the holy crusades where hacking, sacking and ransacking were more popular that regaining the holy land. Further on in the post-modern time, more and more western involvement in Islamic affairs, both physical military enpowerment and cultural domination advancing eastward, has reduced the once glorious world of Islam into a tiny speck of seemingly backward, crazed and barbarious flock of nomads looked down upon by the rest of the world. This is unacceptable to the readings of the Koran, where the magnificent victory and valor of a muslim warrior is valued and praised above all.

Inevitably the Islamic world strike back. Al Quaeda is just the visible portion of a titanic iceberg lurking somewhere near and below the western ship. There is a limit to its sleepiness, and once this limit is reached, the whole of the Islamic world will rise up once again to eliminate the threats to its existence, namely, Christianity and the western civilization. With this surge the other enemies of the United States: China, North Korea, Cuba, etc., will join. The battle is evenly matched until the two other military super powers: India and Russia, decide to take side. India has clashes with China once in a while, and Russia has remained silent in the past decades in terms of international affairs, so it is hard to tell where they'll be when World War III take place.

If Bush wants to stop terrorism, he needs to stop exciting them. This is a long-term process, taking at least 200 years, and I doubt America is patient enough to wait that long. Yet, America does NOT have enough power to overcome the whole Islamic world, so unless they take on this approach, and take it NOW, it might explode into a similar situation to that of israel and palestine, only this time it is on a world scale.

The hard question to ask is: why are there terrorism, and why are they targeting western influences? Answering this egg-or-chiken question will certainly open up a whole new range of possible negotiations between the western world and the Islamic world.


-- Jube (Jube@Jube.Jube), October 16, 2004.

my man ,Jub.

Well , for history of mankind , the religion war between Catholic & Muslim tơok more than 1800 years and keep killing each others. 1,800 is just the number , it took more than couple century ....

Cac cuoc chien tranh giua ton-giao [ Thien chua & Hoi giao ] da keo dai nhieu the ki [ the ki=1000 nam ...] trong lich -su nhan -loai.

Lo lua Thanh -chien [ Jihad] da bung no, do su cham ngoi ngu-xuan cua de-cuoc My va tay-sai .

How can you stop them , NO-WAY !

We just pray God , you pray your God , I pray my God !

-- chi-bua (, October 16, 2004.

"Lo lua Thanh -chien [ Jihad] da bung no, do su cham ngoi ngu-xuan cua de-cuoc My va tay-sai"

--Exactly, I said

"If Bush wants to stop terrorism, he needs to stop exciting them"

As one can clearly see, Israel is NOT improving their relationship with the palestineans, by they pacifists or activists, by assassinating their leaders, isolating them, discriminating against them, and attacking, killing, and arresting them.

-- Jube (Jube@Jube.Jube), October 16, 2004.

By the way I am for the freedom of Tibet. I have personally met with the Dalai lama (he lives in dharamsala, a small town that's about 2 hours drive from me when I was in india). He seems to be a pretty reserved man, but by no mean active, and it looks like the only way to get the Chinese out of Tibet is to get America out of the Islamic world, so that China does not have to worry about its own safety.


-- Jube (Jube@Jube.Jube), October 16, 2004.


Chibua my son, you pray to your Gosh ??? Mr Hochi' Me'n ????

Oh no, he will Pha^'t your mother again :))))))

-- Hanoi 37 pho' phuo`ng :) the 37th is Prostitute Street :) (, October 16, 2004.

My man , jub, DALAI-DAMA is a great man , you're lucky to face & talk to him. In the world now, we have 2 great guys ,POP OF VATICAN & DALAI DAMA. Dat Lai Dat-ma & Duc Giao hoang o Vatican la 2 nhan vat vi dai dang kinh trong , con sot lai cua loai nguoi tham lam . Voi bat cu li do gi ,the chien thu ba xay ra , chung ta co the do-loi cho nuoc My vi-dai va George Bush ! . Cham ngon cua My cung thuong giong CongSan : -Tha giet oan hon bo-sot! Khi khung-bo no 1 trai bom nguyen-tu co nho ,thi My retaliate -phan cong TRA DUA - voi 10 trai bom nguyen-tu co lon ,ban giao tu tren khong . Voi nguyen -tac an toan la so -mot [ safety is job number one ] My se thang tay trung tri nhung cuoc-gia dung duong khung-bo. [ Safe-harbor -countries for terrorists ] Dieu nay ,keo toi nhung su tra-dua cua khung -bo & cac cuoc -gia khac bang nguyen-tu theo he thong day-chuyen - the chien thu ba voi nhung li-do that vo-li , va ngu xuan cua cac lanh-tu the gioi.... [ Cac vat lieu va suply ve nguyen-tu cua Iraq da khong canh ma bay -co the da o trong tay cua khung -bo !] Vi vay, van de bay gio chi la thoi-gian som muon cho nguy co chien tranh the gioi . [ Time will tell and Time is tickling ....] ps : -Dit-me chu Hoi-nach chuyen mon noi-leo !

-- chi-bua (, October 16, 2004.

I choose not to agree on Jube 's opinion about the so-called theory that if American withdraws its force from Iraq then China will stop Tibet invasion. These are facts to show you that there is no relationship in comparison with the US's intervention in Iraq.

1- Tibet's status at the time of the Chinese invasion in 1949 must be judged on the basis of the facts existing at that time and during the decades that preceded it, that is, on the basis of Tibet's modern history rather than, as China tries to do, its ancient history. Tibet was independent at the time of China's invasion: The country possessed all conditions of statehood under international law; there was a defined territory, a population inhabiting that territory; and a functioning Government exercising authority over that territory, and possessing the ability to enter into international relations.

2- The Chinese Government claims that the so-called "17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet", signed in 1951 -- after the defeat of the small Tibetan army -- shows that Tibetans not only agreed to, but actually invited Chinese Communist troops to "liberate" Tibet. The facts show that the Tibetan Government was coerced into accepting the document drafted by China and imposed upon the Tibetan negotiators under the threat of all-out military conquest. Treaties imposed by the threat or use of force upon a country are not valid under international law, and cannot, therefore, serve to legitimise an otherwise illegal invasion of territory. China, in fact, believes all unequal treaties and agreements to be invalid. There can hardly be a better example of an unequal "agreement" than the 1951 Tibetan-Chinese 17-point treaty.

3- Resistance to the Chinese occupation started to take on organised forms as early as 1952, reached massive proportions in 1959, and has continued, primarily underground, ever since.

4- In March 1959, the uprising was brutally put down by the PLA, which claimed to have killed over 87,000 Tibetans between March 1959 and October 1960 in Central Tibet alone. The Dalai Lama fled the country under the protection of Tibetan guerilla forces only hours before the compound where he had stayed was shelled by Chinese artillery, killing thousands of Tibetan people who had gathered around the palace to protect him.

Neither the uprising, nor the Dalai Lama's escape was planned. All the facts show that the Dalai Lama did all he could to prevent an open confrontation between Tibetans and the mighty Chinese army. The consequences of the confrontation which occurred were devastating: the Chinese troops massacred thousands of people; tens of thousands were taken to concentration camps or labour camps where most died; Tibetan cultural and religious institutions were destroyed and the population was subjected to terror campaigns and massive "re- education" efforts which the Chinese in China experienced only years later during the Cultural Revolution. Famine and starvation were unheard of in independent Tibet. However, from 1950 onwards, the Chinese military and civilian personnel were fed on the state buffer stocks. They forced the Tibetan populace to sell their personal stock of grains at nominal prices.

5- Soon after his arrival in India, the Dalai Lama organised the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. A series of democratic changes were initiated. A popularly-elected body of people's representatives, known as the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, was constituted and a draft constitution for future Tibet promulgated. The constitution even contained a clause whereby the executive powers of the Dalai Lama could be curtailed by a majority of two-thirds of the total members of the National Assembly.

In 1990, the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies was expanded and its authority strengthened. The Assembly now elects the council of ministers, who were formerly appointed by the Dalai Lama. A Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission was also set up to act as the judiciary

6- The Chinese occupation of Tibet has been characterised by systematic and gross violations of human rights. This has resulted in the death of over 1.2 million Tibetans (one-sixth of the population) between 1951 and 1979, and exile of some 80,000.

7- Monasteries, temples and hermitages were found in every village and town throughout Tibet. By 1959, there were a total of 6,259 monasteries and temples with about 592,558 resident monks and nuns.

Soon after their invasion of Tibet, the Chinese authorities began to undermine the traditional social system and religion of Tibet. "Religion is the enemy of our materialist ideology and believing in religion is blind faith. Therefore, you should not only not have faith in religion, but should also condemn it, " people were told. By the middle of the fifties, monasteries, temples, and cultural centres were systematically looted and destroyed in eastern Tibet. The physical desecration and destruction was accompanied by public condemnation of religion and humiliation and ridicule of religious persons.

Contrary to official Chinese assertions, much of Tibet's culture and religion was destroyed between 1955 and 1961, and not during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) alone. By 1976 only eight monasteries and nunneries had escaped Chinese destructions.

Since 1979, some superficial religious freedom was allowed. This included selective renovation of places of worship and allowing people to indulge in rituals like prostrations, circumambulations, etc. But the propagation of the teachings of the Buddha is discouraged and strictly controlled. The essence of Buddhism lies in mental and spiritual development achieved through intensive study with qualified lamas, understanding and practice. But the Chinese authorities discourage this in their campaign to misrepresent Tibetan religion

Sourced from 'The Government of Tibet in Exile'

-- Độc Ẩm Cũng Thú !? (, October 16, 2004.

Chi bua is not khowledgeable to discuss a man with a pea brain. Jube read the Smuel P Hunting Book on Clash of civilisations. I wacth the PBS TV ptogram way back in 1989, all scholars concerned about the muslum world will fill in the vacuum to ceate turmoil and instability so is terror war, it becomes true now and the Western World is at war, disreagard about the differences between France and Germany or Spain , the bottom line is they all agree to fight the terror war or so call antiterrorism war. The West with USA as a leader is this war is winning

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Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Author: James Graham Published: May, 2004

In the post Cold War world few articles have influenced how Western and especially American policymakers view the world more than Samuel P. Huntington's 1993 article, The Clash of Civilizations. Published in the influential Foreign Affairs journal the article suggested the world was returning to a civilization dominated world where future conflicts would originate from clashes between 'civilizations'. The theory has been broadly criticised for oversimplification, ignoring indigenous conflicts and for incorrectly predicting what has happened in the decade since its publication. The claim made by many that September the 11th has vindicated Huntington is simply not supported by the evidence. Published while a post Cold War world was searching for a new prism to view international relations through ensured it has however proved influential.

Huntington's thesis outlines a future where the "great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural" (Huntington 1993:22). He divides the world's cultures into seven current civilizations, Western, Latin American, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu and Slavic-Orthodox (Huntington 1993:26). In addition he judged Africa only as a possible civilization depending on how far one viewed the development of an African consciousness had developed. These civilizations seem to be defined primarily by religion with a number of ad hoc exceptions. Israel is lumped together with the West, Buddhist states and the whole religion is completely ignored. Samuel P. Huntington

Who is Samuel P. Huntington?

Born April 18, 1927. Harvard based since 1950. Founder and co-editor of the quarterly journal, Foreign Policy. Currently Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard C.V. reads like a description of the US foreign policy machinery. Recieved $US 4,719,832 over 15 years from the John M. Olin Foundation, a right wing think tank that grew out of a chemicals and munitions business. More info here. Policy adviser to U.S. Presidents Lynson Johnson and Jimmy Carter. Has his own Yahoo category alongside Marx and Aristotle!

Huntington argues that the end of ideological confrontation between liberal democracy and communism will see future conflict occurring along the borders between civilizations at a micro level. At a macro level he predicts conflict occurring between states from different civilizations for control of international institutions and for economic and military power (Huntington 1993:29). He views this mix of conflict as normal by asserting that nation-states are new phenomena in a world dominated for most of its history by conflicts between civilizations. This is a dubious statement as inter- civilizational conflict driven mainly by geo-political factors rather than cultural differences is an equally if not more persuasive way to view much of history.

The theory at least differentiates between non-Western civilizations rather than grouping them together. He also explains how the West presents pro-Western policies as positive for the entire world and that the very idea of a universal culture is a Western idea. This he argues is evidenced by most important Western values like human rights often being the least important values to other civilizations.

His escape from a Eurocentric bias is however only temporary. He completely fails to account for indigenous cultures even though one can argue they collectively comprise a separate civilization (Fox 2002:430). The article also predicts future conflicts will be started by non-Western civilizations reacting to Western power and values ignoring the equally plausible situation where Western states use their military superiority to maintain their superior positions. The policy prescriptions he suggests to counter this perceived threat equate to increasing the power of the West to forestall any loss of the West's pre-eminence. Thus he suggests the Latin American and Orthodox-Slavic civilizations be drawn further into the Western orbit and the maintenance of Western military superiority (Huntington 1993:47).

-- (Cán_Ngố_Ăn-Dải-Dút@BBP.govt), October 17, 2004.

The Clash of Civilizations?

by Samuel P. Huntington

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON is the Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. This article is the product of the Olin Institute's project on "The Changing Security Environment and American National Interests." THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT WORLD POLITICS IS entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be -- the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in thecoming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new worldwill not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase of the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system of the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of theWestern world were largely among princes -- emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the FrenchRevolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the ward of peoples had begun." This nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the endof World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, firstamong communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined itsidentity in terms of ideology.

These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind haslabeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its center-piece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the people and governments of non- Western civilizations no longerremain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.

THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningfulnow to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or interms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.

What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a culturalentity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs,institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change.

Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China ("a civilization pretending to be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivilizations. Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall; they divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappearand are buried in the sands of time.

Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study of History, Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.

WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH CIVILIZATION IDENTITY will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault linesseparating these civilizations from one another.

Why will this be the case?

First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, aswell as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasings; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries. Similarly, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out, "An Ibo may be . . . an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian. In New York, he is an African." The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has remarked, "is one of the dominant social factors of life in the late twentieth century." The revival of religion, "la revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual roleof the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references totrends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.

In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, thepopulace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de- Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non- Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot becomeArmenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which sideare you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a giventhat cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that are intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of Europeanculture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop withother East Asian countries, its cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration like that in Europe and North America.

Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcomeideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. Ifcultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed,

Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese- based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology andmanufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network (Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China). . . . From Guangzhou to Singapore,from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network -- often based on extensions of the traditional clans -- has been described as the backbone of theEast Asian economy. n1

n1 Murray Weidenbaum, Greater China: The Next Economic Superpower?, St. Louis: Washington University Center for the Study of American Business, Contemporary Issues, Series 57, February 1993, pp. 2-3.

Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan,Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization, founded originally in the 1960s by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission to the European Community. Similarly, Caricom, the Central American Common Market and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the Anglo-Latin divide, however, have to date failed.

As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. The end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore. Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity gives rise to conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism to universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on thebasis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro- level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.

THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS THE FAULT LINES between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As theideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, swings westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. The peoples to the north and west of this line are Protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experiences of European history -- feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution; they are generally economically better off than the peoples to the east; and they may now look forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems. The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems. The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict.

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their swayover the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries at Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East.

After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empiresdisappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to, weapons- rich. Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (created by the West). France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria for most of the 1950s; British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956; American forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged in various military encounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists, supported by at least three Middle Eastern governments, employed the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations and seized Western hostages. This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath NATO planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its "southern tier."

This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's militarypresence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab politicalsystems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.

Those relations are also complicated by demography. The spectacular population growth in Arab countries, particularly in North Africa, has led to increased migration to Western Europe. The movement within Western Europe toward minimizing internal boundaries has sharpened political sensitivities withrespect to this development. In Italy, France and Germany, racism is increasingly open, and political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkishmigrants have become more intense and more widespread since 1990.

On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. The West's "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, "is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It isin the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Meghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a regular conclusion:

"We are facing a meed and a movement far transcending the level of issues andpolicies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations -- the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo- Christian heritage, our secular present, and theworldwide expansion of both. n2

n2 Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 266,September 1990, p. 60; Time, June 15k 1992, pp. 24-28.

Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian black peoples to the south. In the past, this antagonism was epitomized in the image of Arab slave dealers and black slaves. It has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between Libyan- supported insurgents and the government, the tensions between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa, and the political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity are likely to enhance the probability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the intensification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul II's speech in Khartoum in February 1993 attacking the actions of the Sudan's Islamist government against the Christian minority there.

On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupted between Orthodox and Muslim peoples, including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo, the simmering violence between Serb and Albanian, the tenuous relation between Bulgarians and their Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians and Ingush, the unremitting slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris, the tense relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, and the deploymentof Russian troops to protect Russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia.Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic identities and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their southern borders. This concern is well captured by Archie Roosevelt:

Much of Russian history concerns the struggle between Slavs and the Turkish peoples on their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs' millennium-long confrontation with their eastern neighbors lies the key to an understanding not only of Russian history, but Russian character. To under Russian realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries. n3

n3 Archie Roosevelt, For Lust of Knowing, Boston: Little, Brown, 1988, pp. 332-333.

The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself nownot only is the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India's substantial Muslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in December 1992 brought to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. In East Asia, China has outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. It has pursued a ruthless policy toward the Buddhist people of Tibet, and it is pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy toward its Turkic- Muslim minority. With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the United States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade and weapons proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate. A "new cold war," Deng Xaioping reportedly asserted in 1991, is under way between China and America.

-- (Cán_Ngố_Ăn-Dải-Dút@BBP.govt), October 17, 2004.

The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference exacerbates economic conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, but at leaston the American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. The basic values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of the two societies could hardly be moredifferent. The economic issues between the United States and Europe are no lessserious than those between the United States and Japan, but they do not have thesame political salience and emotional intensity because the differences between American culture and European culture are so much less than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization.

The interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which they are likely to be characterized by violence. Economic competition clearly predominates between the American and European subcivilizations of the West and between both of them and Japan. On the Eurasian continent, however, the proliferation of ethnic conflict, epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic cleansing," has not been totally random. It has been most frequent and most violent between groups belonging to different civilizations. In Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam hasbloody borders.

CIVILIZATION RALLYING: THE KIN-COUNTRY SYNDROME GROUPS OR STATES belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization. As the post-Cold War world evolves, civilization commonality, what H. D. S. Greenway has termed the "kin-country" syndrome, is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. It can beseen gradually emerging in the post-Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was a full-scale war between civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilization rallying, which seemed to become more important as the conflict continued and which may provide a foretaste of the future.

First, in the Gulf War one Arab state invaded another and then fought a coalition of Arab, Western and other states. While only a few Muslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many Arab elites privately cheeredhim on, and he was highly popular among large sections of the Arab publics. Islamic fundamentalist movements universally supported Iraq rather than the Western-backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Forswearing Arab nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal. He and his supporters attempted to define the was as a war between civilizations. "It is not the world against Iraq," as Safar Al- Hawali, dean of Islamic Studies at the Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca, put it in a widely circulated tape. "It is theWest against Islam." Ignoring the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called for a holy war against the West: "The struggle against American aggression, greed, plans and policies will be counted as a jahad, and anybody who is killed on that path is a martyr.""This is a war," King Hussein of Jordan argued, "against all Arabs and all Muslims and not against Iraq alone."

The rallying of substantial sections of Arab elites and publics behind SaddamHussein called those Arab governments in the anti-Iraq coalition to moderate their activities and temper their public statements. Arab governments opposed or distanced themselves from subsequent Western efforts to apply pressure on Iraq, including enforcement of a no-fly zone in the summer of 1992 and the bombing of Iraq in January 1993. The Western-Soviet-Turkish-Arab anti-Iraq coalition of 1990 had by 1993 become a coalition of almost only the West and Kuwait against Iraq.

Muslims contrasted Western actions against Iraq with the West's failure to protect Bosnians against Serbs and to impose sanctions on Israel for violating U.N. resolutions. The West, they allege, was using a double standard. A world of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards: people apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others.

Second, the kin-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Armenian military successes in 1992 and 1993 stimulated Turkey tobecome increasingly supportive of its religious, ethnic and linguistic brethren in Azerbaijan. "We have a Turkish nation feeling the same sentiments as the Azerbaijanis," said one Turkish official in 1992. "We are under pressure. Our newspapers are full of the photos of atrocities and are asking us if we are still serious about pursuing our neutral policy. Maybe we should show Armenia that there's a big Turkey in the region." President Turgut Ozal agreed, remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the Armenians a little bit." Turkey, Ozal threatened again in 1993, would "show its fangs." Turkey Air Force jets flew reconnaissance flights along the Armenian border; Turkey suspended food shipments and air flights to Armenia; and Turkey and Iran announced they would not accept dismemberment of Azerbaijan. In the last years of its existence, the Soviet government supported Azerbaijan because its government was dominated by former communists. With the end of the Soviet Union, however, political considerations gave way to religious ones. Russian troops fought on the Side of the Armenians, and Azerbaijan accused the "Russian government of turning 180 degrees" toward support for Christian Armenia.

Third, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publicsmanifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was expressed, however, over Croatian attacks on Muslims and participation in the dismembermentof Bosnia- Herzegovina. In the early stages of the Yugoslav breakup, Germany, inan unusual display of diplomatic initiative and muscle, induced the other 11 members of the European Community to follow its lead in recognizing Slovenia andCroatia. As a result of the pope's determination to provide strong backing to the two Catholic countries, the Vatican extended recognition even before the Community did. The United States followed the European lead. Thus the leading actors in Western civilization rallied behind its coreligionists. Subsequently Croatia was reported to be receiving substantial quantities of arms from Central European and other Western countries. Boris Yeltsin's government, on the other hand, attempted to pursue a middle course that would be sympathetic tothe Orthodox Serbs but not alienate Russia from the West. Russian conservative and nationalist groups, however, including many legislators, attacked the government for not being more forthcoming in its support for the Serbs. By early 1993 several hundred Russians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces, and reports circulated of Russian arms being supplied to Serbia.

Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the West for not coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders urged Muslims from all countries to provide help to Bosnia; in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, Iran supplied weapons and men for the Bosnians; Iranian-supported Lebanese groups sent guerrillas to train and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims from over two dozen Islamic countries were reported to be fightingin Bosnia. The governments of Saudia Arabia and other countries felt under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own societies to providemore vigorous support for the Bosnians. By the end of 1992, Saudi Arabia had reportedly supplied substantial funding for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, which significantly increased their military capabilities vis-a-vis the Serbs.

In the 1930s the Spanish Civil War provoked intervention from countries that politically were fascist, communist and democratic. In the 1990s the Yugoslav conflict is provoking intervention from countries that are Muslim, Orthodox and Western Christian. The parallel has not gone unnoticed. "The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has become the emotional equivalent of the fight against fascism in the Spanish Civil War," one Saudi editor observed. "Those who died there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims."

Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups within the same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense and less likely to expand than conflicts between civilizations. Common membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur. In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has been serious fighting between Muslims and Christianselsewhere in the former Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there has been virtually no violence between Russians and Ukrainians.

Civilization rallying to date has been limited, but it has been growing, and it clearly has the potential to spread much further. As the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the positions of nations and the cleavages between them increasingly were along civilizational lines. Populist politicians, religious leaders and the media have found it a potential means of arousing mass support and of pressuring hesitant governments.In the coming years, the local conflicts most likely to escalate into major warswill be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civilizations. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.

THE WEST VERSUS THE REST THE WEST IS NOW at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. In superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. It dominates international economic institutions. Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world economic issues by a directorate of the United States, Germanyand Japan, all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each otherto the exclusion of lesser and largely non-Western countries. Decisions made atthe U.N. Security Council or in the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world community. The very phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing "the Free World") to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers. n4 Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate. In any poll of non-Westernpeoples, the IMF undoubtedly would win the support of finance ministers and a few others, but get an overwhelmingly unfavorable rating from jusat about everyone else, who would agree with Georgy Arbatov's characterization of IMF officials as "neo-Bolsheviks who love expropriating other people's money, imposing undemocratic and alien rules of economic and political conduct and stifling economic freedom."

n4 Almost invariably Western leaders claim they are acting on behalf of "the world community." One minor lapse occurred during the run-up to the Gulf War. In an interview on "Good Morning America," Dec. 21, 1990, British Prime Minister John Major referred to the actions "the West" was taking against SaddamHussein. He quickly corrected himself and subsequently referred to "the world community." He was, however, right when he erred.

Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its decisions, tempered only by occasional abstention by China, produced U.N. legitimation of the West'suse of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and its elimination of Iraq's sophisticated weapons and capacity to produce such weapons. It also produced the quite unprecedented action by the United States, Britain and France in getting the Security Council to demand that Libya hand over the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects and then to impose sanctions when Libya refused. After defeating the largest Arab army, the West did not hesistate to throw its weight around in the Arab world. The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values.

That at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new world, and thereis a significant element of truth in their view. Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Differences in culture, thatis basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. V. S. Naipaul hasargued that Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all men." At a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate each ideas produce instead a reaction against "human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there could bea "universal civilization" is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another. Indeed, the author of a review of 100 comparative studies of values in different societies concluded that "the values that are most important in the West are least important worldwide." n5 In the political realm, of course, these differences are most manifest in the efforts of the United States and other Western powers to induce other peoples to adopt Western ideas concerning democracy and human rights. Modern democratic government originated in the West. When it has developed colonialism or imposition.

n5 Harry C. Triandis, The New York Times, Dec. 25, 1990, p. 41, and "Cross-Cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism," Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, vol. 37, 1989, pp. 41-133.

The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore Mahbubani's phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values. n6 Those responses generally take one or a combination of three forms. At one extreme, non-Western states can, like Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursue a course of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration or "corruption" by the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation in the Western- dominated global community. The costs of this course, however, are high, and few states have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative, the equivalent of "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, is to attempt to join the West and accept its values and institutions. The third alternative is to attempt to "balance" the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions; in short, to modernize but not to Westernize.

n6 Kishore Mahbubani, "The West and the Rest," The National Interest, Summer 1992, pp. 3-13.

THE TORN COUNTRIES IN THE FUTURE, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries with large numbers of people of different civilizations, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another. These are town countries. Their leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make theircountries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypical torn country is Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the Attaturk tradition and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nation state. They allied Turkey with the West in NATO and in the Gulf War; they applied for membership in the European Community. At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society. In addition, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey and such. Turkey will not become a member of the European Community, and the real reason, as President Ozal said, "is that we areMuslim and they are Christian and they don't say that." Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making strenuous efforts to carve out this new identity for itself.

During the past decade Mexico has assumed a position somewhat similar to thatof Turkey. Just as Turkey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and attempted to join Europe, Mexico has stopped defining itself by its opposition to the United States and is instead attempting to imitate the United States and to join it in the North American Free Trade Area. Mexican leaders are engaged in the great task of redefining Mexican identity and have introduced fundamentaleconomic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental political change. In 1991 a top adviser to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari described at length tome all the changes the Salinas government was making. When he finished, I remarked: "That's most impressive. It seems to me that basically you want to change Mexico from a Latin American country into a North American country." He looked at me with surprise and exclaimed: "Exactly! That's precisely what we are trying to do, but of course we could never say so publicly." As his remark indicates, in Mexico as in Turkey, significant elements in society resist the redefinition of their country's identity. In Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to make gestures to Islam (Ozal's pilgrimage to Mecca); so also Mexico's North American-oriented leaders have to make gestures to those who hold Mexico to be a Latin American country (Salinas' Ibero- American Guadalajara summit).

Historically Turkey has been the most profoundly torn country. For the United States, Mexico is the most immediate torn country. Globally the most important torn country is Russia. The question of whether Russia is part of theWest or the leader of the Slavic- Orthodox civilization has been a recurring one in Russian history. That issue was obscured by the communist victory in Russia,which imported a Western ideology, adapted it to Russian conditions and then challenged the West in the name of that ideology. The dominance of communism shut off the historic debate over Westernization versus Russification. With communism discredited Russians once again face that question.

President Yeltsin is adopting Western principles and goals and seeking to make Russia a "normal" country and a part of the West. Yet both the Russian elite and the Russian public are divided on this issue. Among the more moderatedissenters, Sergei Stankevich argues that Russia should reject the "Atlanticist"course, which would lead it "to become European, to become a part of the world economy in rapid and organized fashion, to become the eighth member of the Seven, and to particular emphasis on Germany and the United States as the two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance." While also rejecting an exclusively Eurasian policy, Stankevich nonetheless argues that Russia should give priority to the protection of Russians in other countries, emphasize its Turkic and Muslim connections, and promote "an appreciable redistribution of our resources,our options, our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, of the eastern direction." People of this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for subordinating Russia's interests to those of the West, for reducing Russian military strength,for failing to support traditional friends such as Serbia, and for pushing economic and political reform in ways injurious to the Russian people. Indicative of this trend is the new popularity of the ideas of Petr Savitsky, who in the 1920s argued that Russia was a unique Eurasian civilization. n7 More extreme dissidents voice much more blatantly nationalist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, and urge Russia to redevelop its military strength and to establish closer ties with China and Muslim countries. The people of Russia areas divided as the elite. An opinion survey in European Russia in the spring of 1992 revealed that 40 percent of the public had positive attitudes toward the West and 36 percent had negative attitudes. As it has been for much of its history, Russia in the early 1990s is truly a torn country.

n7 Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," The National Interest, Summer 1992, pp. 47-51; Daniel Schneider, "A Russian Movement Rejects Western Tilt," Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 5, 1993, pp. 5-7.

To redefine its civilization identity, a torn country must meet three requirements. First, its political and economic elite has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about the move. Second, its public has to be willing to acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to be willing to embrace the convert. All three requirements in large part exist with respect to Mexico. The first two in largepart exist with respect to Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with respect to Russia's joining the West. The conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their major differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality and prosperity. A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia could have quite different goals. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be virtually impossible for him to do that with a Russian traditionalist. If, as the Russians stop behaving like Marxists, they reject liberal democracy and begin behaving like Russians but not like Westerners, the relations between Russia and the West could again become distantand conflictual. n8

n8 Owen Harries has pointed out that Australia is trying (unwisely in his view) to become a torn country in reverse. Although it has been a full member not only of the West but also of the ABCA military and intelligence core of the West, its current leaders are in effect proposing that it defect from the West, redefine itself as an Asian country and cultivate close ties with its neighbors. Australia's future, they argue, is with the dynamic economies of East Asia. But, as I have suggested, close economic cooperation normally requires a common cultural base. In addition, none of the three conditions necessary for a torn country to join another civilization is likely to exist in Australia's case.

THE CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC CONNECTION THE OBSTACLES TO non-Western countries joining the West vary considerably. Theyare least for Latin American and East European countries. They are greater for the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union. They are still greater for Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Japan has established a uniqueposition for itself as an associate member of the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions. Those countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or cannot, join the West compete with the West by developing their own economic, military and political power. They do this by promoting their internal development and by cooperating with other non-Western countries. The most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power.

Almost without exception, Western countries are reducing their military power; under Yeltsin's leadership so also is Russia. China, North Korea and several Middle Eastern states, however, are significantly expanding their military capabilities. They are doing this by the import of arms from Western and non-Western sources and by the development of indigenous arms industries. One result is the emergence of what Charles Krauthammer has called "Weapon States," and the Weapon States are not Western states. Another result is the redefinition of arms control, which is a Western concept and a Western goal. During the Cold War the primary purpose of arms control was to establish a stable military balance between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. In the post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts to do this through international agreements, economic pressure and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies.

The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely, although not exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal. The West promotes nonproliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm. It also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. The attention of the Wests focuses, naturally on nations that are actually or potentially hostile to the West.

The non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert their right to acquire andto deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for their security. They also have absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the Indian defense minister when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf War: "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are viewed, probably erroneously, as the potential equalizer of superior Western conventional power. China, of course, already hasnuclear weapons; Pakistan and India have the capability to deploy them. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria appear to be attempting to acquire them. Atop Iranian official has declared that all Muslim states should acquire nuclear weapons, and in 1988 the president of Iran reportedly issued a directive callingfor development of "offensive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological weapons."

Centrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained expansion of China's military power and its means to create military power. Buoyed by spectacular economic development, China is rapidly increasing its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the modernization of its armed forces. It is purchasing weapons from the former Soviet states; it is developing long-range missiles; in 1992 it tested a one-megaton nuclear device. It is developing power-projection capabilities, acquiring aerial refueling technology, and trying to purchase an aircraft carrier. Its military buildup and assertion of sovereignty over the South ChinaSea are provoking a multilateral regional arms race in East Asia. China is alsoa major exporter of arms and weapons technology. It has exported materials to Libya and Iraq that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons and nerve gas. It has helped Algeria build a reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and production. China has sold to Iran nuclear technology that American officials believe could only be used to create weapons and apparently has shipped components of 300-mile- range missiles to Pakistan. North Korea has had a nuclear weapons program under way for some while and has sold advanced missiles and missile technology to Syria and Iran. The flow of weapons and weapons technology is generally from East Asia to the Middle East. There is, however, some movement in the reverse direction; China has received Stinger missiles fromPakistan.

A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into being, designed topromote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military powers of the West. It may or may not last. At present, however, it is, as Dave McCurdy has said, "a renegades' mutual support pact, run by the proliferators and their backers." A new form of arms competition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the West. Inan old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new form of arms competition, one side is developing its arms and the other side is attempting not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms build-up while at the same time reducing its own military capabilities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST THIS ARTICLE DOES not argue that civilization identities will replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civilization will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization will not conflict with and even fight each other. This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Westerncivilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects; successful political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groupsin different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and mostdangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars; the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest"; the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.

This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be like. Ifthese are plausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary to consider their implications for Western policy. These implications should be divided between short-term advantage and long-term accommodation. In the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization, particularly between its European and North American components; to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of counter military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions.

In the longer term other measures would be called for. Western civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become modern without becoming Western. To date only Japan has fully succeeded in thisquest. Non-Western civilization will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth,technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. They will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture andvalues. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which willhave to learn to coexist with the others.

GRAPHIC: Photograph, Sarcophagus of Alexander, Late Fourth Century B.C., BY GIAMBERTO VANNI, FOR ART RESOURCE, NEW YORK; Map, no caption, Source: W. Wallace, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN EUROPE. London: Pinter, 1990. Map by Ib Ohlsson for FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

-- (Cán_Ngố_Ăn-Dải-Dút@BBP.govt), October 17, 2004.

Thằng chi bua bố mày dạy cho mày nhiều lần mà mày vẫn c̣n u tối quá con ạ. Làm đéo ǵ có truyện VNCH chạy xút quần, bàn cờ đă dọn song tụi VNCH đà ko đánh đấm ǵ, mày nói về những người dân miền Nam họ phải chạy rợ cộngt sản trên quê hượng họ v́ bọn Rợ Cộng Sản Khát Máu đă giết han`g vạn dân lành ko theo chúng bằng cách bắn đạo pháo của nga tầu v`o những gịng ngưo8`i Tỵ Na,n Rợ Cộng Sản. Ở Pleiku Kontum trong tháng 3 tụi CS chúng mày đă giết biết bao dân thiểu số v́ họ không theo chúng mày. Chúng mày đă ăn cướp thực phẩm của họ để đi tấn công nhữ!ng khu dân khác Cái mặt mày là 1 thằng đại ngu đại dốt và rất tí trá. Mẹ mày cả tỐi 29-4-75 O6ng Mày c̣n ngồi ở Sài G̣n Sờ Sờ có thằng vẹm nào giám vàọ Bọn Máy bay ConMa F-4 và A-7 Corsair II nó choảng Shrike Missile và Lazer Bomb vào mất dàn SAM 2 và Mấy Dàn Cao Sạ 100 mm điều khiển bằng Radar có thấy thằng Thọ thằng Zuẩn nói ǵ chỉ đƯa đít ra chịu trận Măi 10 Giờ Sánmg chúng O6ng đà1 ra Hạm Đội 7 mà cha con chúng mày tỪ Lê Đức Không Thọ Đến Lê DzUẩn, Văn Tiến Dzũng cũng ko dám vô sài G̣n V́ sO8. bị phục kích. Mày ăn nói dzốt nát mà cỨ đ̣i dzạy đờị

-- (ChoNhayBànDọ, October 17, 2004.

World Peace According to Chi bua and Jube, two die hard Vietnamese Cummunist Hard core Cadres :

===================================================================== ===================================================================== ===========================

From the records of the early history of man down to the present, leaders of society and government have expressed warnings about the dangers of internal subversion. As a means of maintaining the necessary degree of internal security, intelligence services have been formed. Conversely, would-be conquerors have stressed the value of infiltration and subversion as a means of softening the victim society prior to conquest. Members of the intelligence community will remember the writings of Sun Tzu in his 500 B.C. classic, The Art of War. In stressing The Art of War from within, Sun Tzu observed that supreme art in warfare is not winning every battle. He felt the supreme art was in getting the enemy to surrender without having to fight the battle.

It is of special interest to read the words of Marcus Tullius Cicero regarding the danger of internal subversion. In a speech to the Roman Senate, as recorded by Sallust, Cicero said:

"A nation can survive its fools and even the ambitious.But it cannot survive treason from within. An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and he carries his banners openly against the city. But the traitor moves among those within the gates freely, his sly whispers rustling through all alleys, heard in the very halls of government itself. For the traitor appears no traitor; he speaks in the accents familiar to his victim, and he wears their face and their garments and he appeals to the baseness that lies deep in the hearts of all men. He rots the soul of a nation; he works secretly and unknown in the night to undermine the pillars of a city; he infects the body politic so that it can no longer resist. A murderer is less to be feared. The traitor is the plague."

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Under a False Banner of "Peace" As any good student of history knows, we are not blazing new trails in our happenings. The wreckage of other ages and civilizations is about us to remind us of follies and the nature of our enemies.

In a war-weary Twentieth Century, people of good conscience yearn for peace. "Peace" is, of course, a wonderful word, having by itself an almost healing quality.

Unfortunately for us, however, communist semantics is something far too few people understand, and this includes people who are thought of as experts and specialists in foreign policy and the academe. To a Marxist-Leninist the term "peace" is both a tactical term and an objective.

Peace as a goal means Communist world control. But peace as a tactic means the temporary exclusion of military means of conflict, and reliance on "non-violent" means of conflict, by no means non-violent or peaceful, particulary what the intelligence community calls covert action. This includes all the techniques of secret political warfare to subvert and undermine non-Communist governments. It means propaganda, infiltration and subversion; it means the use of covert agents of influence who form a sort of fifth column to manipulate public opinion and policy; it means economic warfare; it means the use of terrorism to provoke overreaction and undermine public confidence in the ability of the government to protect its citizens. Imagine, all of this in the name of "peace"!

As a final reminder in this review of the dangerous folly of disarming before a powerful enemy, or turning our nations' armed services over to a world government, let's turn to the world of verse. In Kipling's "The Gods of the Copybook Headings", we read:

"When the Cambrian measures were forming, they promised perpetual peace,They swore, if we gave them our weapons, that the wars of the tribes would cease.But when we disarmed they sold us and delivered us bound to our foe,And the Gods of the Copybook

-- (ChoNhayBĂ nDọ, October 17, 2004.

Tam tinh ban doc , Chu dai-dut : Dit-me, chu nhat duoc o dau nhung bai viet dai-qua,lan sau viet ngan gon lai cho anh nho !

Chu loi thang Sam Huntington vo chuyen va con keo theo dai PBS -anh rat thuong coi TV,nhung chi coi cartoon va deo tin bon Media. Anh cung tin tuong rang thang Sam Havard deo phai nguoi Muslim ,nen di nhien no viet chuyen 1 chieu -one way only- Anh cung it thac -mac va deo co gi de ban tan .

Chu Doc am : Chu cung biet doc sach Goverment of Tibet in exile. Cuon sach nay chung to 1 dieu : The gioi la CA LON NUOT CA BE.

Viec Tau chiem Tay tang cung nhu Viet nam lay Chiem Thanh va Cambot -trong lich su nhan loai tu Dong sang Tay ,dau co gi khac nhau ? Tham-lam la cac chu de-cuoc da-trang chiem ca 2 dai luc vi dai la My Chau va Uc -chau.

Lich su cho thay 2 giong moi da-do( Indian o My ) va moi Uc ( Aborigine) hau nhu khong co tieng noi trong chinh quyen so-tai ngay nay . Day la viec ca lon giet ca be da man nhat lich-su nhan loai. Nhung chung ta phai chap nhan va vui -song . Anh phai cuoi 1 con vo ban thiu ,hoi nach nguoi Indian o Okalahoma , toi nghiep Da-do !

-- chi-bua (, October 17, 2004.

The gioi la CA LON NUOT CA BE. Nên chuyện : "Tuấn, 20 tuổi, trên đường trở về nhà sau khi dự sinh nhật bạn ḿnh tại Đại học Y khoa mang tên Pavlov, đi ra bến tầu điện ngầm gần Quảng trường Lev Tolstoi th́ bất ngờ bị một đám người từ 16 đến 18 tên, mặc quần áo đen, đuổi đánh và dùng dao đâm nhiều nhát làm Tuấn chết ngay tại chỗ. "là thường t́nh tại sao mà bọn du sinh của Cháu Hồ xạo Hết Chỗ Nói (CHXHCN) khóc lóc than "chúng em chỉ lo học sao nỡ giết chúng em ? .

Thật hèn nhác .Sao không rủ nhau kiếm mấy thằng "Đầu trọc" trả thù ?. Ơ Mỹ nếu có một học sinh VNCH bị tụi Mễ hay Mỹ đen ăn hiếp là toàn thể học sinh VNCH khác lại xin tí huyết liền ,đó mới tự hào là VN .

-- thich du thu (, October 17, 2004.

ChoNhayBĂ nDọ tôi đồng ư với anh chi bua, anh lấy chữ đè người như thế th́ ai mà nói lại được với anh. Lần sau tôi có một đề nghị nho nhỏ thôi, anh tự mà đọc mấy bài (rất hay) này, rồi tóm tắt lại cho chúng tôi hay, sau đó th́ tŕnh bày: tại sao bài này lại giúp chứng minh lập luận của anh, và trích dẫn từ bài viết nguyên thủy nếu cần thiết.

Sự thật là tôi không dám đọc hết v́ không có thời gian, nhưng lướt qua tôi thấy cách nghĩ này về chiến tranh sắc tộc không có ǵ mới. Chính tôi cũng đă nói với anh trong bài của tôi, là chiến tranh Mỹ-Ả Rập là chiến tranh tôn giáo, nhưng cuối cùng th́ nó cũng kéo theo dân tộc, văn hóa và tài chính v́ các nước ả rập coi chính trị và tôn giáo là một (không như tây âu, ví dụ ở Pháp th́ tôn giáo và chính trị đă bị chia ra từ lâu, để giảm bớt quyền lực của thiên chúa giáo trong chính phủ, cho đến ngày này các trường cấp 3 của Pháp cũng vẫn rất sợ nói chuyện chính trị/tôn giáo có màu sắc trong lớp học).

Trên phương diện này, Mỹ đă làm cho các ông ả rập bị bẽ mặt khi họ dằn mặt afghanistan và iraq, và là vị cứu tinh duy nhất của kuwait khiến nước này mang ơn bất đắc dĩ. Mấy nước ả rập có khoái ǵ Mỹ đâu, nhưng v́ Mỹ vẫn c̣n rất mạnh, cho nên đành câm miệng. Vài chục năm nữa khi TQ lên làm siêu cường quốc mà dám thách thức Mỹ th́ họ mới dám hé lời. Đến lúc đấy chưa biết mèo nào cắn mửu nào.

Chuyện cá lớn nuốt cá bé th́ lịch sử có đầy. Việt Nam chiếm Chàm th́ tôi, nếu với tư cách người ngoài cuộc, sẽ phải bảo là sai. Nhưng có làm ǵ được đâu?

Điều tôi muốn nhấn mạnh là ngay cả khi Liên Hợp Quốc đă được thành lập mà các nước vẫn tự do chiếm lẫn nhau như vậy th́ chứng tỏ thế giới vẫn rất bất công, các đại đế quốc vẫn chiếm lĩnh số đông trong các tổ chức thế giới, hầu hết đều nắm quyền veto.

Coi Trung Quốc chiếm Tây Tạng như vậy rơ ràng la sai nhưng thế giới có nói ǵ được đâu? V́ Trung Quốc to quá, mất trung quốc th́ nhu cầu kinh tế thế giới sụp liền. Đầu vào của Mỹ, các anh điền chủ thương nhân đâu có chịu mất mối làm ăn dễ như vậy. Cho nên nếu mà có bỏ phiếu thông qua cấm vận ǵ đi nữa, th́ mấy ông điền chủ có tay chân ở trong thượng/hạ viện đâu có chịu. Nhưng chiến tranh ở Iraq th́ khác. Chính v́ ở đó có miếng ngon, có món nhắm để nhậu, cho nên mấy ông tha hồ bỏ phiếu để nhào vào kiếm lời.


Độc Ẩm Cũng Thú, I apologize to have confused you by an obviously- stupid statement of mine, that the Chinese will get out of Tibet once America gets out of Iraq. Yes that was very naive.

What I was trying to point towards, is the fact that China takes over Tibet for its excellent defensive status, with which China can easily pay surveillance over the world without the use of satellites, and readily mount missiles for launch to anywhere in the world within minutes of order. This is an immense advantage, when China and Communism were on the low end of the everybody's best-friends list.

So then I will change my statement to thus: The further involvement of America in international affairs by the usage of forceful military overpowerment, examples of which are the Iraq war and the Afghan war, is certainly not helping the Tibets in their struggle for freedom, if not reducing it by a significant chunk for the Chinese are now more than ever fully convinced that they should at all times be extremely vigilant for foreign invaders like the US, who proclaims preemptive warfare at its leisure.

-- Jube (Jube@Jube.Jube), October 17, 2004.

Nhan tien wêk-end nen anh du da thoi gio de dau-khau voi cac chu : chu Thich -du thu :

-Chu da lam lan giua chuyen ki-thi va chuyen Ca-lon -nuot ca-be! "Ca lon nuot ca-be la su sinh-ton cua dong vat,con nguoi va thien-nhien khai-trien va bien doi cua doi-song con cho ta thay : Doi khi ca an kien va doi khi kien an ca .

Vi-du : con ca Tau Cho-lon nam trong o kien VN thi bi kien VN an - nhung khi con kien VN (lao dong o Taiwan ) lot vao bien ca Tau thi di nhien ca Tau an ...kien VN .

Ki-thi la thoi-xau ,nhung luat thien nhien Ca lon nuot ca be kho thay doi duoc .

Chu Ban-doc cung da thau nhan duoc ti hieu biet , tuy nhien chu noi rang nguoi ta phai cho doi 50 nam nua moi thay su vi dai cua Tau, thuc te thi My da ne mat Tau ke tu 1999 tu ngay Hongkong trao tra cho Tau [ US did showed his respect to China when Hongkong was returned to China.

Chu Jub : - Tranh-luan voi nhung ke cung dau doi khi ho khong hieu , tuy nhien duong ta ta cu di, cam on chu voi quan niem phong khoang . Discussion with the hard-headed people is hard to get. Be on your way , thanks for your open-minded ideas.

-- chi-bua (, October 17, 2004.

Chí Bựa hỏi thật Chí Bựa bao nhiêu tuổi mà lư sự như đứa lên năm vậy ? .Show up you are man not kid !!! 16-18 đứa đánh một thằng có gọi là cá lớn nuốt cá bé không ?

Tại sao tụi nó giết thằng Tuấn ? lại là câu hỏi khác ,kỳ thị ,nghen tức ,hay là tụi du sinh kiêu khích . . ..

Mấy thằng du sinh tại Nga là những thằng hèn ,không giám đánh lại chỉ khóc lóc ,tụi Nga nó có dùng súng để bắt mấy thằng du sinh ở nước nó không ? hay là phải đóng tiền xin nó cho ở lại học ? cũng như Chí Bựa bảo ghét Mỹ sao không về VN hay Tàu Phù mà ở ? Mỹ nó cho ở v́ lư do nhân đạo giống như kẻ ăn mày vậy mà làm tàng .Lúc làm giấy tờ th́ thề thốt nhận trung thành với nước Mỹ bây giờ lại nói ngượng nói ngạo như bọn VC hô đánh Mỹ cút ngụy nhào rồi quỳ lạy Mỹ Ngụy .

-- thich du thu (, October 17, 2004.

Bo-khi , chu Thich du thu van co-y khong hieu anh noi.

Giai thich ki hon chut nua :

-Chinh phu Nga va dan-toc Nga van chong -doi va bat bo tu nhung thang skin-head pham-pham .

Nhung thang nay thuoc nhom New-Nazi -chong chinh-phu va ki-thi nguoi da -mau [ Da den ,da vang ]

Con sau lam rau noi canh , giong nhu bon KKK o My chuyen mon ki thi dan danh-ca o 5 bang My [ Texas, Lousiana,Mississippi , Alabama va Florida ] Chung no van con do ,nhung rut vao bong toi. Cho doi co -hoi thuan-tien lai tiep-tuc lo mat ra lam bay....

Bon New-Nazi co mat o hau het cac cuoc -gia Au Chau , o cac thanh pho lon, chung la thieu -so qua-khich nhung hen nhat , khi bi tom co chung thuong do loi cho nhau ,khong dua nao nhan toi....

Cai chet cua sinh vien Tuan cung la bai hoc cho tat ca nhung nguoi da-vang song xa que-huong phai biet doan-ket va thuong nhau hon . [ o Nga,Au chau hay o My ,cung vay thoi .]

Van de: Chi-bua khong bao gio ghet nuoc My , nhung phan doi nhung chinh-sach ngu-xuan cua chinh-phu My lam thiet hai quyen-loi cua nguoi dan My. [ Vi Chi -bua la nguoi My da vang ]

Chu phai hieu rang chinh-phu My va dan-toc My la 2 thai-cuc hoan -toan khac -nhau.

Chinh-phu My 100% muon lam canh-sat cuoc te ,lam anh-Hai de kiem soat the-gioi, nhung dan -toc My chan ghet chien tranh chi muon hoa-binh , di cay kiem dollar song an toan ....tren 85% dan My khong ai muon chien-tranh ,chi mot thieu-so chung 15% dan My thich chien -tranh vi chung no la dealer sung ,dan song nho chien-tranh [ mot kieu business ngon lanh , ba con cu viec giet nhau ,chung toi cu viec thau dollars !! !

Them vao do, dang Cong Hoa cua George Bush cung bao gom nhieu tay mau mat dealer sung bom dan .... income business tinh bang tien trieu dollars .....hang nam.

-- chi-bua (, October 17, 2004.

Anh thich du thu: người việt nam ở Mỹ đông hơn người Việt Nam ở Nga rất nhiều. Nếu bọn đầu trọc mà lộng hành ở Cali th́ anh phải biết điều ǵ sẽ xảy ra chứ??? Nhưng đây là Nga, sinh viên sang Nga học không phải là mấy thằng hèn rỗi rồi bỏ nước nhà mà đi t́m chỗ tốt hơn để sinh sống. Tụi nó cũng chả phải đầu gấu anh hùng ǵ.

Cảnh Sát Nga th́ tham nhũng và phân biệt đối xử khủng khiếp anh không biết đâu. 3 bà cô tôi ở St Petersburg có kể về mấy vụ ăn vạ ở Sân Bay, mẹ tụi nó anh mà là người Việt mà vào sân bay Nga một lần thôi th́ anh hết muốn vào lại, bà cô tôi mang có mấy cây rau quả từ bến tre mang lên thôi mà bị tụi nó đ́ cho hơn 5 tiếng đồng hồ! Trong khi bọn tàu bọn nhật th́ đi ra đi vô tự do.

Cho nên chuyện người Việt ở nước ngoài bị "thịt" th́ ngoài người việt ra, bọn quốc tế đếch thèm quan tâm. Nói thẳng là như vầy.

Về chuyện bọn thanh niên ở Cali tôi nói thẳng, tụi nó đi thịt người ta th́ có, chứ làm ǵ có chuyện tây tàu bước vào little saigon mà thịt người Việt? Có một số đứa bị cha mẹ nhồi nhét ư thức về hận thù vớ vẩn, chưa chắc tụi nó đă giúp sinh viên VN từ trong nước qua, mặc dù là sinh viên này chả có dính dáng ǵ tới đảng hay nhà nước VN.

-- Jube (Jube@Jube.Jube), October 18, 2004.

Ông bà bảo nhập gia tùy tùng .Dân tộc nào cũng có những thành kiến đối kỵ nhất là đối với dân tộc khác màu .Người Việt có được ngày hôm nay ở hải ngọai là một sự cố gắng du nhập vào đời sống dân địa phương ,biết tôn trọng những luật lệ của họ .Làm cho người thương th́ khó làm cho người ghét th́ dễ .

Chuyện bên Nga tôi hằng nghe dân Nga và cảnh sát Nga kỳ thị và đánh đập những người CHXHCN (người Việt quốc gia tỵ nạn không ai ở Nga cả).Tại sao không ai tự đặt vấn đề tại sao họ ghét ? .

Tại sao người CHXHCN không làm cho họ thương ? làm cho họ kính trọng ? tại sao không làm cho họ thấy ḿnh là thành phầ tốt cho xă hội họ ? tại sao thấy họ ghét mà vẫn tiếp tục qua Nga vừa du học vừa sinh sống ? người Nga đâu trải chiếu hoa mời .

Nếu bảo bị cộng sản bắt qua Nga trả nợ th́ tôi chịu c̣n không tại sao lại thích ở một quốc gia mà họ không thích ,họ thù ghét ?

-- thich du thu (, October 18, 2004.

Dit-me ,chu Thich -du thu noi chuyen rat hoi-nach va ngo-ngan ....

Nhung sinh vien du hoc the gioi ( Nga , My ,Tau ,Au chau....) da so khong dinh liu gi den chinh-tri -CongSan hay khong Cong San ...

Ngay ca nhung thanh nien , thieu nu VN co phu huynh lam viec cho chanh quyen Cong San , nhung tu tuong cua ho da so khong ai de y den chinh -tri , ho chi muon vui song va di hoc !

Mot cach trung-dung ,sinh vien Tuan bi bon skin-head giet o Nga-So cung la mot su hi -sinh de thuc tinh nhung nguoi VN khac phai biet thuong nhau , doan-ket voi nhau , giup do lan nhau khi cung 1 mau da , mot tieng noi....

Nhung ke thien can nhu chu Thich du -thu khong bao gio nhin vao su -that , cho doi den khi con gai cua chu Thich -du thu bi my-den ham hiep va giet chet , vut xac vao thung rac thi chu moi thay loi anh Chi-bua la dung ?

Cac chu Cong-tru co hieu anh noi gi khong ?

-- chi-bua (, October 18, 2004.

Dit-me ,chu Chí Bu65 mi ngố noi chuyen rat hoi-nach va ngo-ngan .... Nhung sinh vien CHXHCN du hoc the gioi ( Nga , My ,Tau ,Au chau....) da so dinh liu den chinh-tri -CongSan hay Tàu Phù...

Ngay ca nhung thanh nien , thieu nu VN co phu huynh lam viec cho chanh quyen Cong San , nhung tu tuong cua ho da so de y den chinh - tri , ho chi muon vui song di hoc về phục vụ cái đảng ăn cướp sán lải cộng sản và tiếp tục cái sứ mạnh bóc lột dân Việt !

Mot cach trung-dung ,sinh vien Tuan bi bon skin-head giet o Nga-So cung la mot su hi -sinh de thuc tinh nhung nguoi CHXHCN khac phai biet thuong nhau , doan-ket voi nhau , giup do lan nhau khi cung 1 mau da , mot tieng noi đừng a ṭng với bố mẹ chúng ăn xương ăn máu đồng bào Việt .

Nhung ke thien can nhu chu Chí Bự mi ngố khong bao gio nhin vao su - that , cho doi den khi con gai cua chu Chí Bựa mi ngố bi my-den ham hiep va giet chet , vut xac vao thung rac thi chu moi thay loi Bác Thich Du Thứ la dung ?

Cac chu Cong-nhi đồng co hieu Bác noi gi khong ?

-- thich đu thu (, October 18, 2004.

Theo chi bua mi ngố65 nó thích Nga lắm, đéo mẹ mày thằng na9`m xó nhà hay nói chuyện trên trời dưới biển mà ko hiểu 1 tư síu nào, thằng ngu như con ḅ, cho tha9`ng chi bua sang Nga học cho tụi neo nazi nó làm thịt cho hết cái đời mê Nga với AK-47 thằng hại dân hại nước , bây giờ nó c̣n nick giáo hoàn g ko hay hay là thằng dúp. Ko chóng th́ chầy INS sẽ tống khứ nó về Việt Nam ở với thằng Hồ Chủ Địt con mẹ già nhà nó đó là NEw W orld Order cho thằng ăn cháo đá bát chí cùn lực kiệt

-- (ChoNhayBĂ nDọ, October 18, 2004.


-- Bỏ4 (, October 19, 2004.

Tai -sao chu Bo4 khinh -bi tong-thong My ? Con da-nhan [ape ] va Tong thong Bush la mot ?

-- chi-bua (, October 23, 2004.

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