Although this is a little old, I though you'd all find it interesting as it shows what kind of dramatic effect can happen (i.e. The Yorktown has been towed into port several times because of the systems failures) with just one very small bug that can't be fixed when we not under pressure. Makes me wonder what's going to happen to all the embedded systems.

GOVERNMENT COMPUTER NEWS

GCN July 13, 1998

Software glitches leave Navy Smart Ship dead in the water

By Gregory Slabodkin GCN Staff

The Navys Smart Ship technology may not be as smart as the service contends.

Although PCs have reduced workloads for sailors aboard the Aegis missile cruiser USS Yorktown, software glitches resulted in system failures and crippled ship operations, according to Navy officials.

Navy brass have called the Yorktown Smart Ship pilot a success in reducing manpower, maintenance and costs. The Navy began running shipboard applications under Microsoft Windows NT so that fewer sailors would be needed to control key ship functions.

But the Navy last fall learned a difficult lesson about automation: The very information technology on which the ships depend also makes them vulnerable. The Yorktown last September suffered a systems failure when bad data was fed into its computers during maneuvers off the coast of Cape Charles, Va.

The ship had to be towed into the Naval base at Norfolk, Va., because a database overflow caused its propulsion system to fail, according to Anthony DiGiorgio, a civilian engineer with the Atlantic Fleet Technical Support Center in Norfolk.

We are putting equipment in the engine room that we cannot maintain and, when it fails, results in a critical failure, DiGiorgio said. It took two days of pierside maintenance to fix the problem.

The Yorktown has been towed into port after other systems failures, he said.

Not officially

Atlantic Fleet officials acknowledged that the Yorktown last September experienced what they termed an engineering local area network casualty, but denied that the ships systems failure lasted as long as DiGiorgio said. The Yorktown was dead in the water for about two hours and 45 minutes, fleet officials said, and did not have to be towed in.

This is the only time this casualty has occurred and the only propulsion casualty involved with the control system since May 2, 1997, when software configuration was frozen, Vice Adm. Henry Giffin, commander of the Atlantic Fleets Naval Surface Force, reported in an Oct. 24, 1997, memorandum.

Giffin wrote the memo to describe what really happened in hope of clearing the scuttlebutt surrounding the incident, he noted.

The Yorktown lost control of its propulsion system because its computers were unable to divide by the number zero, the memo said. The Yorktowns Standard Monitoring Control System administrator entered zero into the data field for the Remote Data Base Manager program. That caused the database to overflow and crash all LAN consoles and miniature remote terminal units, the memo said.

The program administrators are trained to bypass a bad data field and change the value if such a problem occurs again, Atlantic Fleet officials said.

But the Yorktowns failure in September 1997 was not as simple as reported, DiGiorgio said.

If you understand computers, you know that a computer normally is immune to the character of the data it processes, he wrote in the June U.S. Naval Institutes Proceedings Magazine. Your $2.95 calculator, for example, gives you a zero when you try to divide a number by zero, and does not stop executing the next set of instructions. It seems that the computers on the Yorktown were not designed to tolerate such a simple failure.

The Navy reduced the Yorktown crew by 10 percent and saved more than $2.8 million a year using the computers. The ship uses dual 200-MHz Pentium Pros from Intergraph Corp. of Huntsville, Ala. The PCs and server run NT 4.0 over a high-speed, fiber-optic LAN.

Blame it on the OS

But according to DiGiorgio, who in an interview said he has serviced automated control systems on Navy ships for the past 26 years, the NT operating system is the source of the Yorktowns computer problems.

NT applications aboard the Yorktown provide damage control, run the ships control center on the bridge, monitor the engines and navigate the ship when under way.

Using Windows NT, which is known to have some failure modes, on a warship is similar to hoping that luck will be in our favor, DiGiorgio said.

Pacific and Atlantic fleets in March 1997 selected NT 4.0 as the standard OS for both networks and PCs as part of the Navys Information Technology for the 21st Century initiative. Current guidance approved by the Navys chief information officer calls for all new applications to run under NT.

Ron Redman, deputy technical director of the Fleet Introduction Division of the Aegis Program Executive Office, said there have been numerous software failures associated with NT aboard the Yorktown.

Refining that is an ongoing process, Redman said. Unix is a better system for control of equipment and machinery, whereas NT is a better system for the transfer of information and data. NT has never been fully refined and there are times when we have had shutdowns that resulted from NT.

Hauled in

The Yorktown has been towed into port several times because of the systems failures, he said.

Because of politics, some things are being forced on us that without political pressure we might not do, like Windows NT, Redman said. If it were up to me I probably would not have used Windows NT in this particular application. If we used Unix, we would have a system that has less of a tendency to go down.

Although Unix is more reliable, Redman said, NT may become more reliable with time.

The Navy is moving the services command and control applications from Unix to NT as part of IT-21. Under IT-21, the Navy also plans to modernize ships in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets with asynchronous transfer mode LANs. Large ATM networks running NT have already been installed on the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Essex.

But DiGiorgio said the LANs might experience a chain reaction of computer failures like those experienced on the Yorktown. That domino effect is inherent to the system design of shipboard LANs, he said.

There is very little segregation of error when software shares bad data, DiGiorgio said. Instead of one computer knocking off on the Yorktown, they all did, one after the other. What if this happened in actual combat?

Although the Yorktown did not have backup systems, Redman said that future Smart Ships will have systems redundancy to ensure that ships can continue to operate.

But DiGiorgio said that the Smart Ship project needs to do more engineering up front.

Installing a control system on a warship and resolving problems as the project progresses is a costly and naive process, DiGiorgio wrote in the Proceedings article. Now, with the top people rotated off the Smart Ship Project, it would be wise for the Navy to investigate this fiasco more fully.

Redman has a different perspective. If it were me, I wouldnt say all the things that Tony [DiGiorgio] has said out of discretion and consideration for being a long-term employee, he said. But I will say this about Tony, hes a very bright engineer.

Everybody plays the obedience role where you cannot criticize the system, said DiGiorgio, a self-described whistle-blower. Im not that kind of guy.

-- Interested Spectator (is@the_ring.side), December 21, 1999

Answers

Excuse, please Excuse me. Was there more than one Carrier named "York Town"? If not, then the original York Town was in use in WWII. The article was dated 1998. Well! it was time to retire that Carrier, it was 50 years old! Had nothing to do with Y2K and NT!.

-- I Have Eaten (crow@morethanonce.com), December 21, 1999.

During the first half of 1970, Yorktown operated out of Norfolk and began preparations for inactivation. On 27 June 1970, Yorktown was decommissioned at Philadelphia, Pa., and was berthed with the Philadelphia Group, Atlantic Reserve Fleet. She remained there almost three years before her name was struck from the Navy list on 1 June 1973. During 1974, the Navy Department approved the donation of Yorktown to the Patriot's Point Development Authority, Charleston, S.C. She was towed from Bayonne, N.J., to Charleston S.C., in June of 1975. She was formally dedicated as a memorial on the 200th anniversary of the Navy, 13 October 1975. As of April 1980, she was still on display at Patriot's Point, S.C.

-- Rob (maxovrdrv51@hotmail.com), December 21, 1999.

This is an Aegis missile crusier not a carrier. I have seen different classes of ships with the same name before.

-- Interested Spectator (is@the_ring.side), December 21, 1999.

Read 'em and weep--

AEGIS COMBAT SYSTEM: A CONTINUING COLLECTION OF AEGIS DOCUMENTATION

Statem ent of The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Honorable Paul G. Kaminski Before the House Committee on National Security on Defense Acquisition Reform. February 26, 1997

"New national security challenges require DoD to design a more flexible, agile, and timely acquisition system capable of meeting unpredictable threats. This means that the DoD acquisition system must improve it's support to the war fighter by reducing the acquisition cycle time and leveraging the latest available technologies, particularly information technology.

"Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that our acquisition system is responding well to this challenge. The Army's major initiative in this area is called Force XXI. In the Navy, it's called Smart Ship. The Air Force is standing up six new battle labs. And on a Department- wide basis, our Bosnia Command and Control Augmentation and Advanced Concept technology Demonstration initiatives are providing unprecedented support to the NATO Implementation/Stabilization Force (I/SFOR) in Bosnia and our operational forces deployed around the globe."

Another instructive episode in the ongoing chronicle of Unintended Consequences.

-- Tom Carey (tomcarey@mindspring.com), December 21, 1999.

The Japanese sank the original Yorktown (carrier) at the Battle of Midway in 1942.

-- History Lesson (history@ww.2), December 21, 1999.

This post is BOGUS, until someone can prove differently!!!!! The Smart Ships are nuclear, the York Town was never a Smart Ship! Check it out for yourself! It was OLD, OUTDATED, USELESS! http://www.warships1.com/UScv05_Yorktown_history.htm

-- I Have Eaten (crow@morethanonce.com), December 21, 1999.

USS Yorktown is a CG-47 Ticonderoga-class Aegis guided missile cruiser. She is indeed the testbed for the Navy's SmartShip project. Her purpose in this project was to test and evaluate SmartShip systems in a real Naval environment. As the original post stated, this is a bit old. Failure teaches many things...

-- Spindoc' (spindoc_99_2000@HeadDown.Now), December 21, 1999.

BTW, if you do a Yahoo search for USS YORKTOWN, DoD firewalls will prevent you from accessing info on this ship (for very good reasons, IMHO). However, you will find that the ship is question is designated USS YORKTOWN, CG-48. Even Jane's Ships will give you that much. A proud name for a gallant ship of the line.

-- Spindoc' (spindoc_99_2000@HeadDown.Now), December 22, 1999.

Okay, all you Navy people, let this be put to "Right" or pasture! And believe me, I can check validation of each ones statement. Can I get a show of Hands here!

-- I Have Eaten (crow@morethanonce.com), December 22, 1999.

Link

Cruisers - CG, CGN

Updated: December 7, 1999

Description: Large combat vessel with multiple target response capability.

Features: Modern U. S. Navy guided missile cruisers perform primarily in a Battle Force role. These ships are multi-mission (AAW, ASW, ASUW) surface combatants capable of supporting carrier battle groups, amphibious forces, or of operating independently and as flagships of surface action groups. Due to their extensive combat capability, these ships have been designated as Battle Force Capable (BFC) units. The cruisers are equipped with Tomahawk ASM/LAM giving them additional long range strike mission capability.

Background: Technological advances in the Standard Missile coupled with the AEGIS combat system in Ticonderoga class cruisers and the upgrading of older cruisers have increased the AAW capability of surface combatants to pinpoint accuracy from wave-top to zenith. The addition of Tomahawk ASM/LAM in the CG-47, CGN-36 and CGN-38 classes, has vastly complicated unit target planning for any potential enemy and returned an offensive strike role to the surface forces that seemed to have been lost to air power at Pearl Harbor.

The California-class nuclear-powered guided-missile cruisers were inactivated at the end of Fiscal Year 1998

Point of Contact: Department of the Navy (OP-03PA) Washington, D.C. 20350-2000

General Characteristics, Ticonderoga Class

Builders: Ingalls Shipbuilding: CG 47-50, CG 52-57, 59,62, 65-66, 68-69, 71-73 Bath Iron Works: CG-51,58,60-61,63-64,67,70. Power Plant:4 General Electric LM 2500 gas turbine engines; 2 shafts, 80,000 shaft horsepower total. Length: 567 feet (172.82 meters) Beam: 55 feet (16.76 meters) Displacement: 9,600 long tons (9,754.06 metric tons) full load Speed: 30+ knots (34.52+mph, 55.55+ kph) Aircraft: Two SH-2 Seasprite (LAMPS) in CG 47-48; Two SH-60 Sea Hawk (LAMPS III) Cost: About $1 billion each Ships: USS Ticonderoga (CG 47), Pascagoula, Miss. USS Yorktown (CG 48), Pascagoula, Miss. USS Vincennes (CG 49), Yokosuka, Japan USS Valley Forge (CG 50), San Diego, Calif. USS Thomas S. Gates (CG 51), Pascagoula, Miss. USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), San Diego, Calif. USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), Yokosuka, Japan USS Antietam (CG 54), San Diego, Calif. USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55), Norfolk, Va. USS San Jacinto (CG 56), Norfolk, Va. USS Lake Champlain (CG 57), San Diego, Calif. USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), Norfolk, Va. USS Princeton (CG 59), San Diego, Calif. USS Normandy (CG 60), Norfolk, Va. USS Monterey (CG 61), Norfolk, Va. USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), Yokosuka, Japan USS Cowpens (CG 63), San Diego, Calif. USS Gettysburg (CG 64), Norfolk, Va. USS Chosin (CG 65), Pearl Harbor, HI USS Hue City (CG 66), Mayport, Fla. USS Shiloh (CG 67), San Diego, Calif. USS Anzio (CG 68), Norfolk, Va. USS Vicksburg (CG 69), Mayport, Fla. USS Lake Erie (CG 70), Pearl Harbor, HI USS Cape St. George (CG 71), Norfolk, Va. USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), Norfolk, Va. USS Port Royal (CG 73), Pearl Harbor, HI Crew: 24 Officers, 340 Enlisted Armament: MK26 missile launcher (CG 47 thru CG 51) or MK41 vertical launching system (CG 52 thru CG 73) Standard Missile (MR); Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC); Tomahawk ASM/LAM; Six MK-46 torpedoes (from two triple mounts); Two MK 45 5-inch/54 caliber lightweight guns; Two Phalanx close-in-weapons systems Date Deployed: 22 January 1983 (USS Ticonderoga)

-- hiding in plain (sight@edge. of no-where), December 22, 1999.

Mr. Crow,

Look it up.

USS YORKTOWN.

CG-48.

Non-Nuclear-fueled.

OK?

-- Spindoc' (spindoc_99_2000@HeadDown.Now), December 22, 1999.

Thanks, Hiding IPS.

-- Spindoc' (spindoc_99_2000@HeadDown.Now), December 22, 1999.

Re-formatted for easier reading:

NOTE: Link to the USS Yorktown is embedded in listing below.

Link to Navy Fact File:Cruisers

Cruisers - CG, CGN

Updated: December 7, 1999

Description: Large combat vessel with multiple target response capability.

Features: Modern U. S. Navy guided missile cruisers perform primarily in a Battle Force role. These ships are multi-mission (AAW, ASW, ASUW) surface combatants capable of supporting carrier battle groups, amphibious forces, or of operating independently and as flagships of surface action groups. Due to their extensive combat capability, these ships have been designated as Battle Force Capable (BFC) units. The cruisers are equipped with Tomahawk ASM/LAM giving them additional long range strike mission capability.

Background: Technological advances in the Standard Missile coupled with the AEGIS combat system in Ticonderoga class cruisers and the upgrading of older cruisers have increased the AAW capability of surface combatants to pinpoint accuracy from wave-top to zenith. The addition of Tomahawk ASM/LAM in the CG-47, CGN-36 and CGN-38 classes, has vastly complicated unit target planning for any potential enemy and returned an offensive strike role to the surface forces that seemed to have been lost to air power at Pearl Harbor.

The California-class nuclear-powered guided-missile cruisers were inactivated at the end of Fiscal Year 1998

Point of Contact:
Department of the Navy (OP-03PA)
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000

General Characteristics, Ticonderoga Class

Builders:

Ingalls Shipbuilding: CG 47-50, CG 52-57, 59,62, 65-66, 68-69, 71-73

Bath Iron Works: CG-51,58,60-61,63-64,67,70.

Power Plant:4 General Electric LM 2500 gas turbine engines; 2 shafts, 80,000 shaft horsepower total.

Length: 567 feet (172.82 meters)

Beam: 55 feet (16.76 meters)

Displacement: 9,600 long tons (9,754.06 metric tons) full load

Speed: 30+ knots (34.52+mph, 55.55+ kph)

Aircraft: Two SH-2 Seasprite (LAMPS) in CG 47-48; Two SH-60 Sea Hawk (LAMPS III)

Cost: About $1 billion each

Ships:

USS Ticonderoga (CG 47), Pascagoula, Miss.

USS YORKTOWN (CG 48) , Pascagoula, Miss.

USS Vincennes (CG 49), Yokosuka, Japan

USS Valley Forge (CG 50), San Diego, Calif.

USS Thomas S. Gates (CG 51), Pascagoula, Miss.

USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), San Diego, Calif.

USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), Yokosuka, Japan

USS Antietam (CG 54), San Diego, Calif.

USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55), Norfolk, Va.

USS San Jacinto (CG 56), Norfolk, Va.

USS Lake Champlain (CG 57), San Diego, Calif.

USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), Norfolk, Va.

USS Princeton (CG 59), San Diego, Calif.

USS Normandy (CG 60), Norfolk, Va.

USS Monterey (CG 61), Norfolk, Va.

USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), Yokosuka, Japan

USS Cowpens (CG 63), San Diego, Calif.

USS Gettysburg (CG 64), Norfolk, Va.

USS Chosin (CG 65), Pearl Harbor, HI

USS Hue City (CG 66), Mayport, Fla.

USS Shiloh (CG 67), San Diego, Calif.

USS Anzio (CG 68), Norfolk, Va.

USS Vicksburg (CG 69), Mayport, Fla.

USS Lake Erie (CG 70), Pearl Harbor, HI

USS Cape St. George (CG 71), Norfolk, Va.

USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), Norfolk, Va.

USS Port Royal (CG 73), Pearl Harbor, HI

Crew: 24 Officers, 340 Enlisted

Armament:

MK26 missile launcher (CG 47 thru CG 51) or MK41 vertical launching system (CG 52 thru CG 73)

Standard Missile (MR); Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC); Tomahawk ASM/LAM; Six MK-46 torpedoes (from two triple mounts); Two MK 45 5-inch/54 caliber lightweight guns; Two Phalanx close-in-weapons systems

Date Deployed: 22 January 1983 (USS Ticonderoga)

-- hiding in plain (sight@edge. of no-where), December 22, 1999.

forgot to close the first link ... my apologies.

2nd Link to the Yorktown works tho!

-- hiding in plain (sight@edge. of no-where), December 22, 1999.

Ok, now that everybody has debated weather this ship is part of the "Manhatten Project" (hope you've seen the movie to understand the metaphor), is any body going to comment on my original observation and the fact that as the article talks about massive cascade failures from just one system going down. Yes its a 1998 article, but the technology is current and therefore the issues are current and very relevant to learn from to understand what can quite easily happen due to y2k, particularly since those working on y2k haven't had the luxury of working under no pressure, have not been able to do adequate testing, haven't even got around to fixing all mission critical systems, let alone the non-mission critical systems (why do I get the feeling that those "non-mission" critical systems are going to become more critical because of the side effects they are going to create in the "critical" systems).

-- Interested Spectator (is@the_ring.side), December 22, 1999.

Chazam! This air tight ammo might take me more than tommorrow to verify, what with Christmas Shut downs and such. But the Fat Lady hasn't sung yet! Thank you, for food for thought, and reasons to investigate myself, to get gray matter working. If I can find REASON TO REBUKE YOU, I will, but it will be from the Horses mouths (Johnny six pack) mouths, those in the Trenches. Heaven's Speed.

-- I Have Eaten (crow@morethanonce.com), December 22, 1999.

What will navy be down to in 2000? Galley, long ship, man'o war, ironclad, dreadnought?

-- Ocotillo (peeling@out.===), December 22, 1999.

Interested Spectator,

Yes, I saw the movie.

Yes, it was understood about cascading failures. The personnel on YORKTOWN got that very quickly. Sitting dead in the water off Hampton Roads was a powerfull lesson. In 1998. It still is.

I am not a polly. Understand now? Or are you as dense as Mr Crow?

-- Spindoc' (spindoc_99_2000@HeadDown.Now), December 22, 1999.

Spindoc:

No more than you. And since it seems that are since you are also monitoring this thread very frequently right now, I would assume you are doing so probably because like me you looking for some one to post something more relevant than the debate that just ensued, which seemed a bit pointless since the I think we can assume those quoted in the article would know what the Yorktown is and what happened.

-- Interested Spectator (is@the_ring.side), December 22, 1999.

IS:

Using this ship, as an example.

BTW: the following is NOT classified y'all. Do some net research! Amazing what you can learn. Also, back when things were tough in the Gulf off Saudi, escorting tankers as the such (I'm sure some of you are old enough to remember this) ... this particular ship took a hit from a missile. A lot was said on the satellite feed news at the time about the ship and how it operated. Not sure how much press it received here stateside at the time tho!

Anyway ...

When the Aegis weapon system is online, command and control functions are routed through what is known as the FG&C (fire guidance and control) System. Once this system identifies and locks onto a target, it takes command of helm, navigation, and ship control systems until the FG&C launches weapons and confirms 'kill.' Until the Aegis radar systems provide the confirmation signal to the FG&C, the FG&C retains control of the ship. During this time, the FG&C manuevers the ship in such a manner as to allow the correct course and speed for additional weapon launches if needed.

If any comand and control inputs to either the FG&C and/or Ship Command and Control System or their subsystems or either looses synchronization or the fiber optic communications systems --- ship is dead in the water.

In other words, ONE faulty embedded has the possibility of rendering the entire ship a floating junk pile. (Neatly assembled piece of junk tho it may be! :-)

A chain is only as strong as its' weakest link.

-- hiding in plain (sight@edge. of no-where), December 22, 1999.

Interested Spectator,

I've been on YORKTOWN. Post your real addy, and I will reply as best I can. Sorry, times are tense right now.

-- Spindoc' (spindoc_99_2000@HeadDown.now), December 22, 1999.

Thanks sys-op person ... looks a lot better now! Much obliged!

-- hiding in plain (sight@edge. of no-where), December 22, 1999.

Hiding,

You're right, I should have said "DoD firewalls will prevent you from accessing CURRENT info on this ship"...

As it should be.

-- Spindoc' (spindoc_99_2000@HeadDown.Now), December 22, 1999.

Wouldn't post otherwise spindoc ... :-)

Been on the line ... opsec is a way of life ... :-)

-- hiding in plain (sight@edge. of no-where), December 22, 1999.

Basic information about the ship(s) in question is correct.

More important is the lesson learned in "simple" failures that shutdown the engineroom....very embarrassing lesson.

Will others break down? Possiibly. Very, very likely. If they are in port - as expected during a holiday - at least the failures will be less obvious. (Until they have to get underway to protect Taiwan or Korea that is.)

More important - after one hit during combat elsewhere in the ship - yes, I know they shockmount computers! - I'm predicting disruption and shutdown too.

Every destroyer/cruiser size ship hit by even only one weapon (some of them duds) since late WWII has lost either power, propulsion, weapons systems, or communication systems.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), December 22, 1999.

Sorry, Robert.

The US suffered one ship casualty during the Gulf War. What was it?

The CG-51......the first of the Aegis line to use the SPY-1B radar system.....was serving to control air traffic (combat) in the Gulf when she struck a mine. The ship later limped back to port with a major bend midships. An acquaintance was taking a shower when she hit the mine......he bounced off the ceiling.

But, the 51 maintained full operation of her Combat System and continued in her role of controlling US aircraft. No loss of Combat System function, no loss of power, etc.

BTW, I've been on Yorktown, too, as well as the lead ship Ticonderoga (CG-47) and a few others, including the 51. The initial Combat System was developed by one contractor. The ship used militarized computers.......I have more computing power and speed in my desktop. But, they are big hunks of shock mounted, carefully cooled iron. They are reliable, and man are the programs tested. The Yorktown fiasco was the result of putting Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) computers in to replace manual functions......strickly a Navy decision.

-- (not@telling.now), December 22, 1999.

Let's hope they've got rid of all their Windoze trash by now.

Godspeed,

-- Pinkrock (aphotonboy@aol.com), December 22, 1999.

No, I'll politely but firmly disagree with you there: from engineering analysis of the residual hull strength after the explosion, the cracks and tears in the hull and frame sections going topside on both sides (almost all the way up to the main deck, and from the immediate drop of electric power and propulsion due to shock - the naval arch's predicted that she would have broken in two if the seas were not calm that day.

Even with calm seas, she could not - until the gas turbines and 400 HZ generators and power supplies were reset to the weapons systems - even detect targets and control the fire control system, much less launch missiles or shhot guns. Thus she she could not immediately defend herself, much less propell herself out of danger. Once the hull cracks were re-welded with patches and strengthening plates, then they could tow her into port - to cross the Atlantic and Indian Oceans for repairs, she had to placed "piggy-back" on a salvage ship - too weak to even open ocean!

---...--

Same thing happened to the Stark (no power after a dud missile impact). I've lookd up 24 other similar cases - the modern frigate/destroyer/"cruiser" sized ships are more fragile than ever....turns the old saying around:

Used to be "Wooden Ships and Iron Men...then Steel Ships and Iron men, it's now Glass Ships and Stolen Men.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), December 22, 1999.

My error. I'll agree with you on the fire control system.

On the subs, and on the earlier version of the NTDS systems, all were typically lost on any "bump" - even during the much vaunted "shock tests" - standard procedure was to remove electronics lest it be broken. The Navy computers were rugged - but the power to them invariably tripped circuit breakers, invertors, rotating equipment such as pumps, radars themselves, generators, and cooling systems.

It was those losses (not the computer itself) that was most often as fault.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Marietta, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), December 22, 1999.