[FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY]

Published at URL: http://www.emergency.com/emrchaos.htm

Special to EmergencyNet News Service: 09/17/97

Emergency Service Multi-System Disruption and Recovery
During Catastrophic Events

By: James P. Denney, MICP
Daved Vanstralen, MD
Michael Denney, ISE

The probability of a catastrophic occurrence, expressed as numerical risk, does not help in planning. However, the possibility of an event, or the degree or ease that it will occur, allows incorporation of uncertainty into decision making. Possibility is whether an event can happen; probability is frequency, or whether an event will happen.

This appears to be random and stochastic. Cooperative emergency planning prepares system components and their assets to respond in an organized, coordinated manner to a-historic uncontrolled catastrophic events when they occur.

In the modern emergency management system the sharing of information and the interdependence of operational assets has resulted in a form of symbiosis that also directly impacts the extended system and its' processes. Theoretically, independent actions or the failure of a single component may result in negative consequences to other components and system effectiveness may be significantly impaired, particularly following an event of magnitude.

Chaos

It has been stated that the transitional period from peak to threshold, or onset and reaction is represented by chaos and that chaos is the transitional phase between routine and extraordinary response. In fact, chaos represents the transition from one physical state to another (Phase order transition). In this case, from an in- tact emergency management system to a fragmented system where agency communication failure and critical facility loss has occurred. Chaos is predictably unpredictable, events are not completely random and outcome is sensitive to initial conditions. Since time of intervention is unpredictable, outcomes will vary, the decision-maker becomes part of the system and chosen courses of action will change the catastrophe.

Catastrophes occur in open systems. Our knowledge of the system is always partial, approximate at best and objects and events do not conform precisely to mathematical models. Therefore, catastrophe cannot be measured to degree yet it will exist. There is multivalence in catastrophe to degree and to attribute. Catastrophe can be from physical, social or medical threat dimensions and varying degrees along each dimension. It then follows that the ability for assets to respond and bring control to catastrophe is also multivalent.

As a result system fragmentation may occur, and system fragmentation may be perceived as system failure by inexperienced emergency managers. The sense of urgency associated with disaster and the concern that problems will become worse in the absence of appropriate action creates an air of uncertainty concerning what has happened or is likely to happen, coupled with a stron urge to take some action "before it is too late."

Catastrophes are non-linear systems. Social, physical and medical threats may be placed into an equation but the equations are not additive. Signals from a catastrophe have time duration. Each signal has an uncertainty. Increasing time duration will decrease uncertainty. However, the catastrophe will have changed during that time. Thus, decisions must be made during a catastrophe with uncertain data. Large time signals to produce information leave out information because of averaging the time signal. Thus, decisions must be made with short time signals, adapting to rapid changes of this open system. The problem, however, may be deciding which action to take.

Actions are shaped by contingent, unpredictable circumstances. Leaders are active participants and their actions shape the catastrophe, just as the external events that started the catastrophe do. The cascade that started with the initiating event will not stop, but can be directed. The goal may be to increase chances of success while decreasing chances of failure.

Emergency Reaction can Strongly Influence Initial Emergency Managers.

Fight reactions, mediated by adrenaline, may cause the initial manager to rely too heavily on emotion in decision making and argue unsupportable positions. Flight reactions, also mediated by adrenaline, may cause these early managers to avoid decisions or even deny a catastrophe has started. Freeze reactions, mediated by cortisol, may cause confused states and inaction in the emergency manager.

Hypervigilance may develop into a state of panic or near-panic. Early managers engage in a frantic search for a way out, are overwhelmed by an overload of information, some of it with questionable accuracy. Over-reaction occurs to bits of unreliable information, rumors, warnings, and advice about potential threats. Vacillation becomes the response as one course of action seems less dangerous, than another. Commitment may be impulsively made to hastily contrived courses of action without taking fully into account undesirable consequence. Mediating conditions for hypervigilence include insufficient time to avoid threat, rapid onset of danger, and all courses of action appear risky. Contributing environmental conditions include restrictions of activity, deprivation of sensing and lack of contact with supportive persons. It is for these reasons that early efforts to reconstruct the system during an emergency may actually result in system failure.

Vigilance is an adaptive pattern that develops when there is more painstaking search for relevant information, assimilation of new information in an unbiased manner, and careful appraisal of alternatives before deciding. It becomes ok to do nothing, to wait. Essential conditions for vigilance include belief that serious risks exist for any choice of action, it is realistic to be optimistic as a better alternative can be found, and there is time to find the better choice. This requires mental decompressing time for better judgment.

The average emergency management system is actually composed of multiple micro systems that include hospitals, ambulances, fire departments, law enforcement and relief agencies that may or may not have a shared means of communication. Experience has demonstrated that if these micro systems have common capabilities and regularly train and interact with each other they will continue to do so whether or not the emergency management system is in tact. This is a direct result of the imbedding of purpose within individual system components.

Normal Accident Theory explains that systems are so complex that accidents are inevitable. However, High Reliability Theory, as recent studies aboard U.S. Navy Aircraft carriers and F-14 squadrons shows, explains that complexity can mitigate risk. High Reliability Organizations use organizational structure to adapt to and then mitigate the uncommon yet catastrophic event.

As stated, localized micro systems will evolve within a fragmented system (fractal percolation) and perform flawlessly during an emergency. These localized micro systems will link to other micro systems and, at some point during the event, a new emergency management system will evolve that is composed of elements of the original system (second phase order transition and complex self- organized system evolution). Nonlinear systems have greater complexity than linear (Chaos is a non-linear system).

The re-formed emergency management system will implement condition specific management methodologies that will be utilized until demobilization occurs, at which time the system will incorporate lessons learned and return to its' pre-catastrophe state. Then, through process auditing, reward systems, risk awareness, and decision migration (a few of the processes) the routine management system can again quickly accelerate and respond to catastrophes.

A catastrophic failure of the specialized computer information systems utilized by emergency managers may seriously impact the intervening period between onset and response to an emergency event; thereby greatly extending the transition period outlined in the chaos model. When a failure occurs, managers trained to depend on systems that extend their communication and control capability, are forced to rely on manual systems that, by default, introduce additional elements of uncertainty into the mix.

The innate weakness of specialized systems is their proprietary nature. In most cases interoperability between jurisdictions is not available (with the exception of mutual aid radio frequencies). The result is fractionalized micro-systems that, although effective, are strained by a lack of ready information leading to less than optimal utilization of resources.

It is important that emergency managers understand these concepts and incorporate them into their planning efforts.

Copyright by Emergencynet News and the authors. Author contact information: Micheal Denney -909-736-8130 or Starbuc122@aol.com, Dr. Vanstralen - 909-824-4250, or James Denney - JCHV72A@prodigy.com

Return to the Disaster Operations Page

-- Critt Jarvis (critt@critt.com), October 07, 1999

Answers

Critt

Great find! Best example of chaos evaluation and social breakdown I have seen. Who ever wrote this knew their stuff. How unusual.

-- Brian (imager@home.com), October 07, 1999.

Given one of my avocations, this is GREAT STUFF and RIGHT ON in terms of responses, Chaos Theory explanations, and actually helps to explain some of what I have seen in the field (particularly the brain chemistry part).

chuck

-- Chuck, a night driver (rienzoo@en.com), October 08, 1999.

Good one, Critt.

...Chaos is predictably unpredictable, events are not completely random and outcome is sensitive to initial conditions. Since time of intervention is unpredictable, outcomes will vary, the decision-maker becomes part of the system and chosen courses of action will change the catastrophe. ...

Choices... choices.

Diane

-- Diane J. Squire (sacredspaces@yahoo.com), October 08, 1999.