China Gives Clues on GOP Rivals

By JIM MANN

WASHINGTON--So, as the presidential primary season reaches its climax, where do George W. Bush and John McCain stand on foreign policy? How should voters decide between them? If you take China as a prism through which to view the candidates, you will see remarkably few substantive differences. The choice on foreign policy boils down to important but subtle questions of style, personal abilities, organization and constituencies. Both McCain and Bush have endorsed China's membership in the World Trade Organization and the follow-on legislation that would grant China normal trading rights (or most-favored-nation benefits) on a permanent basis in the United States. Both of them also have come out strongly in favor of establishing a missile-defense system in Asia and of stronger American help to protect Taiwan. Bush has called China a "strategic competitor" of the United States. McCain has branded it a "strategic rival." Not much disagreement there, either. Let's throw aside the formal position papers. The differences between Bush and McCain emerge most clearly when you look at three broader factors: 1) the candidate and his advisors; 2) the role of big business; and 3) the power of the right wing. * * * CANDIDATE AND ADVISORS. Bush has little direct personal experience in foreign policy. McCain has quite a bit. Bush's way of counteracting this problem has been to collect a long list of experienced foreign policy advisors--most of whom, such as Condoleezza Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard L. Armitage and Robert Zoellick, worked for presidents Reagan or Bush. This list is an impressive one. However, the reality is that many of these Bush foreign-policy advisors would probably go to work for any Republican president, including McCain. In his book "The Double-Edged Sword," former Times political reporter Robert Shogan recalls how, during the 1968 presidential campaign, Nelson A. Rockefeller's foreign policy advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, often spoke with quiet contempt of Rockefeller's Republican rival, Richard Nixon. "When I asked him if Nixon could bring the country together, Kissinger snorted, 'If he did, it would be the first positive thing he has ever done,' " writes Shogan. The rest is history: After the election, Kissinger signed on with the Nixon administration. * * * BIG BUSINESS. McCain, of course, has made campaign-finance reform a central theme in his campaign, and he has broadened his pitch to include attacks on special interests. Bush, who collected an unprecedented $67 million in contributions last year, did not come out for changes in the financing rules until two weeks ago, and then in a weaker way. It's possible to envision ways in which these differences could affect foreign policy. Would Bush, feeling in the business community's debt for its strong financial support, tend to give priority to American corporate interests in China at the expense of other interests such as Taiwan, the trade imbalance, human rights and democracy? Would McCain be less business-oriented? There are no definitive answers to these questions. One can also draw up contrary scenarios: If McCain put all his energies as president into campaign-finance legislation, maybe he'd have to appease the business community by making concessions to it in other areas, such as foreign policy. * * * THE RIGHT WING. On China, Bush has emerged as the preferred candidate of the right wing--that is, those within the Republican Party who propelled the series of congressional investigations into China's role in the 1996 campaign, its smuggling of U.S. technology and its espionage against the United States. Bush's leading campaign advisors include prominent defense hawks such as former Pentagon aide Richard Perle. And the right-wing China hands mistrust McCain--who, many complain, has regularly listed Kissinger as one of those he turns to for advice on foreign policy. Such judgments seem puzzling. After all, among the senior Bush advisors is Brent Scowcroft, who worked alongside Kissinger in forging the secretive 1970s relationship with China. And McCain's advisors include a few prominent conservatives, such as former U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. Still, the fact remains: Those most determinedly opposed to China's Communist government are an element of Bush's constituency, in a way that they are not for McCain. At the moment, foreign policy in general and China in particular are not high-profile issues. The Democrats aren't arguing about China now, either. Both Vice President Al Gore and Bill Bradley support China's entry into the WTO; both have avoided committing themselves to a missile-defense system in Asia. The general election could be more contentious. Both Bush and McCain are now positioned to attack the Democrats this fall on issues such as Taiwan and missile defenses, claiming that the Republicans will provide stronger support for U.S. allies in Asia. China may have faded from presidential politics for the moment, but the disappearance is only temporary. Jim Mann's column appears in this space every Wednesday. - - -

-- Vern (bacon17@ibm.net), March 02, 2000

Answers

. . . The Right Response

By George F. Will

Sunday , February 27, 2000 ; B07

Nations usually use diplomatic manners to mask their malevolence, but China cultivates an impressive lack of graciousness, and now, at a propitious moment, has given another glimpse of that lack. Its extraordinary threat against Taiwan may cause foreign policy to intrude upon the presidential campaign.

While Al Gore and Bill Bradley spar over decidedly nonpresidential subjects such as racial profiling by state and local police, and George W. Bush and John McCain argue about who was a meanie first, China last week issued a reminder that the world is still a dangerous place. China said that "the Taiwan issue is one left over by the Chinese civil war" that ended half a century ago, and threatened to use war to end "the state of hostility" that has not been formally ended: "The Chinese government always makes it clear that the means used to solve the Taiwan issue is a matter of China's internal affairs, and China is under no obligation to commit itself to rule out the use of force."

This is the fifth recent development that has roiled U.S.-China relations. One occurred last May, when U.S. planes mistakenly bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Beijing cynically treated the mistake as deliberate and orchestrated an orgy of anti-Americanism, including a mob attack on the U.S. Embassy.

A second occurred last July, when President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan stated the undeniable, that it was time to retire the fiction of "one China" by reconstituting relations between Taiwan and the mainland as a "state-to-state" relationship. The Clinton administration, always inclined to regard truthfulness as a faux pas, was very upset, having virtually adopted Beijing's position that Taiwan, the first democracy in 4,000 years of Chinese history, is a renegade province. In his 1998 grovel through China, President Clinton acceded to Beijing's demand for "three no's"--no independence for Taiwan (although Beijing has not had sovereignty over Taiwan since 1895), no two Chinas and no membership for Taiwan in international organizations for which statehood is a condition of membership.

A third development was Beijing's menacing deployment opposite Taiwan of short-range ballistic missiles, tactical aircraft and a Russian destroyer with advanced anti-ship missiles designed for use against U.S. aircraft carriers. A fourth was Beijing's arrest of more than 1,000 members of the Falun Gong religious movement, a crackdown that spoke volumes about the insecurities of the regime.

The example of Taiwan--its muscular economy (in the 20th century, world's fastest growth rate, 4.8 percent per year; 22 million people producing a GDP one-third that produced by the 1.2 billion mainland Chinese) and vibrant democracy--is the largest exacerbator of those insecurities. The Clinton administration, disposed to infuse even foreign policy with the therapeutic ethic, probably believes that the aim of U.S. policy should be to assuage those insecurities. The administration has tried to do so by aggravating Taiwan's insecurity, making the U.S. commitment to Taiwan more attenuated than at any time since President Nixon's 1972 visit to China.

Taiwan says democratization on the mainland is a prerequisite for reunification. Beijing last week called that "totally unreasonable" and--get this--"undemocratic." And, plunging into U.S. internal affairs, it denounced as a "gross interference in China's internal affairs" attempts by Congress to pass the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act and any plans to include Taiwan in a theater missile defense system. Which suggests two questions the presidential candidates should be asked.

First, do you favor a crash program for development and deployment of a ship-based theater missile defense system to be deployed near Taiwan as needed? Second, do you favor prompt passage by the Senate--the House has passed it--of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which would establish close ties between the U.S. and Taiwan militaries, and would require the executive branch to inform Congress of the military supplies Taiwan seeks to purchase?

One reason all candidates should answer "yes" to both questions can be called Lord Nelson's Rule. Shortly before Trafalgar, Nelson, aboard HMS Victory with some of his officers, picked up a fire poker and said: "It matters not at all in what way I lay this poker on the floor. But if Bonaparte should say it must be placed in this direction, we must instantly insist on its being laid in some other one."

Which is why Congress should promptly respond to China's strictures against the Taiwan act and theater missile defense by demonstrating to Beijing that the Clinton era of infinite U.S. pliability is finite.

-- Vern (bacon17@ibm.net), March 02, 2000.

Vern,

Do you believe everything that the press writes about any given issue? Or is it just this one that you swallow hook, line and sinker?

I must go rent The Manchurian Candidate, heard it was a goodie.

-- Just Curious (jnmpow@flash.net), March 02, 2000.

Well, here are some clues that sober me and have for a while. America better wake up and smell the coffee. There are many in denial about the allegience between Russia and China. Then there are those who say, "well there is nothing I can do", and put their heads back in the sand. The liberal media will not warn this country's citizens into preparing or voting for candidates who want a strong defense. Early in '99 my preparations began in earnest for more than y2k. It is more terrifying than y2k and only God can stop it not. Will HE? Jeremiah 5.

Summary of Russian/China Threat

-- BB (peace2u@bellatlantic.net), March 02, 2000.

It would seem to me that Just Curious is incorrect on this one. I believe the press on this one because China issued a white paper stating what the press printed that it said.

Do I doubt the Chinese resolve to use nuclear weapons against the U.S. over Taiwan? No...but likewise I think that if they did so, there would be a lot more casualties (both to population and to real property usefulness) on the Chinese side than on the American side.

The Japanese once wakened a sleeping giant and filled it with a terrible resolve. Let us hope China is not drawn to the same fateful error.

-- LordR38 (woodburn@wgn.net), March 04, 2000.