Q/A exchange -- R.C. and Dr. Paula Gordon -- Embeddeds/Gov U gotta see this

greenspun.com : LUSENET : TimeBomb 2000 (Y2000) : One Thread

I posted a thread the other day entitled "What did our government know and when did it know it? [oil embedded chips problem] "

http://greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=0023hG

There is not a bad post on that thread. All were great. Go to the link and read the whole thread if you have the time. The thread is about to fall off the front page. I felt however that because Dr. Gordon just dropped some bombshells on me (and I thought I was pretty much already updated on everything) I figured many others may not realize and want to know also that might otherwise have missed her post because the thread was dying. Her comments should give you a greater insight as to how this gov't is actually working (or not working).

So I'm reposting the essential elements of her posts and my Questions/Comments and then her latest follow up reply so that we can all have a chance to read/evaluate her important information.

She explains the fumbled footballs by the key gov't players and how they're still not really getting the picture on embedded systems. To me its "scary" stuff and reveals an ineptitude that just frosts me to no end. What about you? What do you think? Should some heads roll over this in the next elections (assuming we have them)? Personally I'd like to have them all thrown out with 1-term term limits imposed.

Read and weep below:

-- R.C. (racambab@mailcity.com), December 22, 1999

Answers

I have tried in my White Paper on Y2K and Embedded Systems to address question of what persons in roles of responsibility in the U.S. government have understood concerning the nature and scope of embedded systems problems. I have tried to address the question of who failed to understand the problems, and who also failed to appreciate the implications of those problems for policy and action. See especially Parts 1, 2, 5, and 6 of my White Paper at http://www.edu/~y2k/keypeople/gordon. I have also addressed these issues in the "Comments, Essays, and Op- ed Pieces" which can be found at that same website. In addition, the real video website accessible from the GW website has videos of panels and briefings that address these issues. The November 23 panel program at GW University on national and global Y2K and embedded systems initiatives that are still needed is also available online on video in the C-SPAN archives at their website at http://www.c- span.org. (When you get to the C-SPAN archives, click on the November 23 GW panel program.)

I recognize that this is hard to accept, but the fact is that people in key roles of responsibility in agencies of the Federal government, responsible for preventing disasters, responding to disasters, or both, have simply been inadequately informed concerning embedded systems. They have typically had no one on staff with the expertise to help them understand these matters. This includes especially individuals who have responsibilities for any of a wide range of technological man-made disasters. And some of the people in roles of responsibility in the government who now as of November 1999 have a better comprehension of the seriousness of embedded systems problems have yet to demonstrate a full appreciation of the implications that this new understanding should have for policy and action. They have failed to take the action that should follow from their new found understanding. It is as if the failure to understand technological complexities has served as a major barrier to sound policy and action.

On top of this few of those who have been responsible for the manufacture and distribution of embedded systems that are destined to fail have come forward to help educate and persuade government officials from the President on down about the seriousness of the situation we are in. And until November of 1999, few who have significant hands on embedded systems expertise have either tried to be heard or succeeded in being heard by persons in key policymaking positions.

Since May of 1998, I have been looking for people in government, including individuals in the Congress and on Congressional staffs, who had an understanding of embedded systems and their implications. I have organized meetings between people with embedded systems expertise and individuals in roles of responsibility in these branches of government. To my knowledge, White House advisors were not in effect successfully "briefed" on these matters until November 9, 1999. Also, to my knowledge, the briefings that the President and Vice President had on these matters as early as 1995, did not result in sufficiently increasing the comprehension and concern of either. It also does not appear that either the President or the Vice President is aware of the implications of the statements and article released by the Department of Commerce (DOC), the National Institute for Standards and Technology (DOC), and the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion. Neither the President nor the Vice President has made any statement since November 9 concerning the scope and seriousness of the embedded systems problems that have yet to be addressed. Indeed, the comments on November 10 by the President reflected no knowledge of such matters whatsoever.

I have found very, very few individuals in policymaking roles in government who have a basic understanding of the seriousness of embedded systems problems. And most of those who have exhibited such understanding have failed for one reason or another to initiative the kinds of policies and actions need to help prevent and minimize the potential disasters that could result from malfunctioning embedded systems. For whatever reasons, only a very few of those who have had such an understanding or who have recently attained such an understanding have tried to make their influence felt. Only a very few have applied their understanding to action or at the very least a call to action. These individuals have not been in White House positions.

In the coming months, as the seriousness of embedded systems problems becomes a reality, one can only hope that those in leadership roles will be jarred into recognizing that it is incumbent upon them to apply adequate resources to these most serious threats and take action. I describe the course of action that they could take in my White Paper.

-- Paula Gordon (pgordon@erols.com), December 21, 1999.

------------------------------------------------------- R.C.'s Response Q's ------------------------------------------

Paula, Thank you for taking the time (out of what must still be a busy schedule) to provide input on this question.

You indicated that the gov't leaders "have simply been inadequately informed concerning embedded systems." This suggests passivity on their part. In other words, how aggressively did they pursue this? I ask this but I doubt that any of us could provide a documentable answer. Your post does lead me to think that gov't leadership on this issue of embeddeds must have therefore been rather passive and certainly lacked follow through. This is amazing to me because as a layman I did quickly come to consider the embeddeds problem to be a more insurmountable issue than simply software code remediation. I came to recognize the enormity and complexity of the embeddeds problem in early 1998 (though I was coming to terms with the overall Y2K issue in late 1997 and was substantially aware as early as 1995/96. [Though I remember the issue first broached in a computer class in 1969! but we were told not to worry, someone would fix it in 30 years! yeah, right!]

My point is that if I, as a layperson inquiring and educating myself in my spare time can figure this out (and I did so way back in time) surely those whose job called for such an understanding should have done so way back then. It is nearly inconceivable to me that those tasked with the issues of Y2K would have not aggressively pursued a thorough education on this important aspect of Y2K. I know if I were in that position of responsibility I would exhaustively research the issue. In my case as a layman, I didn't have to get exhausted to pick up the necessary elements to realize that embeddeds needed special monitoring and that self-reporting was untrustworthy.

It is hard for me to conceive that presidential advisors would not have had intelligence personnel extensively research all aspects of embeddeds issues and that the results would have been so benign in their conclusions. IF this is so, then it speaks volumes concerning the levels of incompetence within the Intelligence community. I find that a little hard to believe that they didn't know. I can accept the notion that intelligence sources knew and simply failed to educate top leadership personnel effectively. I can see that political minds would attempt to ignore it because they prefer to focus upon "happy" thoughts and thus ignore vital issues that might confuse and derail their "positive" approach to solutions.

In looking at your historical recap (and its very good, I take no issue with your work) I am amazed that leadership didn't call these people into the loop until last month. These people should have been identified by intelligence sources, contacted and brought forward by 1995 at the first Presidential briefing.

I guess the bottom line here Paula is this:

If the top levels of the Administration and Congress were unaware of the embeddeds problems until 1999 then there has been gross dereliction of duty and a complete failure by top leaders including the President. They were unworthy of the responsibilities entrusted to them. This applies equally to members of both parties. This is really a case of gross negligence and incompetence from the top all the way down to the bottom.

Frankly, I suspect that the buck passing started long ago. If so, as it seems by Koskinen's statements, then that these people really have known all along but refused to admit it and have been spinning excuses for their failures. If the gov't is just now finding out the full scope of embedded systems issues it only points to gross negligence on their part. They deserve the blame. IF, however, they knew long ago and even then realized it was hopeless and suppressed that information then we have another instance of gross incompetence and mismanagement in regards to preparations.

No matter how I look at it. The government is at fault here as much if not more so than industry. It's really the case of what happens when a government gets corrupted by big business in a bi-partisan manner.

Based upon the way this government has conducted itself so far, I am not optimistic that they will provide correct leadership to solve the problems that are about to descend upon us.

On a different note: What was your opinion of John Koskinen's recent comments at a National Press Club appearance regarding the embeddeds memo he recently made?

Again, thank you Paula for sharing this important information.

-- R.C. (racambab@mailcity.com), December 21, 1999.

------------------------------ Dr. Paula Gordon Responds to R.C. ----- ----------------------------

R.C. I wanted to respond to a few of the very thoughtful comments you made.

Quoting you:

"My point is that if I, as a layperson inquiring and educating myself in my spare time can figure this out (and I did so way back in time) surely those whose job called for such an understanding should have done so way back then. It is nearly inconceivable to me that those tasked with the issues of Y2K would have not aggressively pursued a thorough education on this important aspect of Y2K. I know if I were in that position of responsibility I would exhaustively research the issue. In my case as a layman, I didn't have to get exhausted to pick up the necessary elements to realize that embeddeds needed special monitoring and that self-reporting was untrustworthy."

Even comments about embedded systems that Bill Gates has made reflect a failure on his part to comprehend the problems that embedded systems failures can pose, including multiple, near simultaneous failures. One must spend at a bare minimum at least ten to twenty minutes with someone who not only knows about the nature and scope of the problem, but who is also able to communicate in understandable terms. If a person with Bill Gates' intelligence has not applied himself to learning about embedded systems, it becomes less of a surprise that persons in the government who had little or no expertise in technology to begin with, would do so. They might not even know what questions to begin to ask beyond: "What's an embedded system?" Indeed, I talked with several people in roles of responsibility in the Federal government in 1998 who have asked me that very question. One, in fact, was in the Office of the Vice President.

As for a sense of responsibility, I certainly agree that one just assumes that surely everyone who serves in government has such a sense of responsibility. It is a tragedy for our country that there are persons serving in government today who do not have such a sense of responsibility.

Quoting you again:

"It is hard for me to conceive that presidential advisors would not have had intelligence personnel extensively research all aspects of embeddeds issues and that the results would have been so benign in their conclusions. IF this is so, then it speaks volumes concerning the levels of incompetence within the Intelligence community. I find that a little hard to believe that they didn't know. I can accept the notion that intelligence sources knew and simply failed to educate top leadership personnel effectively. I can see that political minds would attempt to ignore it because they prefer to focus upon "happy" thoughts and thus ignore vital issues that might confuse and derail their "positive" approach to solutions."

I can personally attest to the fact that there are people who are knowledgeable concerning embedded systems who have either tried or volunteered to "educate" the President and the Vice President concerning the entire Y2K problem, including embedded systems. To my knowledge, such efforts began as long ago as 1995. That would be educators were not successful may say far more about the capacity or interest of the President and the Vice President to grapple with this subject, than it does with the competency of those who tried to educate them.

I personally know that the closest advisors of both the President and the Vice President have been provided materials on the subject of embedded systems since July of 1998. I have no idea whether those materials were ever read, or if read, if they were understood. I know that offers of technical briefings and invitations to panels on embedded systems were given to Presidential advisors beginning in the early summer of 1998 and again in December 1998, as well as several times in early 1999, including as late as May. The specific offers and invitations that I know about were not accepted.

In May of 1999 I learned that the President's Council had asked the National Institute for Standards and Technology to provide the Council with a kind of definitive review of embedded systems issues. Mr. Koskinen was seeking clarification concerning some specific issues. Several of these same issues turned out to be ones that I had brought up with him. Mr. Koskinen released a statement summarizing the concerns discussed at the November 9th meeting. That summary covered many of the issues that I, among others, had raised with him.

Quoting you again:

"In looking at your historical recap (and its very good, I take no issue with your work) I am amazed that leadership didn't call these people into the loop until last month. These people should have been identified by intelligence sources, contacted and brought forward by 1995 at the first Presidential briefing."

The President's Council's decision to seek clarification on embedded systems concerns did not start in November. The November 9th meeting was the culmination of efforts begun in April or May. I would add, however, that such efforts were long overdue even in April or May, let alone November.

Again quoting you:

"I guess the bottom line here Paula is this:

If the top levels of the Administration and Congress were unaware of the embeddeds problems until 1999 then there has been gross dereliction of duty and a complete failure by top leaders including the President. They were unworthy of the responsibilities entrusted to them. This applies equally to members of both parties. This is really a case of gross negligence and incompetence from the top all the way down to the bottom."

Your conclusions are quite similar to my own. Senator Bennett seemed to understand the embedded issue for a time between June and July of 1998 and early in 1999. Then in early 1999 the Senator became convinced by corporate leaders that he spoke with that embedded systems problems were not as great as he had previously been led to believe. For a variety of reasons, including, apparently, the political riskiness of holding onto such an unpopular point of view, Senator Bennett accepted the more sanguine appraisal and at times, seems to have all but declared a premature victory. Meanwhile the President does not seem to have comprehended the problem of embedded systems and the Vice President and his highest level staff seem to understand the significance of embedded systems even less.

Quoting you:

"Frankly, I suspect that the buck passing started long ago. If so, as it seems by Koskinen's statements, then that these people really have known all along but refused to admit it and have been spinning excuses for their failures.

If the gov't is just now finding out the full scope of embedded systems issues it only points to gross negligence on their part. They deserve the blame. IF, however, they knew long ago and even then realized it was hopeless and suppressed that information then we have another instance of gross incompetence and mismanagement in regards to preparations."

From my explorations of relevant background material here, I think that we are looking less at the suppression of information and far more at the failure to both gather the most pertinent information and assess its full significance. One needs to first grasp the significance of information before making a decision to suppress it. They truly did not grasp the significance of the information. True, this is unbelievable. It is nonetheless the conclusion that my information, knowledge, and experience compel me to believe. Quoting you:

"No matter how I look at it. The government is at fault here as much if not more so than industry. It's really the case of what happens when a government gets corrupted by big business in a bi-partisan manner."

I think that the failure to understand the complexities of the threats and challenges that face the nation and the world is more attributable to simple ignorance and lack of effort to try to understand. There has been a widespread failure on the part numerous people in key roles of responsibility to learn about the nature and scope of the technological aspects of the problems facing us. They have not gathered persons around them who have adequate technical expertise. The strategies that they have developed for addressing those problems are consequently less than adequate. The problem definition is simply an inadequate one. Even now the level of comprehension of technological complexities, let along organizational, sociological, psychological, and managerial aspects of the Y2K and embedded systems crisis are greating wanting. Perhaps, if the problem being faced were likely to have only a level 1 or 2 impact on the impact scale, the approach they have advocated would have been appropriate. Perhaps, too, their optimism might have some nearterm justification if there were no embedded systems issues, and if all the remediation and testing of all information systems, mission critical and non-mission critical, in both the public and private sectors were complete and tested. Such a sanguine view, however, would not be justified over the long run since the rest of the world has dealt with the remediation of information systems far less effectively than we have. The impacts that will be felt in other parts of the world will have major ripple effects that will have the most profound impacts on the U.S.

You wrote:

"Based upon the way this government has conducted itself so far, I am not optimistic that they will provide correct leadership to solve the problems that are about to descend upon us."

In Part 5 of my White Paper, I describe some alternatives in the event that the current leadership of the Federal government does not rise to the occasion. There is still an outside chance that they could. It would require incredible integrity to admit their failure to understand the nature and scope of the problem to date. It would require including persons in the decisionmaking process who possessed needed kinds of expertise. It would require applying adequate resources to addressing the set of problems facing us now and for the coming months and years.

You wrote:

"On a different note: What was your opinion of John Koskinen's recent comments at a National Press Club appearance regarding the embeddeds memo he recently made?"

If you are referring to the questions that were asked of Mr. Koskinen on November 10th (during and after the Press Conference), I felt that his comments demonstrated that he had taken a major step in the right direction. However, this new found realization that the embedded problem is far more serious than previously recognized, does not as yet appear to have been incorporated into any plan of action or change in overall strategy. Such a plan of action is going to have to be undertaken sooner or later if potential future impacts are to be significantly prevented or minimized over the coming months and years. There are embedded systems that will continue to be "ticking timebombs" until they are remediated. The high hazard areas have to be addressed proactively and head-on. There are still many opportunities to avoid having to "fix on failure". In fact, such opportunities will continue to exist for months, if not years to come.

A major task right now is that of getting the powers that be to recognize that we are not facing a single period of time when there are apt to be disruptions, unless you consider that the rollover period as a period of time that could last for months or years.

I hope to have a chance to address many of the issues discussed here in Part 7 of my White Paper. I will likely use there as well some of the thoughts developed here.

Best wishes,

-- Paula Gordon (pgordon@erols.com), December 21, 1999.

---------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------

End of Old Thread comments

-- R.C. (racambab@mailcity.com), December 22, 1999.

Paula,

This is just amazing to me. Thanks for the information... I'll have more comments a little later when I can digest the info and provide a more reasoned response. BTW, you're doing great work.

-- R.C. (racambab@mailcity.com), December 22, 1999.

RC, thanks for your effort here! This board is info overload, and I regret not staying current on late posts on threads that interest me.

-- Hokie (nn@va.com), December 22, 1999.

R.C. and Dr. Gordon: thank you. That's the best summary of how we got into this mess I have read so far. No conspiry theory involved just petty politics and ignorance, and failure to grasp the ramifications of the nature of the problem.

Infomagic was right along,...it's going to be a 10.

-- Sure M. Worried (SureMWorried@bout.Y2K.coming), December 22, 1999.

Hanlon's Razor: "Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity."

Couple of other maxims which are more specific to computer systems development:

"The first 90% of the code accounts for the first 90% of the development time. The remaining 10% of the code accounts for the other 90% of the development time."

and

"The time from now until the completion of the project tends to become constant."

But everyone said, "Y2K is different." Only in scale, friends. Not in kind.

-- Mac (sneak@lurk.com), December 22, 1999.

I almost fell over twice reading this, but the second time was from laughter. What was Paula's comment again? It may not be entirely too late for the president and vice president to act but they'd need what? I think she said, "incredible amounts of integrity"? Oh, man, that was as good as anything Groucho Marx ever came up with.

-- paul leblanc (bronyaur@gis.net), December 22, 1999.

Define "integrity".

-- Ron Schwarz (rs@clubvb.com.delete.this), December 22, 1999.

Paula,

Again, thank you for taking the time to share with us your thoughts on this. You are right there on the scene to report to us some critical aspects of how the gov't has handled what will now become a "mess" or worse. I for one truly appreciate it your tireless efforts as I am sure all the rest of the forum.

I did want to respond to some of your comments. Your take on Bill Gates was another eye-opener. I would certainly figure that he GI'd the embeddeds issue so your post was enlightening in that regard. I am shocked that he's not comprehended the problem. Of course he's primarily focused on software and not hardware except for PCs for small business and the home.

What I don't understand is why those in the intelligence community didn't have some top-notch people really checking this out and really educating themselves and others, in fact, becoming experts and capable of insisting that politicians at the White House and Congressional level grasp the same facts that you and I know. I mean the NSA/DIA/CIA should all have had top men researching this who could easily brief in a easily understood manner.

After all, it can't be that hard if even I (a tech dummy)can recognize the potential problems. I didn't know about embeddeds until I first heard about Y2K. The moment I did hear about it, I realized that it could pose a greater threat than code remediation. To me, it should be a no-brainer. Frankly, I don't think of myself as being very brilliant and my family could testify to my non-brilliance. :-) But I would think, that if I can get it, then at least our leaders in Washington should have been able to do so.

You did state something that I want to repeat and comment upon. You stated:

------ "I think that we are looking less at the suppression of information and far more at the failure to both gather the most pertinent information and assess its full significance. One needs to first grasp the significance of information before making a decision to suppress it. They truly did not grasp the significance of the information. True, this is unbelievable. It is nonetheless the conclusion that my information, knowledge, and experience compel me to believe." -------

I am glad that you have pointed this out. I think that this does help us better understand that this is an issue of incompetence by neglect rather than something of a conspiratorial and plotting nature. Yet, I do wonder why have did they have command bunkers and take such extraordinary steps if they really don't get it about the embeddeds? Are these drastic preparations being taken because they are that concerned about code remediation?

For a long time I didn't really focus or grasp the significance of the 'wrap around' effect of embeddeds, and just focused upon the main date factor.

This "wrap-around" issue is being overlooked by even those of us here on the forum and "doomerland" who've been focused upon the main event. I guess this may be so because its hard for me to picture how far out the problems in a given "oil" application might play out. I'd figure

-- Darlene (boomer@tdstelme.net), December 30, 1999

Answers

Good morning all.

-- Darlene (boomer@tdstelme.net), December 30, 1999.

Hi Darlene - Is this where the action is going to be?

-- Delurking (delurking@no.w), December 30, 1999.