I've been wondering why this didn't make the news anywhere but the NRC's reports, I wasn't sure where this plant was located when I read the report. Can you imagine that this occurred only 24 miles up the Hudson River from NYC and hardly anything has been mentioned in NY press? Yikes. I've posted the original reports at the bottom of this story as well for anyone who didn't read it before. The electricity web debaters have been talking about how diesel gen backups don't always work, this is prime example. Does anyone care?

For educational and research purposes only: In the story headlined "N.Y. Indian Point 3 nuke shutdown for several days," please read headline as "Indian Point 2 nuke off line for days"... (Corrects number of nuclear unit from 3, which is still operating.) A corrected version follows. NEW YORK, Sept 2 (Reuters) - Consolidated Edison Inc. (Con Ed) said Thursday its 975-megawatt (MW) Indian Point 2 nuclear unit will remain off line for several days following its automatic shutdown Tuesday. "We don't know yet when the plant will restart. It will probably take several more days to fully understand the reasons for the automatic shutdown and the subsequent unusual event with one of its backup systems," Con Ed spokesman Mike Spall said. On Tuesday, the plant tripped off line after a reaction protection system received a spurious signal. A few minutes after the trip, the plant's three emergency diesel generators automatically activated as expected. However, one of the generators failed to load properly, leading to the eventual draindown of a battery that serves as a backup power source. Con Ed informed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the unusual event with the backup system. The company said three separate groups were on site at Indian Point 2 Thursday, including a Con Ed team, a team of independent nuclear specialists and a team sent by the NRC, to fully understand the cause of the trip and subsequent failure of the backup systems. "The plant will not restart until we fully understand what occurred. Safety is our number one priority," Spall said. The plant, located in Buchanan, N.Y., has remained in hot shutdown mode since Tuesday's outage. Meanwhile, the New York Power Authority's adjacent 965-MW Indian Point 3 nuclear unit was operating at 89 percent power as it coasts down for its 45-day September 10 refueling outage. ((S DiSavino, New York Power Desk, +212-859-1622, fax +212-859-1758, scott.disavino@reuters.com))

Original Reports INDIAN POINT: EMERGENCY DECLARED

Date: 990901 From: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/DAILY/der.htm

Daily Events Report U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Power Reactor Event Number: 36104 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/31/1999 UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:01[EDT] RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP EVENT DATE: 08/31/1999 -----------------------------------------EVENT TIME: 14:30[EDT] NRC NOTIFIED BY: DENNIS CORNAX LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/31/1999 HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY ----------------------------- ------------------------------------------PERSON ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A JOHN ROGGE R1 10 CFR SECTION: ED GOODWIN NRR ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION FRANK CONGEL IRO AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby ---------------------------------------------------------------------- EVENT TEXT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP WITH COMPLICATIONS

An automatic reactor trip/turbine trip occurred due to an overtemperature differential temperature (OTdT) trip signal. The licensee was replacing Channel 3 pressurizer low pressure trip bistables when a spurious OTdT trip signal occurred on Channel 4, completing the 2/4 logic. Following the trip, control rod K-2 of Control Bank D had an indicated position of 14.4 steps out from fully inserted. All other control rods are fully inserted.

Following the trip, 480 VAC bus 6A received an undervoltage trip signal, causing buses 2A, 3A, 5A, and 6A to transfer to their associated emergency diesel generators (EDGs) (22, 21, and 23, respectively). Buses 2A, 3A, and 5A are currently being supplied by the EDGs; however, the output breaker for EDG 23 tripped upon loading to bus 6A, which remains deenergized. Operators manually started the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump due to the loss of control power to one of the motor driven AFW pumps caused by the loss of bus 6A.

The unit is currently stable in hot standby. The licensee is currently troubleshooting bus 6A in anticipation of restoring power. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.

HOO Note: See Event #36107.

* * *

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Power Reactor Event Number: 36107 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- FACILITY: INDIAN POINT EGION: 1 NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/31/1999 UNIT: [2] [] [] TATE: NY NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:39[EDT] RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP EVENT DATE: 08/31/1999 -----------------------------------------EVENT TIME: 21:55[EDT] NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK STUBBLE LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/01/1999 HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY ----------------------------- ------------------------------------------PERSON ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY CLASS: UNU JOHN WHITE R1 10 CFR SECTION: DAVID MATTHEWS NRR AAEC 50.72 (a) (1) (I) EMERGENCY DECLARED CHARLES MILLER IRO JOHN ROGGE R1 GENE CANUPP FEMA

---------------------------------------------------------------------- UNIT SCRAM CODERX CRITINIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby ---------------------------------------------------------------------- EVENT TEXT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF MOST CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS

An Unusual Event was declared at 2155 EDT due to an unplanned loss of greater than 75% of the control room safety system annunciators for longer than 15 minutes. The licensee reported that the annunciators are currently inoperable, and that additional panel walkdowns are being performed. The unit is currently stable in Hot Standby following a reactor trip earlier today (see EN 36104). The NRC resident inspector has been informed, and is in the control room.

* * UPDATE AT 0157 EDT ON 9/1/99 BY MARK STUBBLE TO FANGIE JONES * *

The plant conditions are improving and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown. The annunciators have been restored. The previous problem with 480 VAC busses on Event #36104 has been found to be related to the loss of the annunciators. Further evaluation is ongoing and the licensee expects to exit the Unusual Event soon.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The HOO notified the R1DO (John White), NRR EO (David Matthews), and IRO Manager (Charles Miller).

* * UPDATE AT 0343 EDT ON 9/1/99 BY MARK STUBBLE TO FANGIE JONES * *

The plant has exited the Unusual Event, the plant is in normal Hot Shutdown. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident. The HOO notified the R1DO (John White), NRR EO (David Matthews), IRO Manager (Charles Miller), and FEMA (Gene Canupp)

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

-- Gordon (g_gecko_69@hotmail.com), September 03, 1999

Answers

Not nearly as news worthy as the Clintons buying a house is it ?

I'm afraid we'll see LOTS more of this in the NEAR future.

-- Dan G (earth_changes@hotmail.com), September 03, 1999.

Its been my experience having lived around a few nukes, that this is very common. I think that you are more alert and aware due to y2k. Taz

-- Taz (Tassie@aol.com), September 03, 1999.

Many years ago, they wanted to build a nuke plant, just a little ways down river from my city. Citizen protests put the kabosh on the plan, and the partially built plant was converted to coal.

The closer we get to Y2K, the happier I am about that.

The scary thing, Gordon, is that there's probably buches of near misses going on daily, that we never hear about, as remediation efforts are tested. There have been six power outages in or immediately next to my neighborhood, this summer. We've pretty much been in a drought, this year, so it can't really be blamed on the weather, but nonetheless, it is.

On one three hour outage, there was nothing more going on than some stiff breezes. It's not uncommon for my area to experience one, maybe two outages during the really fierce storms of spring, but rarely in the summer, and certainly never six. Even though there seems to be an increase in the number of outages, this only made the local news, the one time that there WAS some heavy weather, in the area.

-- Bokonon (bok0non@my-Deja.com), September 03, 1999.

There's nothing common about this. The original article I read said the NRC had sent a team of specialists in to figure out what the hell happened.

You don't notify FEMA unless there's a real problem. Sorry to hear you live near a nuke..

-- Gordon (g_gecko_69@hotmail.com), September 03, 1999.

Bokonon,

UYou ARE aware, I'm sure, that the coal plant, when operating properly, releases a couple of orders of magnitude more radiation than a properly operating nuke plant?

And that if someone were to go directly from a coal plant to a nuke plant, on the way IN he would set off alarms and he would not be allowed out until he had deconned?

Chuck

-- Chuck, a night driver (rienzoo@en.com), September 03, 1999.

Gordon,

Having worked as Fire Protection System Inspector, I realize the importance of the annunciators. The fact that they had them restored within 15 mins. is remarkable.

-- (test@inspect.systems), September 03, 1999.

What exactly is an annunciator? Is it a loudspeaker?

-- Gordon (g_gecko_69@hotmail.com), September 03, 1999.

Gordon, Enjoying your posts on oil. Anyway, apparently this reactor scramming is fairly common. The local Shearon Harris plant was scrammed a couple of time this winter. The utility notifies the NRC, but they don't tell the public. They do not report this to any local papers. So by the time the papers find out about it, the problem is often on its way to being solved.

For example, if the reactor is scrammed on a Thursday and reported to NRC, the one reporter assigned to the utility beat will, if he/she is diligent, check the NRC online reports and see it on Monday morning. Then it'll be in the Tuesday paper and the TV reporters will hear it. TV will do a story on Tues. pm if the reactor is still down.

I was frankly amazed at the lack of publicity over emergency shutdowns. Welcome to the club.

-- Puddintame (achillesg@hotmail.com), September 03, 1999.

Did you notice this:

"However, one of the generators failed to load properly, leading to the eventual draindown of a battery that serves as a backup power source."

-- dw (y2k@outhere.com), September 04, 1999.

Chuck........it's not the "properly functioning" ones I'm worried about......

-- Bokonon (bok0non@my-Deja.com), September 04, 1999.

Gordon:

An annunciator is a status board that is a quick reference to indicate alarm conditions.

On alarm, an audio device sounds to attract the operator's attention to the board where he will see led's indicating alarm conditions.

Fire, smoke, temperature, flow, whatever according to the application.

Note for the Fire Inspector that posted above, the annunciator was not restored in fifteen minutes. Read through the event logs and follow the activity on bus 6A.

From Gordon's post yesterday I recall the logs stating a fault caused 6A to trip, taking out several other busses, causing them to transfer to emergency diesel gererator feed, where all the circuits transfered OK except 6A. On 6A the generator output breaker tripped upon transfer causing an automatic feedwater pump to remain disabled and at the same time the annunciator was said to still be disabled.

Operators had to manually start the automatic feedwater pump that was out of service because of the failure of bus 6A to restore control voltage to the pump it served.

Bottom line is upon fault, the backup system failed. The feedwater pump would have remained disabled if the operator had not identified the problem and reacted.

My perspective is if this scenario had occurred in a process that did not warrant continuous operator oversight, there would have been a catastophic failure for the process.

The significance of the event is that one of the tools the operators rely on failed.

We are faced with the prospect of losing a lot of the tools we now take for granted.

It was demonstrated here that a random intermittent failure can be handled by the operators. The question remains are we facing multiple random intermittent failures in a compressed time frame and if this occurs what will be the consequences.

-- Tom Beckner (tbeckner@xout.erols.com), September 04, 1999.