In 1895, tried to pass an act that imposed income taxes on the interest and dividends of U S citizens on deposit in U S banks. This act was immediately struck down in Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. 157 US 429 wherein the SC ruled that it was unconstitutional to impose an income tax on the interest and dividends of United States citizens on deposits in US banks. The court ruled that the tax was unconstitutional because it was a direct tax that was not apportioned as required by the Constitution. This decision has never been overturned.

Then, in 1913 Congress passed the 16th Amendment which says: "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment(without equal division) among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration."-(designated list)

So, that changed everything, right?

That's not what the SC ruled, in Brushaber v. Union Pacific RR Co. and in Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., is that since the provisions of Article 1, requiring that direct taxes be apportioned were not appealed, they are still in full force and effect. And, that since the language of the 16th specifies that the income tax is to be a tax without apprtionment, then it cannot be a direct tax, because otherwise the Constitution would inherently contradict itself, which cannot be allowed to happen. Article 1 cannot prohibit direct taxation unless apportioned, while th 16th grants the power to lay direct taxes without apportionment, because then the Constitution would inherently contradict itself, and could no longer serve as a valid foundation for our Law. So, to specifically prevent the Constitution from contradicting itself, the SC ruled that since the 16th provides for an income tax without apportionment, then the income tax cannot be a direct tax.

But there are only two major classes of taxation authorized in the Constitution ; direct taxes and indirect taxes. So, if the income tax cannot be a direct tax, then it must be an indirect tax.

Indirect taxes are classified into three minor categories in the Constitution: Impost, duties, and excises. The income tax started in 1861 as an Income Duty, imposed only on foreign imports, so obviously it was contained and and allowed within the Constitutional category of duties. As a duty it was only imposed on the flow of foreign goods into America, NOT DOMESTIC GOODS, NOR DOMESTIC INCOME.

Obviously today, the income tax is not currently being enforced as a duty, so the questions are: Did the 16th create a new congressional power to tax directly?, and: How did the 16th change the income tax?

The answer to the first question was supplied by the SC in Satnton v. Baltic Mining Co. 240 US 112 (1916) stating:

"..by the previous ruling, it was settled that the 16th amendment conferred no new power of taxation but simply prohibited the previus complete and plenary(full) power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being TAKEN OUT of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged.."

The SC clearly states the the 16th did NOT create a new power to tax the people in a direct fashion without apportionment, as is fraudently claimed by the IRS.

-- KoFE (your@town.USSA), May 01, 2001

Answers

Caesar takes what Caesar wants... unless you choose to remove yourself from Caesar's grasp.

Memoirs of a Tax Protester

[Editor's note: What you are about to read is a true story from the front lines of the Great American Tax $windle, written by an underground author who -- for reasons that will become obvious -- wishes to remain anonymous. Address feedback to parascope@aol.com.]

I used to pay income tax. The IRS used to take a big chunk out of my paycheck. Most of it went straight to the Federal Reserve to service the interest on the escalating national debt. The rest went into an alphabet soup of federal agencies, many of which I had no desire to fund with my hard-earned money. And while taxes on my labor kept going up, the taxes on the corporate entities I worked for stayed the same or even dropped. After a while, it just didn't make a whole lot of sense anymore.

It took me a long time to learn the full extent to which American citizens have been deceived regarding the true nature of the income tax. And it took even longer to learn how to avoid the pitfalls inherent with being blacklisted as a "tax protester." But consider this: I haven't paid taxes since 1988. Believe me, it's worth the effort. It is a lot of effort, but that's life -- freedom requires eternal vigilance.

The evolution of the income tax in America is hidden in the shadows of history. But every long journey begins somewhere, so let's start with the U.S. Constitution:

--Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned...

--The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect taxes...

--The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or emuneration.

These three crucial components of our Constitution, in theory, work together in harmony. But in reality, they are rife with contradictions. Point by point:

--Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned...

Over the life of our nation, Congress has tried unsuccessfully to implement a direct tax, and these attempts have always eventually been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. So, at the moment, we need not worry about the application of a direct tax.

--The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect taxes...

Currently, taxes are collected by the Internal Revenue Service, a supposed indirect agency of the Executive Branch. People might ask how our federal government allows this blatant violation of the Constitution. To grant the Treasury the power to collect taxes is by Congress' own words unconstitutional, and this Congressional standing has been upheld as law since 1787. (Starting to get confused yet?) Now let's look at the 16th Amendment:

--The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or emuneration.

Sounds pretty powerful doesn't it? But how come the 16th Amendment didn't affect the other two Constitutional clauses on taxation?

Would you believe me if I told you that the Supreme Court concluded long ago that the 16th Amendment had no change or affect on the Constitution? It's actually wasted print. No joke.

Now I must warn you, unless you're courageous enough to bear the title of "tax protester" on your IRS tax record, you won't ask these questions of the IRS. The average person would think that the answers would be so simple and obvious that the IRS wouldn't resort to harassment tactics to avoid answering them. If you ask these questions and are fortunate enough to get an IRS worker on a good day, they'll send you a tax protester form letter telling you that they have the authority to do whatever the hell they want, and that they can find a judge willing to prove it if you dare ask again.

After my first futile attempts to get a straight answer from the IRS, I knew that I would have to find the truth on my own. Convinced that the IRS was hiding something by their shady responses to my inquiries, I took all my savings -- about $500 -- and hit several used book stores to grab any and every book that might contain a clue.

It didn't take long to figure out that public libraries often sell their "Do Not Circulate" books to local used book stores. I had found my gold mine. At the end of three days, I had accumulated a library of sixty of the best books an American could ever have.

With my army of books on Constitutional issues, I dug in for a year-long investigation. I started with the Federalist debates and discovered the difference between internal and external taxes and direct and indirect taxes. I proceeded along to early Congressional records, where I discovered Congress' declaration in 1787 that passing tax collection to the department of the treasury (IRS) is unconstitutional.

Naturally, this led to even more questions. I had to turn to the Supreme Court for answers. From my reading, I discovered the Pollock decision, which declared direct taxes -- including income taxes -- to be unconstitutional.

This case resulted in Congress passing the 16th Amendment. With the 16th Amendment in hand, Congress thought it had outsmarted the Supreme Court... until 1916, when the Supreme Court declared in the Brushaber case that the 16th Amendment did not change the Constitution, since the Amendment only applied to excise taxes which the U.S. government already had the power to assess and collect without apportionment.

By then I was REALLY getting confused. Here was all this history and precedent stacked up against the income tax. I had also come across case after case in which various courts had repeatedly affirmed that the income tax applied only to gains and profits, not to compensation for labor -- a fundamental Right which cannot be legally taxed. The Courts even agreed that the tax on one's labor (all of a person's compensation) was a tax on total receipts and thus was also unconstitutional.

I knew there had to be an explanation for how the IRS could make their income tax stick. While reviewing my research material, I remembered the definition of "internal" and "external" tax. After remembering that "internal" taxes originate from within the States and that "external" taxes originate from the Federal government, it dawned on me that there was a problem with the Federal "internal" income tax. I had to dig through the Constitution to find the answer.

It took several months of digging and reading, but over time I found several Supreme Court cases that hinted that something was going on which enabled the Federal government to bypass the Constitution, to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court. But how could this legally be done?

The door finally opened when I read Downes v. Bidwell, in which Justice Harlan explained the existence of two national governments. A quick rereading of the Constitution allowed me to locate the loophole. I now realized that the Federal income tax was, in essence, a tax on the incomes of citizens of the District government -- that is, Washington D.C. and its Territories, such as Guam, Puerto Rico and Wake Island. But how could Citizens of the States be classified as Federal citizens, and when did this happen?

The answer is rooted in the 14th Amendment, which apparently was never ratified, but nevertheless holds full force and effect of law. The 14th Amendment, which was drafted and "ratified" specifically for the purpose of granting 2nd class federal citizenship for the freed slaves, has been deliberately misconstrued to assume that all Americans become Federal citizens. This Amendment gave Federal District citizenship to those persons, namely those of African blood who were slaves, but who did not qualify for State citizenship under existing law. Since the Federal Congress has Absolute Legislative power over Federal (District) citizens, it can rule over them the same way each State can rule within their borders. But Congress has one additional advantageous power that the States do not have.

The Bill of Rights does not apply to 14th Amendment district citizens. (This prompted the creation of Civil Rights for Federal citizens, but still does not guarantee even the most basic Constitutional protections.)

So that was the hidden secret that allowed Congress to apply unconstitutional law upon U.S. citizens (district citizens). But another question remained unanswered: How do laws such as the Federal Internal Income tax reach into the States in defiance of Constitutional restrictions?

After more research, I learned that in 1939, Congress established the Public Salary Tax Act to tax any and all federal workers. Congress was, at the time, unable to impede within the States and tax their federal workers. So in 1940, Congress passed the Buck Act, which authorized them to reach into the domain of the States and impose the Public Salary Tax Act, thus forcing federal employees working within a State to pay this Federal Salary Tax. (Notice that they didn't call it income.) At the time, only 3 to 5 percent of the American population was required to pay a salary or income tax to the Federal government. But that's how the Feds got their foot in the States' door. And thanks to FDR and World War II, the income tax snowballed into the beast we have to contend with today.

In 1942, Congress needed money for the war effort and passed a Constitutional two-year income tax called the Victory Tax. FDR invented the Voluntary W-4 Tax Withholding system, making income tax and withholdings mandatory for all citizens of the Union. Again, this was a two-year tax, and as expected, both the Victory tax and W-4 withholdings legislation were repealed by Congress in 1944.

Unfortunately, they forgot to tell America.

Under the disguise of the 1913 Internal Income tax, the machinery of the Victory tax remained in operation. Voluntary compliance with the Federal internal income tax jumped from an anemic 5 percent to a robust 60 percent in a matter of a couple years via the repealed Victory tax system of tax collection.

By using two illegitimate tax systems, Congress created the beast we have today, taxing us under rates and conditions exceeding those which prompted the Boston Tea Party and the Declaration of Independence.

You may have heard the rumblings, a whisper here, a thinly-veiled news report there. IRS Commissioners complain that 34 million Americans no longer file personal income taxes. Most people are smart enough to see the obvious flip side of those figures: 30 to 40 percent of America doesn't file and pay the Federal income tax.

I fall in that 30 to 40 percent category. I am often questioned by people about how I have "survived" non-compliance for nearly a decade without going to prison. Although this is an easy question for me to answer, it's very difficult for most people to understand.

By understanding my status as a citizen of the States, by knowing how to exercise my Rights under the Constitution, and by knowing who the Federal Internal Income tax does apply to, I have been able to stand up to the IRS without flinching. Some have accused me of being unAmerican. My response to those critics: If I commit fraud against you, you send me to jail. When did participating in government fraud become one's patriotic duty?

Besides, knowledge of the truth is empowering. For example, I know I can sue any IRS employee who violates my Rights. This seems to strike terror to Revenue employees. You see, the IRS is legal fiction. Their employees cry wolf, assuming you'll take their bait. But when you request signatures on all communication or notify them that you record your phone calls, a miraculous transformation of their attitude occurs.

Another example: If you understand how the Code of Federal Regulations works and discover that the policing and collection powers that the IRS claims to have were only delegated to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, IRS agents tend to quickly reassign your case to another unsuspecting minion of the agency.

If they know you understand your Rights, their only resort is to what I call "faxscimile warfare." This is where the think tank of the IRS bombards you with Civil Notices which are not signed or connected with any employee's name. Usually, there isn't a return address to specifically reply to or a phone number to call the person assessing you with yet another groundless penalty.

I found it quite easy to stop this type of harassment by responding to them with questions about the purpose of the assessment. This puts a wrench in their trickery, since they are required to respond as part of the Civil procedure. The response, if there ever is one, is usually another form letter stating that you are a tax protester and that there is no legal requirement for them to answer your questions. Whether such tactics will ever hold up in Court, I will never know. Echoing their thug-like threats, I've told them to take me to court, but they never seem willing to oblige me.

I don't hear much from the IRS these days. I occasionally get the $500 penalty notice for using "unreasonable excuses" like my Constitutional Rights to avoid the income tax. I can only guess that the IRS is only doing their job of running the numbers and maximizing revenues from an increasingly agitated tax base. I'm still waiting for the $500 penalty for breathing Federal air or not recycling the 1040 pamphlet they sent me several years ago. At this point, nothing would surprise me. But hopefully I won't run into anything I can't handle, either.

-- freddie the freeloader (freddiethefreeloader@aol.com), May 01, 2001.

That should read: In 1895, Congress.......

-- KoFE (your@town.USSA), May 01, 2001.

Well, KoFE, I really like the part about "That's not what the SC ruled, in Brushaber v. Union Pacific RR Co. and in Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., is that since the provisions of Article 1, requiring that direct taxes be apportioned were not appealed, they are still in full force and effect."

In one of our earlier discussions, I took the time to read Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., and quoted it to you. My recollection is that you neither recognized the case nor could understand it.

The case certainly says nothing about income tax.

-- E.H.Porter (just.wondering@about.it), May 02, 2001.

I got a great idea. Lets all QUIT paying for everything.

Ok,?

Now what?

-- sumer (shh@aoa.con), May 02, 2001.

http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2278/

The Cases....

United States v. Melton, No. 94-5535 (4th Cir. 1996) Argued that the law requiring them to pay taxes and file returns is unclear.

United States v. Ross, No. 93-1010 (7th Cir. 1995) Argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Indiana is not part of the United States, and because there were no regulations issued to implement the criminal statute under which he was convicted.

United States v. Gardell, No. 93-1916 (1st Cir. 1994) Argued that he has no obligation to pay taxes because he has "the Status of Freeman and . . . has no Contractual, Quasi-Contractual or implied agreements with the Federal Government."

United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1993) Argued that the district court did not have "inland jurisdiction," that wages are untaxable, that the income tax is voluntary, and that they were "Free Citizens of the Republic of Minnesota.

United States v. Steiner, 963 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1992) Argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over "sovereign citizens," that he was not a "taxpayer" under the federal tax laws, and that the word "includes" is a term of restriction, not expansion.

United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1991) Argued that there is no law imposing a tax on income, that "freeborn" state citizens are exempt from income tax, and that an individual is not a"person" under the tax code.

United States v. Saunders, 951 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1991) Argued that IRS summonses are invalid without an OMB control number, that the IRS lacks authority to issue and enforce summonses because no Treasury Delegation Orders were published in the Federal Register, and that the district court has no jurisdiction.

United States v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1991) Argued that he should be acquitted of tax evasion because the IRS failed to display OMB numbers on Form 1040 and because the IRS failed to publish Form 1040 in the Federal Register.

Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830 (2nd Cir. 1990) Argued that federal reserve notes are not taxable income, that the Constitution does not authorize an income tax, and that tax assessments are takings.

United States v. Bowers, 920 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1990) Argued that the IRS failed to comply with the publication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.

United States v. White, No. 89-10533 (9th Cir. 1990) Argued that there is no law requiring him, as "a sovereign citizen of the state of Nevada," to file income tax returns.

United States v. McDonald, No. 88-5239 (9th Cir. 1990) Argued that as a "white, natural born, state citizen," the income tax does not apply to him, that he is not a "person" or a "resident," and that the district court lacked jurisdiction.

In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1989) Argued that the Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize a direct non-apportioned tax on citizens residing in the United States.

Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1988) Argued that the Sixteenth Amendment was never legally ratified.

United States v. Genger, No. 87-1043 (9th Cir. 1988) Argued that the district court erroneously exercised admiralty jurisdiction over him, and that filing a federal tax return violated his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion.

McLaughlin v. United States, 832 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1987) Argued that the federal income tax is a contract, and that he didn't owe any tax because he rescinded the contract.

Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986) Argued that wages are not income under the tax code, and that the income tax is a taking.

United States v. Stahl, 792 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) Argued that the Sixteenth Amendment was never properly ratified.

Casper v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1986) Argued that wages are exchanges of property rather than taxable income.

Eicher v. United States, 774 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1985) Argued that the Fifth Amendment allowed him to withhold all financial information from his income tax return.

Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1985) Irwin Schiff offered $100,000 to anyone who could prove that the tax code requires individuals to pay income tax.

Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1985) Argued that he owed no taxes because he had not obtained any privilege from a governmental agency.

Charczuk v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1985) Argued that the Constitution does not authorize an income tax, that there is no law imposing an income tax, and that the definition of "income" is vague.

Ficalora v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984) Argued that Congress does not possess the constitutional authority to impose a "direct" tax, that no law makes any individual liable to pay a tax or excise on "taxable income," and that "income" has no defined meaning and is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite.

Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1984) Argued that they are exempt from federal taxation because they are "natural individuals" who have not "requested, obtained or exercised any privilege from an agency of government."

United States v. Condo, 741 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1984) Argued that Federal Reserve notes cannot be taxed, that the Sixteenth Amendment only allows taxing income from "sources," not persons, and that the word "includes" is a term of limitation, not expansion.

United States v. Heise, 709 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1983) Argued that his failure to file proper returns constituted a valid exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1983) Argued that he was a "nontaxpayer" because he did not enter a contract for government services, that the district court had no jurisdiction, and that the tax code violated his Fifth and Thirteenth Amendment rights.

McCann v. Greenway, 952 F. Supp. 647 (W.D. Mo. 1997) Argued that a state court lacked jurisdiction over him because the flag in the courtroom had yellow fringe on it, thus converting it into the "maritime flag of war."

United States v. Hartman, 915 F. Supp. 1227 (M.D. Fla. 1996) Argued that payment of income taxes is voluntary, and that summonses from the I.R.S. cannot be enforced without implementing regulations.

United States v. Rhodes, 921 F. Supp. 261 (M.D. Penn. 1996) Argued that "income" under the Sixteenth Amendment is limited to profit proceeding from property, and that he is not a "person" under the Internal Revenue Code.

United States v. Greenstreet, 912 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1996) Filed UCC-1 financing statements against federal employees. Argued that as a "white Preamble natural sovereign Common Law De Jure Citizen of the Republic/State of Texas," the district court lacked jurisdiction, that the case should be moved to "Our One Supreme Court for the Republic of Texas," and that fringe on an American flag denotes a court of admiralty.

Albers v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 95-3068 (D. Neb. 1996) Argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction, that they were non-resident aliens because Nebraska is not part of the United States, and that they did not fall within the provisions of the tax code.

Valldejuli v. Social Security Admin., No. 94-10051 (N.D. Fla. 1994) Argued that he was fraudulently induced into signing a "contract" with the Social Security Administration, and that he is a natural sovereign citizen of the United States who is not subject to the Social Security system.

United States v. Sato, 704 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ill. 1989) Argued that Congress' power to tax does not extend beyond the District of Columbia and other federal areas, and that the Sixteenth Amendment was never ratified lawfully.

United States v. House, 617 F. Supp 237 (W.D. Mich. 1985) Argued that the Sixteenth Amendment was never legally ratified.

Young v. Internal Revenue Service, 596 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Ind. 1984) Argued that the IRS was not created by "positive law," that the tax code does not apply to "sovereign citizens," that the tax code is a bill of attainder, and that the district court lacks jurisdiction.

Snyder v. United States, 596 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Ind. 1984) Argued that the I.R.S. is a private corporation and not part of the government of the United States.

McKinney v. Regan, 599 F. Supp. 126 (M.D. La. 1984) Argued that as a "Sovereign Individual," the "Common Law of the United States of America, a Republic" protected him from penalties for filing a frivolous tax return.

-- Buddy (buddydc@go.com), May 02, 2001.

http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html

-- Buddy (buddydc@go.com), May 02, 2001.

IS THE INCOME TAX LEGALLY ENFORCED ? or HOW OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ARE BEING LOST

The United States citizens have been cursed with the income tax since 1913 and observed litigation, adjudication, and incalculable absconding of moneys in the guise of "fair share", and with government internet sites of Tax Protester Hall of Shame and Tax Protester Frequently Asked Questions to assure the public that any and all questions regarding the legal status of the income tax on individuals from wages and salaries have been adjudicated and found unpersuasive. Is it possible that this conclusion might be erroneous? Allow me to string some legal points together so you can make your own judgment.

The Fifth Amendment mandates that all judicial proceedings must proceed by due process of law. Since all judges take an oath of office to uphold the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has additionally held that government employees who violate any law in the performance of duties do not represent the government, should we conclude that adjudication that is not within constitutional requirements nullifies any claim to jurisdiction? Sure it does. This is the only guarantee that a court of admiralty, a star chamber proceeding, a kangaroo court, or an arbitrary proceeding by whatever name does not occur. That court proceedings must be within constitutional provisions has been forcefully established by the Supreme Court. Muskrat v United States, 219 US 346; Smith v US, 360 US 1.

Due process requires the movant initiate a cause of action by a complaint, information, or indictment that enumerate every essential legal and factual step of an action--a prima facie case. They must aver the defendant was legally required to perform, or not perform, a specific act and that the defendant did, or did not, perform the stated act. The only questions that are before the court are the disagreements between the indictment/complaint and the response.

These legal points are basic fundamental tenants of pleading that any first year law student must learn. The provision dates from the Magna Carta: "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or deceased, or outlawed, or exiled, or anywise destroyed, nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by...the law of the land." To be sure, "due process" is the evolutionary heir to "law of the land." Constitution of the United States of America, United States Printing Office (1973), p 1137-1145. [The barons, at the point of a sword, forced King John to desist from arbitrary confiscation of goods in the guise of insatiable public necessity. The practice has returned and we call it the income tax.]

The Supreme Court has been more specific: The district court's jurisdiction for revenue cases must pertain to a law providing in its terms for revenue which is directly traceable to the constitutional power to lay and collect taxes. U.S. v Hill, 123 US 681. Defendants have written volumes on the inconsistent adjudication that the income tax is an excise tax, a direct tax, or is empowered by the 16th. Amendment. When inadequate pleadings are challenged, due process requires the movant to establish the authority for a tax, and whether it is an excise, a duty, a direct tax, or is authorized by the 16th Amendment. Spreckles Sugar v McClain, 192 US 397. Whether these conditions are enforced upon the IRS is an open question.

An indictment/information for willful failure to file income tax returns relies upon the phrase "as required by law." What law? Due process requires the IRS aver a law that imposes a lawful responsibility for filing tax forms. Notification of legal responsibility is "the first essential of due process of law." Connally v General Construction Co., 269 US 385, 391. If there is no legal requirement for an individual to pay a tax, the citizen is free to do as he wishes. Flora v US, 362 US 145.

A complaint filed for a court to enforce an IRS summons is no different. 26 USC §7602, the only statute listed in the complaint, empowers the IRS to issue a summons. This is a power that is applicable to all revenue taxes; it is not an authorized purpose. Ref. Boyd v US, 116 US 616, 627. If the history of §7602 is traced through the 1954 code rewriting that made "no material change", all three source paragraphs incorporated into §7602 required the object of the summons be shown "liable by law." The legislated purpose for the Secretary is to "collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws." 26 USC §6301. The IRS has eighty or so taxes they enforce. Legal liability for all of them ---except the income tax---is clearly stated, i.e., 26 USC §§4061, 4071, 4081, 4091 etc. A complaint that lists only the power of a summons has not averred an authorized purpose as required by the LaSalle/Powers cases.

The Englishman William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, made an eloquent contrast of authority and power 200 years ago: "The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." If society has regressed to where power alone is sufficient for government action, we have a police state.

Various subterfuges are used to avoid a demand to aver a law declaring the legal liability of a citizen. If the defendant brings the discrepancy to the attention of the court in an action to enforce a summons, the court responds that the summons is to determine the liability from the defendant's books and records. The court has made a play on words. It has corrupted the attempt to determine a legal liability into a question of factual liability.

The court will even say "Respondent argues that the Federal Government does not have the authority to levy and collect income taxes from individuals." You had merely asked to see their authority and they won't show it to you. They say in effect: "We have the authority and we don't have to show you." The court will then impose sanctions for raising such a "frivolous" issue.

Tax court is the epitome of subterfuges. Tax court is an Article II agency of the Executive branch of government staffed with IRS agents akin to a zoning board. You are not entitled to a trial by jury, it is not empowered to hear challenges to the tax code, you are guilty as accused and must prove your innocence, and you, as a petitioner, cannot challenge jurisdiction. If you do not volunteer to forfeit your constitutional rights, the only way to challenge an IRS assessment is after seizure.

The IRS will argue before the jury in an Article III court (who are all individuals who file 1040's and have never been roughed up by the IRS) that the defendant filed 1040's in previous years, and he knew he had to file for the missing years. Even letters to your congressman requesting the statute imposing legal liability, forwarded to the IRS for answering, respond that this is a question for a court to decide. Several sections of the IRS code include phrases such as "any person made liable" or "every person liable" must do thus and thus. Who is liable? Not a clue.

Title 26 USC §7701(a)(14) identifies a "taxpayer" as a person who is legally required to pay a tax. A person who is not legally required by an unambiguous statute to pay a tax is not a taxpayer. Spreckles Sugar v McClain, 192 US 397; Miller v Standard Nut Margarine, 284 US 498; Gould v Gould, 245 US 151. Further, the IRS does not have authority over any individual who is not a taxpayer, or is claimed to be a taxpayer, or holds information on a putative taxpayer. Botta v Scanlon, 288 F2d 504; Economy Plumbing v US, 470 F2d 585.

A signature on a tax form that asks for the "taxpayer's name", "taxpayer's address", or "taxpayer's signature" is sometimes suggested to certify the signer is a bona fide "taxpayer" and the only remaining question is the extent of his factual liability. The tables listing percentages calculated for the taxpayer's convenience (26 USC §1) are also suggested to impose liability. The tables are for "taxable income." Taxable income relates only to taxpayers. What converts a sovereign citizen into a mere taxpayer subject to the IRS?

Let's be candid. "Taxpayer" is substituted for your name as soon as the IRS looks at you, as in "the taxpayer's failure to file income tax forms..." The courts and the IRS interchange "taxpayer" and "citizen." This hardly seems compatible with declarations that enforcement of a revenue summons "is not (to be) in derogation of any constitutional right." US v Euge, 444 US 707, 711, 718; Upjohn v US, 449 US 383, 398. Such as a right to know the law imposing liability for a tax?

There is no statute imposing legal liability for the income tax. If the law exists, wouldn't the IRS and the courts be waving it in your face? The absence of a law imposing legal responsibility in an indictment or complaint for the income tax is a denial of due process. A rule 7(f) motion for a bill of particulars in criminal cases or, in civil cases, a motion for a more definite statement (disfavored) or a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction/ failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (rule 12b) would put the question in the judge's lap. Lots of luck. Be prepared to see a government based on a rule of man rather than a rule of law.

Fragmented pro se motions, unprofessional and lacking media understanding or access, are dismissed as frivolous, and this is often another judicial play on words. Read "not likely to be adjudicated", and the court's words, frequently distorting or totally avoiding the real issue raised, are the ones published in the law books and parroted by the media.

Proceedings in a court are legally void where there is an absence of jurisdiction. Scott v McNeal, 154 US 34; Re Bonner, 151 US 242. Theoretically, a claim of want of jurisdiction can be made at any time, even by habeas corpus, but for an income tax case, not until global warming abates.

There is an excellent reason why no statute imposes legal liability on a citizen: if the law exists, it would be cited; if it were cited, it could be challenged. Averments made in the indictment/complaint that are denied in the defendant's response are the only questions before the court. Without a citation of a legal responsibility for the income tax, the lawful standing of the income tax is not before the court. Any subsequent attempt to present a constitutional challenge has shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The reversal of the burden of proof determines who wins. But does a formidable constitutional challenge exist?

We must, at this time, put some limits on our scope. It is well know that the 1913 income tax on individuals was merged with the Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909. Distinctions between the two taxes have been blurred with time, but corporations, as creations of the state, receive only what privileges (subject to an excise tax) the legislators/courts grant to them. Lehnhauser v Lakeshore Auto Parts, 410 US 336. Almost all adjudication of the income tax involves corporations. The sovereign citizens who established this government retain all rights secured by the constitution. This paper relates only to a right of a citizen---the pursuit of a livelihood. Taxation is a matter of sovereignty, and that over which the government is not sovereign is not a suitable basis for taxation. Pittman v Home Owners Loan, 308 US 21; McCulloch v Maryland 17 US 316. A sovereign citizen cannot be required to purchase as a mere privilege what is already his as a secured constitutional right.

Also excluded is any adjudication relating to regulation. The income tax is strictly a revenue measure that does not involve police action for public safety.

An individual has the right to Liberty secured for him by the Preamble, the Fifth Amendment, and the 14th. Amendment. Liberty, for 200 years, has included the pursuit of a livelihood as a basic fundamental right. US v Robel, 389 US 258; Greene v McElroy, 360 US 492; ref. 16A Am Jur2d Constitutional Law §§ 562, 569, 570, 590. The right to put food on one's table and provide shelter for one's family was established long before this nation was created; it will exist long after this government is history. It is not a creation of, or a privilege granted by, a government upon which an exaction or a return can be demanded. Of what value is life if an individual cannot exchange the sweat of his brow for the things that make life worthwhile? The power to tax is the power to control. Murdock v Pennsylvania, 317 US 105. When employment is granted/sold by government, we have a totalitarian government controlling slave labor, not a Republic controlled by Sovereign People.

Constitutional rights, such as liberty, are not suitable objects for taxation or encumbrances. West Virginia v Barnette, 319 US 624; US v Euge, 444 US 707. "A (government) may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution." Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105; 113. Taxes exacted as a price of exercising freedoms protected by the constitution are presumptively invalid for "on their face they are a restriction of the free exercise of those freedoms." id 114. A mere $1.75 poll tax on the right to vote received a scathing rebuke. US v Texas, 252 F.Sup. 234; affm 384 US 155; Harper v Virginia, 383 US 670. A tax levied on the right of interstate commerce was invalidated. McGoldrick v Berwind-White, 309 US 33. The exercise of religion is not a suitable basis for taxation. Follett v McCormick, 321 US 573. The mere chilling of a constitutional right is held oppressive. Shapiro v Thompson, 374 US 618. If constitutional rights could be taxed, your right to a trial by jury, or any constitutional right, could be priced out of existence.

The exercise of our constitutional right to pursue a livelihood is the basis for a criminal act if we do not surrender part of the earnings to government. The concept is inane. Under any other circumstances, we would cry "Extortion!!" At what percentage do we cry "Slavery!!!"? If the power to tax exists, it is not a matter for the courts if the tax destroys the object of taxation. Magnona v Hamilton, 292 US 40. The exercise of a constitutional right cannot be the basis of a crime. Marchetti v U.S., 390 US 39, 57; See v Seattle, 387 US 541. The crusade against the income tax is a fight to preserve our heritage.

The Supreme Court has interesting words on slavery: "For the very idea, that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 370.

The internet sites mentioned above and other government sources rely heavily upon Springer v U.S. , 102 US 586 (1881) and Pollock v Farmers Loan, 157 US 429 and 158 US 601 to assert challenges to the income tax on wages and salaries of individuals have been adjudicated and found unpersuasive. Let us review those cases to see if they are being correctly analyzed.

The Springer court stated that if the tax "involved any wrong or unnecessary harshness, it was for Congress, or the people who make congresses to see that the evil was corrected. The remedy does not lie with the judicial branch of the government." (emphasis added) id 594. The court observed that Congress must have intended the tax to be an excise, a duty, or an impost for otherwise the tax would conflict with constitutional prohibitions, and it was also observed to not fulfill requirements of a direct tax. id 602. The court deliberately refrained from adjudicating any challenge to the tax but the action of the court can only be understood within the era.

The practice of the court in this era was to decline review of any state adjudication as being an infringement of federal rights; if a state had legislated and adjudicated the state law, then due process was fulfilled and the federal courts would not review the state's action. (The Springer case involved a foreclosure under state law for apportioned federal income taxes.) This policy was revised in Hurtado v California, 110 US 516 (1884) where the court served notice from then on state adjudication would be reviewed to verify constitutional provisions were not infringed. Ref. The Constitution of the United States of America, U.S. Printing Office, 1972, p 1312. Springer cannot be cited as adjudicating a challenge to the income tax.

The income tax was rescinded after the Civil War, was reintroduced in the 1890's and was challenged in the Pollock v Farmers Loan cases. The Pollock challenge involved income from bonds (dividends) and income from rental property. The court distinguished the issues as being a tax levied upon the income from capital investments that might be considered differently from a tax levied on "business, privileges, or employment." id 579. The court held the tax levied on income from capital investments was a direct tax and unconstitutional. Since this action would place the bulk of the remaining tax on salaries and wages (an issue not before the court--it was not defended and not represented) which was not the intent of congress, the entire tax scheme on rehearing was ruled invalid (do not read unconstitutional). id 637. Pollock did not adjudicate any issue relative to wages/salary. A tax levied on salaries/wages (employment) was mentioned by the Pollock court to have previously "assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such." id 157 US 579; 158 US 635. The Pollock court did not cite the case where the "guise" was suggested, nor should we confuse a guise as being a holding. Pollock did not hold a tax on wages/salaries to be constitutional or unconstitutional; it could be revived by Congress as desired because the issue of wages/salaries was not adjudicated by the court.

Congress had realized the tremendous economic bonanza of an income tax and submitted the 16th. Amendment to the states for ratification in 1909. Congress also passed the Corporate Excise Tax Act in 1909 that was merged with the income tax in 1914. Subsequent adjudication declared the purpose of the 16th. Amendment was to reverse, by legislation, the judicial action of the Pollock court. Brushaber v Union Pacific, 240 US 1, 18-19. Since the holding of the Pollock court related only to income from capital investments, the 16th. Amendment is irrelevant to any tax on wages, salaries, or employment. Ref. Bowers v Kerbaugh-Empire, 271 US 170, 174; Eisner v Macomber, 252 US 189, 206.

Concurrence of this point is found in Congressional Research Service Report #84-168A, SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, updated 9/26/84, at page 8: "The fallacy of this argument (that wages are not taxable as income) is that the taxation of wages had never been found unconstitutional and therefore the (16th) amendment to the Constitution was not necessary to permit this type of taxation (on wages)." The statement is true but misleading. The reason "taxation of wages had never been found unconstitutional" is that a court has never adjudicated the issue, and obviously did not validate the tax as implied. The only relevant case discussed in the report is Pollock which is, by convoluted phraseology, erroneously implied to hold "income taxes are generally indirect taxes in the nature of excises..." on page 3. Pollock definitely did not make such a holding. The congressional report's reliance on Pollock as adjudicating any issue of wages or salary is poorly placed. [The report unwittingly confirms this point. Since the report acknowledges "taxation of wages had never been found unconstitutional," and history identifies Pollock for its unconstitutional ruling, Pollock obviously did not adjudicate an issue of wages.]

Does the nebulous 16th. Amendment undermine the right to liberty by implication? The Brushaber court, among others, points out that fundamental constitutional provisions cannot be negated by amendment. The constitution was written to put certain provisions beyond the mischief of elected officials. "One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." West Virginia v Barnett, 319 US 624, 638. "Where rights secured by the constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436. If it were otherwise, the entire constitution, including the right to trial by jury, could be destroyed by the state legislators. However, if a citizen is intimidated and declines to assert his right, he has voluntarily acquiesced that right. If we do, let us hear no more of the sacrifices, and blood, our forefathers have paid to establish our freedom.

In conclusion, there is no case that has adjudicated a claim that the income tax is not an improper burden on an individual's right to liberty. But the IRS, and the courts, will do anything necessary to prevent the issue from being adjudicated. Pro se's have been hard pressed to find justice. With the assistance of an exceptional tenacious lawyer, a few isolated victories have been achieved.

If an adjudication of constitutional rights---an outright assault on the income tax---is the objective, it will not be accomplished in district or circuit courts. Washington may be available only with the strategy used in the Brown v Topeka adjudication by numerous cases from different circuits. Success will require coordinated cases raising similar issues with massive media exposure. Only the glare of public spotlights on the court, with an informed citizenry, will compel the court to respect constitutional rights.

Contributed by Jim Carter

Copyright 2000

-- freddie the freeloader (freddiethefreeloader@aol.com), May 02, 2001.

Um,Counsel, That's just about ALL they are talking about.

You've had plenty of opportunity to enlighten everyone, but instead choose to make useless non-contributions to the discussion; that is probably why I didn't respond.

-- KoFE (your@town.USSA), May 02, 2001.

BTW, I'm addressing Porter, the dubious lawyer, in the reply above.

-- KoFE (your@town.USSA), May 02, 2001.

The Baltic Mining case says the following, Kofe. Since you're the expert in this area, perhaps you could explain to me how it impacts on the constitutionality of the income tax. Looks to me like they upheld it.

Looks to me like you just parrot what you read on the 'net, without understanding it.

********************Baltic Mining Decision********************

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. As in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., ante, p. 1, this case was commenced by the appellant as a stockholder of the Baltic Mining Company, the appellee, to enjoin the voluntary payment by the corporation and its officers of the tax assessed against it under the Income Tax section of the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 166, 181. As the grounds for the equitable relief sought in this case so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned are substantially the same as those which were relied upon in the Brushaber Case, it follows that the ruling in that case upholding the power to dispose of that controversy is controlling here and we put that subject out of view.

Further also like the Brushaber Case this is before us on a direct appeal prosecuted for the purpose of reviewing the action of the court below in dismissing on motion the bill for want of equity. The bill averred: "That, under and by virtue of the alleged authority contained in said Income Tax law, if valid and constitutional, the respondent company is taxable at the rate of 1 per cent. upon its gross receipts from all sources, during the calendar year ending December 31, 1914, after deducting (1) its ordinary and necessary expenses paid within the year in the maintenance and operation of its business and properties and (2) all losses actually sustained within the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise, including depreciation arising from depletion of its ore deposits to the limited extent of 5% of the 'gross value at the mine of the output' during said year." It was further alleged that the company would if not restrained make a return for taxation conformably to the statute and would pay the tax upon the basis stated without protest and that to do so would result in depriving the complainant as a stockholder of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States as the tax which it was proposed to pay without protest was void for repugnancy to that Constitution. The bill contained many averments on the following subjects which may be divided into two generic classes: (A) Those concerning the operation of the law in question upon individuals generally and upon other than mining corporations and the discrimination against mining corporations which arose in favor of such other corporations and individuals by the legislation, as well as discrimination which the provisions of the act operated against mining corporations because of the separate and more unfavorable cast upon them by the statute than was placed upon other corporations and individuals --, averments all of which were obviously made to support the subsequent charges which the bill contained as to the repugnancy of the law imposing the tax to the equal protection, due process and uniformity clauses of the Constitution. And (B) those dealing with the practical results on the company of the operation of the tax in question evidently alleged for the purpose of sustaining the charge which the bill made that the tax levied was not what was deemed to be the peculiar direct tax which the Sixteenth Amendment exceptionally authorized to be levied without apportionment and of the resulting repugnancy of the tax to the Constitution as a direct tax on property because of its ownership levied without conforming to the regulation of apportionment generally required by the Constitution as to such taxation.

We need not more particularly state the averments as to the various contentions in class (A), as their character will necessarily be made manifest by the statement of the legal propositions based on them which we shall hereafter have occasion to make. As to the averments concerning class (B), it suffices to say that it resulted from copious allegations in the bill as to the value of the ore body contained in the mine which the company worked and the total output for the year of the product of the mine after deducting the expenses as previously stated, that the five per cent. deduction permitted by the statute was inadequate to allow for the depletion of the ore body and therefore the law to a large extent taxed not the mere profit arising from the operation of the mine, but taxed as income the yearly product which represented to a large extent the yearly depletion or exhaustion of the ore body from which during they year ore was taken. Indeed, the following alleged facts concerning the relation which the annual production bore to the exhaustion or diminution of the property in the ore bed must be taken as true for the purpose of reviewing the judgment sustaining the motion to dismiss the bill.

"That the real or actual yearly income derived by the respondent company from its business or property, does not exceed $550,000. That, under the Income Tax, the said company is held taxable, in an average year, to the amount of approximately $1,150,000, the same being ascertained by deducting from its net receipts of $1,400,000 only a depreciation of $100,000 on its plant and a depletion of its ore supply limited by law to 5% of the value of its annual gross receipts and amounting to $150,000; whereas, in order properly to ascertain its actual income $750,000 per annum should be allowed to be deducted for such depletion, or five times the amount actually allowed."

Without attempting minutely to state every possible ground of attack which might be deduced from the averments of the bill, but in substance embracing every material grievance therein asserted and pressed in argument upon our attention in the elaborate briefs which have been submitted, we come to separately dispose of the legal propositions advanced in the bill and arguments concerning the two classes.

Class A. Under this the bill charged that the provisions of the statute "are unconstitutional and void under the Fifth Amendment, in that they deny to mining companies and their stockholders equal protection of the laws and deprive them of their property without due process of law," for the following reasons:

(1) Because all other individuals or corporations were given a right to deduct a fair and reasonable percentage for losses and depreciation of their capital and they were therefore not confined to the arbitrary 5% fixed as the basis for deductions by mining corporations.

(2) Because by reason of the differences in the allowances which the statute permitted the tax levied was virtually a net income tax on other corporations and individuals and a gross income tax on mining corporations.

(3) Because the statute established a discriminating rule as to individuals and other corporations as against mining corporations on the subject of the method of the allowance for depreciations.

(4) Because the law permitted all individuals to deduct from their net income dividends received from corporations which had paid the tax on their incomes, and did not give the right to corporations to make such deductions from their income of dividends received from other corporations which had paid their income tax. This was illustrated by the averment that 99 per cent. of the stock of the defendant company was owned by a holding company and that under the statute not only was the corporation obliged to pay the tax on its income, but so also was the holding company obliged to pay on the dividends paid it by the defendant company.

(5) Because of the discrimination resulting from the provision of the statute providing for a progressive increase of taxation or surtax as to individuals and not as to corporations.

[48] (6) Because of the exemptions which the statute made of individual incomes below $4,000 and of incomes of labor organizations and various other exemptions which were set forth.

But it is apparent from the mere statement of these contentions that each and all of them were adversely disposed of by the decision in the Brushaber case and they all therefore may be put out of view.

Class B. Under this class these propositions are relied upon: (1) That as the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes only an exceptional direct income tax without apportionment, to which the tax in question does not conform, it is therefore not within the authority of that Amendment.

(2) Not being within the authority of the Sixteenth Amendment the tax is therefore, within the ruling of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429; 158 U.S. 601, a direct tax and void for want of compliance with the regulation of apportionment.

As the first proposition is plainly in conflict with the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment as interpreted in the Brushaber Case, it may also be put out of view. As to the second, while indeed it is distinct from the subjects considered in the Brushaber Case to the extent that the particular tax which the statute levies on mining corporations here under consideration is distinct from the tax on corporations other than mining and on individuals which was disposed of in the Brushaber Case, a brief analysis will serve to demonstrate that the distinction is one without a difference and therefore that the proposition is also foreclosed by the previous ruling. The contention is that as the tax here imposed is not on the net product but in a sense somewhat equivalent to a tax on the gross product of the working of the mine by the corporation, therefore the tax is not within the purview of the Sixteenth Amendment and consequently it must be treated as a direct tax on property because of its ownership and as such void for want of apportionment. But aside from the obvious error of the proposition intrinsically considered, it manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what it was -- a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or source of the income taxed. Mark, of course, in saying this we are not here considering a tax not within the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment, that is, one in which the regulation of apportionment or the rule of uniformity is wholly negligible because the tax is one entirely beyond the scope of the taxing power of Congress and where consequently no authority to impose a burden either direct or indirect exists. In other words, we are here dealing solely with the restriction imposed by the Sixteenth Amendment on the right to resort to the source whence an income is derived in a case where there is power to tax for the purpose of taking the income tax out of the class of indirect to which it generically belongs and putting it in the class of direct to which it would not otherwise belong in order to subject it to the regulation of apportionment. But it is said that although this be undoubtedly true as a general rule, the peculiarity of mining property and the exhaustion of the ore body which must result from working the mine, causes the tax in a case like this where an inadequate allowance by way of deduction is made for the exhaustion of the ore body to be in the nature of things a tax on property because of its ownership and therefore subject to apportionment. Not to so hold, it is urged, is as to mining property but to say that mere form controls, thus rendering in substance the command of the Constitution that taxation directly on property because of its ownership be apportioned, wholly illusory or futile. But this merely asserts a right to take the taxation of mining corporations out of the rule established by the Sixteenth Amendment when there is no authority for so doing. It moreover rests upon the wholly fallacious assumption that looked at from the point of view of substance a tax on the product of a mine is necessarily in its essence and nature in every case a direct tax on property because of its ownership unless adequate allowance be made for the exhaustion of the ore body to result from working the mine. We say wholly fallacious assumption because independently of the effect of the operation of the Sixteenth Amendment it was settled in Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, that such a tax is not a tax upon property as such because of its ownership, but a true excise levied on the results of the business of carrying on mining operations (pp. 413 et seq.)

As it follows from what we have said that the contentions are in substance and effect controlled by the Brushaber Case and in so far as this may not be the case are without merit, it results that for the reasons stated in the opinion in that case and those expressed in this, the judgment must be and it is

Affirmed.

Justice McREYNOLDS took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.

-- E.H.Porter (just.wondering@about.it), May 02, 2001.

Porter, the explanation is above, in quotes:

"..by the previous ruling, it was settled that the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being take out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged."

In other words, the ruling^ is saying that Congress has always had the power to tax incomes INDIRECTLY, and the 16th is being clarified here, in TREASURY DECISION 2313 - ( letter to Collectors of Internal Revenue: "...it is hereby held that the income accruing to nonresident aliens in the form of interest from bonds and dividends on the stock of domestic corporations is subject to the income tax imposed by the act of Oct. 3, 1913 -

Second paragraph:

"Nonresident aliens are not entitled to the SPECIFIC EXEMPTION DESIGNATED IN PARAGRAPH C OF THE INCOME TAX LAW, but are liable for the normal and additional tax upon the entire net income from all property owned,and of every business, trade, or profession carried on in the United States, computed upon the basis prescribed in the law"

(2) Pollock- Class B. "Under this class these propositions are relied upon: (1) That as the 16th Amendment authorizes only an exceptional direct income tax without apportionment, to which the tax in question does not conform, it is therefore not within the authority of that Amendment"-

(2) '.... Not being within the authority of the 16th Amendment, the tax is therefore, within the ruling of Pollock v. Farmers Loan Co., a direct tax and void for want of compliance with the regulation of apportionment." "...The contention is that as the tax here imposed is not on the net product, but in a sense somewhat equivalent to a tax on the gross product of the working of the mine by the corporation, therefore the tax is not within the purview of the 16th Amendment, and consequently it must be treated as a direct tax on property because of ownership and as such void for want of apportionment.

" But aside from the obvious error of the proposition intrinsically considered, it manisfestly disregards the FACT THAT BY THE PREVIOUS RULING IT WAS SETTLED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE 16TH AMENDMENT CONFERRED NO NEW POWERS OF TAXATION, BUT SIMPLY PROHIBITED THE PREVIOUS COMPLETE AND PLENARY POWER OF INCOME TAXATION POSSESSED BY CONGRESS FROM THE BEGINNING FROM BEING TAKEN OUT OF THE

*CATEGORY OF INDIRECT TAXATION, TO WHICH IT INHERENTLY BELONGED*,

AND PLACED IN THE CATEGORY OF DIRECT TAXATION, SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT.......end of quote

This is contrary to the assumption that the 16th gives power to tax incomes from "whatever" source.

Yes, it does give power to tax incomes, but it is only valid to tax those incomes in the category of INDIRECT, or, on the DIRECT incomes of NON-RESIDENT ALIENS- because they do not enjoy the same rights of citizens.

-- KoFE (your@town.USSA), May 03, 2001.

Ah, KoFE -- you're not paying attention or you need a little more legal training.

As is common in a lot of older opinions, the Court explains at length the arguments made by counsel for both sides. This is what you quote above.

The Court then basically says the arguments made against the tax in question are absurd, and upholds the tax.

Read it Dude . . . read it very carefully . . . take your time.

And, for the sake of god, the country and the tax paying public, please don't ever think about a career in law.

-- E.H.Porter (just.wondering@about.it), May 03, 2001.

Alright Porter, I accept your challenge, keeping in mind that you just claimed above, that Stanton was not about taxes, but something else.

-- KoFE (your@town.USSA), May 04, 2001.

What I said was that Stanton cannot rationally be held to suggest in any way that the income tax is unconstitutional or that "the 16th did not create a new power to tax people"

-- E.H.Porter (just.wondering@about.it), May 04, 2001.

And I quoted the appelants argument as a reference point.

I quoted this case because of it's reference to the Brushaber Case,

"..by the previous ruling, (Brushaber) it was settled that the provisions of the 16th conferred no new powers of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged"

"conferred no new power of taxation"

They are saying the 16th does not alter the constitutional provisions that protect citizens Due Process, and Art. 1, Sec. 9 Cl. 4, and Art. 1, Sec. 2, Cl 3

"Direct taxes(on citizens) shall be apportioned(divided evenly) among the states...."

"No capitation or other direct, Tax shall be laid unless in Proportion...."

------------------------------------------------------- What I'm saying Porter, is that I don't have property that is generating income. If I did, THAT income would be taxable. PERSONALLY, I am not liable, because I don't have taxable income.

But I have a question for you. Why is it that you, and Flint, and just about all the rest, can't put a straight-to-the-point, factual argument together that refutes the claim that I'm making?

Soon after Brushaber, this:

Treasury Decision 2313

Office of Commisioner of Internal Revenue

To collectors of internal revenue:

Under the decision of the SC of the U.S. in the case of Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railway Co., decided Jan 21, 1916, it is hereby held that income accruing to nonresident aliens in the form of interest from the bonds and divdends on the stock of domestic corporations is subject to the income tax imposed by the act of Oct 3, 1913.

Nonresident aliens are not entitled to the SPECIFIC EXEMPTION IN PARAGRAPH C OF THE INCOME-TAX LAW...."

It shouldn't be too much trouble for you to look TD 2313 up, and the paragraph C of the US Code, and tell me if it is true or not.

-- KoFE (your@town.USSA), May 04, 2001.

KoFE -- you have to be used to the tax-nut babble of the internet to understand even half of what you say. Those of us who learned our tax law in law school find it hard to follow you. Sort of like trying to refute the Xians.

For example, what's all this about "non-resident aliens?" Generally, non-resident aliens are not taxed, because, well, they are: (1) non- residents and (2) aliens. Granted, it would be a lot of fun to tax the French, Germans, etc., but they'd probably not cooperate anyway. Apparently, however, under certain circumstances, income generated in the United States can be taxed even if it flows to non-resident aliens. Why is this either surprising or relevant?

And, of course, as you point out in your opening post, Stanton suggests that income tax is an "indirect tax" -- to quote you: "16th amendment conferred no new power of taxation but simply prohibited the previus complete and plenary(full) power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being TAKEN OUT of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged.."

The problem with income tax is it is arguably not apportioned. To quote you again -- the 16th amendment allows income taxation "without apportionment(without equal division) among the several states"

That's why I'm reasonably sure you've read or understood few if any of these case.

-- E.H.Porter (just.wondering@about.it), May 05, 2001.

What kind of lawyer can't look up Treasury Decision 2313?

Probably one who is not a lawyer.

-- KoFE (your@town.USSA), May 05, 2001.

I have a question for you, Latte. Why is it that you can't put a straight-to-the-point, factual argument together that supports the claim that you're making?

-- Already Done Happened (oh.yeah@it.did.com), May 05, 2001.

What's boring is the same tactic used over and over and over again.

Kofe makes a claim, which is soundly refuted.

He changes the subject, and makes a different claim.

Now, you either stick to the original topic, or refute this new claim. If you stick to the topic, he says his new claim cannot be answered. If you refute the new one, he says you are jumping to something new without settling the first issue, so you're trying to confuse things!

And of course, his "points" consist of non sequiturs, quotes taken out of order and out of context, with no mention of them having been soundly rejected in that or a later decision, or what the decision actally was that's being quoted from (like, who lost and which claims were therefore rejected).

So, like Porter, I find it hard to decide if KoFE either actually understands what he writes, or understands it and is simply trying to look ignorant and stupid at the same time. Either way, he has all the credibility of Paula Gordon's secret anonymous continuing embedded systems crisis.

-- Flint (flintc@mindspring.com), May 05, 2001.

Should I expect something otherwise from Flint, who thinks some Amendments void others?

Most of these post have been efforts to establish reality for you, Flint.

From the beginning, I've had to teach you the fundementals of the Constitution, and you have been slow getting there, however, I see that you are finally dropping most of the stupid arguments you started with.

I may have made a couple of minor mistakes, but my basic premise is sound. However, it has been Pearls before Swine from beginning to end. You have used the very same tactics you accuse me of. And I think it's obvious to everyone. You are not foolng anyone. I've said from the beginning that a fair debate should be done point by point, but you see each thread as an opportunity to spam, and cut n paste articles you clearly haven't read, faster than they can be answered. Meawhile, being very careful not to give your personal opinion of what they mean, because you really don't know what they mean.

-- KoFE (your@town.USSA), May 06, 2001.

Hey, KoFE -- what makes you think a 1916 "Treasury Decision" is of any particular relevance? What makes you think that ANY executive branch "decision" is anything more than the passing whim of a particular administration.

One of the sure signs of "nut-case" symptom on the Internet is quoting "executive orders" or "decisions," particularly those without a date.

-- E.H.Porter (just.wondering@about.it), May 06, 2001.

And, KoFE -- what's this stuff about "Should I expect something otherwise from Flint, who thinks some Amendments void others? "

Some Amendments do void others. Take a look, for example, at the 18th and 21st amendments, which instituted and then repealed prohibition.

-- E.H.Porter (just.wondering@about.it), May 06, 2001.

And they actually say repealed, dumbass.

Nothing you can say can defend Flints stupidity. This is the mentality I've been dealing with from the beginning.

Not one of you geniuses has refuted one point that I've made. Are you even aware of that fact?

It's very obvious that none of you has the confidence to state your own opinion of the facts(that is unless you include Flints fiasco, (which resulted in his launching a spam attack)

Actually, I am beginning to get interested in the reactions, more than the argument, because it illustrates your lack of credibility.

I am even as much interested in the disinformation links provided. Thanks.

-- KoFE (your@town.USSA), May 06, 2001.

"Not one of you geniuses has refuted one point that I've made. Are you even aware of that fact?"

There's nothing to refute, Latte, since you haven't MADE a point so far. You seem to miss out on a big clue here. You have to PROVE your assertions. We're not bound to DISPROVE assertions of yours that haven't been proven. Are you even aware of THOSE facts?

BTW, did you get that all-male action you were craving earlier? It's most interesting how easily you sling the "fag" label around, yet you seem to know all about gay hangouts. It's okay, Latte. You're among friends. I won't sleep with you, since I don't swing that way, but I promise not to beat you up like your less understanding pals might.

-- Already Done Happened (oh.yeah@it.did.com), May 06, 2001.

[And they actually say repealed, dumbass.]

This is irrelevant. What a strange, groundless claim this is. But just for the record, Article II, Section 1, clause 3 of the Constitution provides that the losing Presidential candidate shall become Vice President. The 12th Amendment repealed that, but didn't "actually say repealed, dumbass" as KoFE seems to require.

Now, why all of a sudden is special KoFE-approved language required in an amendment? Does he claim Gore "really is" the Vice President today, but "really wasn't" during the Clinton admistration? Why not? The repealing amendment didn't use KoFE's special language!

-- Flint (flintc@mindspring.com), May 06, 2001.