...Paula".: Someone tell me this TWIT is not a "conspiracy theory" prone AIRHEAD.

I can't believe she would expose herself in public as follows on what is obviously a "venue" that like GICC she must think is "appropriate". But then......she did "run for Congress" and given the riff raff that was allowed under the Dome over 200 years, who the Fukk really would take her seriously:

Its all a coverup I tell ye. They have to be lying.

Biggest Fruitcake is also a "conspiracy" freak-out.

http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdony2kglitches.showMessage?topicID=107.topic

8/15/00

Paula Gordon Re: THE EMBEDDED SPIKE .......

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Interesting exchange...

The following is a relevant excerpt of something I posted on GICC a few weeks ago:

"The most recent in the series of briefing/brainstorming sessions at George Washington University on Y2K was held on Tuesday, July 11....

A primary focus of that session was some newly shared information concerning what is going on behind the scenes. It turns out that according to a number of persons with hands-on expertise in the field, Y2K/embedded systems problems involving integrated systems are very much with us and are becoming more evident with the passage of time. Owing to liability, absence of focus, threats of dismissal, bottomline and market concerns, the political incorrectness of mentioning Y2K problems, and other factors, it appears that information concerning such problems is not getting out. Y2K/embedded systems problems seem to be unfolding in slow motion and only a very few people appear to be inclined or able to identify them and fewer still seem interested in openly tracking, assessing, or addressign them. Few seem willing to talk about what is happening. No one that I have been able to identify in the Federal government has responsibility for tracking, assessing, and addressing such ongoing problems.

Given present circumstances, including high levels of disinterest, absence of expertise, absence of resources, and failure to assign responsibility, potential long term scenarios that could evolve are cause for some concern. For instance, it would be possible for a scenario of mid-range impact on the impact scale to evolve. In such a scenario more and more problems could become evident while little in the way of expertise and resources were directed to tracking, assessing, and addressing the underlying causes of the problems. One possible consequence of such failures is the detrimental impact that they can have on public health and safety or the environment. Two other possible consequences that can follow from a failure to acknowledge or address the underlying causes of problems include the following:

~ only the most obvious symptoms might be addressed when a failure occurs or a malfunction becomes apparent, meaning that the problem may recur again and again until the underlying cause is finally addressed OR

~ costly equipment and systems might have to be replaced in its entirety, obviously a very costly proposition.

Such possible consequences could have been avoided had remediation efforts been completed or had repairs been done that were based on an understanding of the actual or possible causes of the problems.

At the June 12 meeting at GW, communications with engineers familiar with Y2K-related integrated systems problems were reported on and discussed along with suggestions for initiatives. As the developments that were discussed are sensitive in nature (jobs and careers can be at stake), particular care must be taken in publicly reporting them. I hope to be posting some general information about these developments in the next few months.

Meanwhile, I continue to communicate with officials behind the scenes, even though, in most cases, the level of interest is very low. The low level of interest can be attributed in part to the absence of technical expertise within most all government offices and/or the failure of such expertise to inform government policies and priorities. Such technical expertise is needed to understand Y2K-related complex integrated systems problems involving IT systems and embedded systems.

There is a commonly held perception among Members of Congress, the Administration, the media, and the public that the Administration was correct in declaring victory in early January. Efforts to track and assess Y2K problems, such as they were, ceased early in the year. As one contractor to government put it at a public meeting in March, "we (the public) are on our own."

I am aware of only a very individuals who have continued to express continuing concern about Y2K-related matters. Aside from GICC, I know of very few other efforts that continue to include a focus on such concerns and none of these has the visibility that GICC has. It is curious that public institutions have abrograted their responsibilities to continue event to track and assess, let alone address, this stage of the first greatest global challenge in the information age. It makes me wonder if this is an indication that at least for the time being, as a society, we have collectively allowed technology to "snooker" us: Technology may have gotten the upperhand. Very few of those with the technical training that enables them to understand Y2K-related complex integrated systems problems are openly acknowledging their concerns. In recent months, far too few seem to be helping shed light on and address current and continuing Y2K-related challenges. It also seems that when the insights of those with such training and expertise is brought to the attention of those in roles of public responsibility, it can fall on deaf ears. Such individuals too often lack a basic grasp of the complexities of technical subjects and cannot see the relevance of such concerns to policy and action. In our overly specialized society, we have failed to create a sufficient role for generalists and cross-disciplinary experts. We have failed to create roles for persons who understand enough about the complexities of technology and policy to act as catalysts and interpreters between the experts and those in policy roles. This could well prove to be one of the gravest failings of schools that train and prepare professionals in scientific and technical fields as well as the fields of public administration and business administration....

I am interested in communicating directly with those who have technical expertise bearing on Y2K-related complex integrated systems problems who might be willing to share their insights into what is going on behind the scenes, on the record or off the record."

Paula Gordon
<pgordon@erols.com>
=============================================================== http://pub5.ezboard.com/fyourdony2kglitches.showMessage?topicID=74.topic
Re: Paula Gordon's questions to John Koskinen re Y2K outcomes

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Snooze,

The analogy fits. I am personally aware of several unreported Y2K failures. While not "show stoppers" they illustrate that failures have ocurred and will continue to occur for some time. If they occur in low-profile programs, some may also occur in high-profile ones, especially as infrustructures get closer to their maximum capacities.

All the best,
Mountain Mike

Paula Gordon
Registered User
(8/29/00 3:01:03 am)
You have been banned
in this ezboard


My questions to John Koskinen: A belated posting

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Very belated thanks, Ed, for posting this note concerning the John Koskinen Q&A! Until very recently, I had technical problems that had kept me from visiting ezboard. Those problems solved, I have only recently found this thread.

Also belated thanks to everyone for your comments.

John Koskinen's response to my question concerning the small size of his staff (11) and the absence of even one technical expert on his staff helps explain why so little information has gotten to the public concerning embedded systems and complex integrated systems problems. It also helps explain why the most serious problems that have occurred and that are continuing to occur (and that could potentially occur) are either not being tracked, monitored, or assessed, or they are simply not being identified or reported out by the public or private sector as being even possibly Y2K-related. The reports of the Chem Safety Board contain no information concerning whether or not a problem is Y2K-related or whether there is evidence to suggest that it might possibly be Y2K-related. There is no one at the National Institute for Standards and Technology who has any continuing responsibilities regarding Y2K-related embedded systems concerns. To the best of my knowledge, no official with embedded systems expertise at the Department of Energy is looking into Y2K-related problems as they may be related to refinery disruptions. There is no one at the National Transportation Safety Board who is investigating possible connections between the abnormally high number of problems falling within NTSB's areas of responsibility and Y2K-related IT and embedded system malfunctions. I would be glad to receive information to the contrary on any and all of these statements. I would be happy to stand corrected.

Surely someone in the Federal government should have responsibility for evaluating what has happened. A sound approach to the policy process would seem to require it. Surely there should be someone charged with tracking, assessing, and monitoring current problems. Surely, someone in a role of public responsibility should be charged with taking steps, regulatory or otherwise, to prevent future problems or address the problems that are continuing to occur.

So far as I have been able to discern, there are no individuals in roles of public responsibility in the Executive Branch of the Federal government who have any official ongoing involvement in even tracking the effectiveness of past Y2K-related efforts. There seems to be little or no recognition in Washington of the desirability of even assessing the completeness of remediation efforts and of making sure that all stop gap measures have been replaced with fixes that will last.

"Victory" was viewed perhaps by most, as escaping any worst case scenarios. Having escaped worst case scenarios or their likelihood, all efforts to identify, track, assess, and address continuing problems simply ceased, at least as far as the media and the public is concerned.

Complicating matters has been the fact that very few individuals with the requisite specialized technical expertise in complex integrated systems seem to have an interest in stepping forward to make the case that any unfinished efforts need to be completed and that there are problems that need to be acknowledged and addressed.

According to the best information I have been able to gather, problems involving the malfunctioning or failure of embedded systems and complex integrated systems can be expected to continue in those high hazard sectors that took a fix on failure approach or that did not remediate successfully or completely. Two clear choices for those in roles of public responsibility and for those concerned about the public interest seem to be:

~ continue as we are or

~ do what can be done to investigate, acknowledge, assess, minimize, and address the problems. ----------------------------------------

-- cpr (buytexas@swbell.net), September 26, 2000