"O" rings not safe below 40 degrees

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In an attempt to reconcile the disconnect with society and this technical challenge. I search my mental data-base for other scenarios of programming/engineering debacles that can be compared to this situation.

The reason I find myself having to do this is because it seems difficult to comprehend the inability of the experts who build em to tell us flat out uniquivocably, "they will fail and by x amount". Take Morton/Thiokol. Remember them? The infamous "O" rings. I will never forget seeing the docu-drama on that little Engineering Mishap.

"Excuse me gentlemen those "O" rings MAY not withstand the cool temperatures. We recommend you cancel the Launch!!"

"What!!! abort lift off! do you guys at thiokol no how much MONEY and TIME we've spent on this project". You must be nuts"

LIFT OFF!!

-- David Butts (dciinc@aol.com), June 28, 1999

Answers

I thought you (or anyone else who hasn't seen it) might enjoy this from PNG:

Challenger, Thermodynamics and y2k

In 1985, Roger M. Boisjoly, P.E. had over 25 years of engineering experience in the aerospace industry. He, and other engineers, persistently warned supervisors and the management of Morton Thiokol that the O-ring seals of the Space Shuttle solid rocket boosters were dangerously flawed. His warnings were based on experimental testing plus examinations and analyses of O-rings from boosters recovered from previous launches. He was using data, science, technical expertise and experience to form his opinions.

He was particularly concerned about cold weather launches. He went so far as to write a memo stating that a launch in temperature conditions under 53{F could result in losing the Shuttle and the launch facilities. His warnings were unanswered by management.

The management of Morton Thiokol was "aware" of the problem. NASA was "aware" of the problem. Their response was to "manage" the problem, not "solve" the problem. That's what managers do. (Is this beginning to sound familiar?) Morton Thiokol management and NASA management used a different set of criteria to form their opinions. Both knew that a fix was necessary but time would be required to develop the technology. We hadn't lost a Shuttle yet and there were other management considerations- money.

Morton Thiokol was paid by NASA. NASA was paid by Congress. Members of Congress were elected by people who were beginning to think the Space Shuttle program was boring and costly. So, Morton Thiokol management told NASA they were working on upgrading the O-rings. (sound familiar?) NASA did not want to admit to Congress that the Space Shuttle program had any problems. (...?) Everyone was putting a management spin on the problem - except Mr. Boisjoly, P.E.

In the search for companies and experts to help solve the problem, Morton Thiokol engineers were instructed not to reveal the urgency or seriousness of the problem. The responses mirrored the tone of the inquiries - no urgency. Everybody knew, but nobody knew.

The night before the launch of Challenger, NASA required a launch decision from it's contractor, Morton Thiokol. The temperature forecast was 18{F. Mr. Boisjoly, P.E. vigorously opposed the launch. In the telephone call with NASA, Morton Thiokol expressed their reservations and were told by NASA that they would respect the decision of their contractor...but they were "disappointed" to hear that.

The mute button was pushed and the most senior executive present suggested that the decision to launch should be a "management" decision. Mr. Boisjoly, P.E., again, vigorously opposed the launch. His co-workers, who had previously supported and agreed with his position, sat silent in the face of the passive pressure of management. The Engineering Manager was told to take off his engineer hat and put on his manager hat. Mr. Boisjoly, P.E. was excluded from the vote.

The next morning, a blase public, lulled into believing that our computerized marvels of high-technology will always work, watched as Challenger and crew exploded into our memories.

The complex system of Challenger failed because of one flawed part: Character.

As I wrote this synopsis of Challenger's fate, I didn't even have to plan my words to parallel the current condition of y2k. As naturally as I wrote it, the parallels were there. I'll let you fill them in to suit your experience. Once again, we have failed to learn the lessons of history. Once again, the warnings from the people who designed and built the system are being managed. Everybody knows, but nobody knows.

Mr. Roger M. Boisjoly is a Professional Engineer (P.E.). Being a P.E. means he is registered by one or more states as meeting the educational, experience and character requirements for licensing. He is bound by a code of ethics. He is subject to disciplinary action by a board for negligence and/or incompetence.

I know of no professional registration or license for managers. They are not bound by a code of ethics. They meet no educational, experience or character requirements.

Why is there such a disparity between the programmers and engineers versus the managed statements of companies and governments on y2k? I suspect a disparity in character. If I asked you to name one statesman alive today, who would name? I didn't say politician, I said statesman. Character is my way to separating the two.

There are some laws that cannot be broken by anyone, regardless of character: The Laws of Thermodynamics. One law is the conservation of energy. Energy out equals energy in, minus some losses - your monitor is radiating light and heat energy (we won't talk about the other...).

Just for the sake of argument, let's pretend that reasonable progress is made within the U.S. power generation and distribution system. Just for fun, let's say the work-in-process now will result in only localized and nusance outages starting the end of next year. Great. Now, where do you get the energy in? You know... the fuel for the generating stations? The U.S. generating system and economic system doesn't work without Mid-East oil. The U.S. is just as dependent on Mid-East oil today as it was during the oil embargo of the 1970's.

Energy is power. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait because he wanted Kuwait's oil. Could you imagine if he had taken Saudi Arabia also? The Gulf War was most definitely fought for oil. Why isn't the U.S. leading a coalition into Bosnia to save the thousands of people dying there? Bosnia has no products the world needs. No oil. Iraq was punished by denying it the right to sell oil. Oil and energy are power.

Japan has no energy resources. Zero. 100% of all energy is imported. Japan is extremely sensitive to any disruption in the supply of oil and gas products. How would a disruption in the flow of Mid-East oil affect the world's two largest economies?

This week, I was in the Tokyo office of the man who wrote probably the definitive Japanese book on y2k. His background is intriguing. His background is SCADA. Japanese SCADA. That's right...the Japanese bid and installed SCADA systems for the Mid-East network of oil wells. Custom Japanese systems for monitoring and controlling flow meters, valves, pumps, etc. He is convinced that the SCADA systems he bid years ago will not be remediated in time. He is convinced the oil and gas supply from the Mid-East will be disrupted.

Our planned one hour meeting lasted three hours. Just as I was leaving, he asked me if I was planning to be in Japan at the turn of the century. I told him I was. In a very quiet and serious voice, he advised me to leave.

PNG from Japan



-- Gayla Dunbar (privacy@please.com), June 28, 1999.


Here is an old article on the subject and why it is similar to the Y2K situation.

Nature Cannot Be Fooled

Nature Cannot Be Fooled

  What The Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster Can Teach Us
  About Year 2000 Remediation Efforts

 by Dale W. Way
 DBStar, Inc.

 Member of the IEEE Technical Advisory Board Year 2000

  Technical Information Ad Hoc Committee (Y2K Committee)

Copyright 1997, Dale W. Way. All rights reserved.

-- Brian (imager@home.com), June 28, 1999.


A Quote from the link above and then think about the letter from the IEEE to Congress

Why NASA management was, in the end, so determined to "fool themselves" emerges in Feynman's understated conclusion to this part of his analysis: mutually-reinforced wishful thinking in the face of external pressure for an "acceptable answer."

"Finally, if we are to replace standard numerical probability usage with engineering judgment, why do we find such an enormous disparity between the management estimate and the judgment of the engineers? It would appear that, for whatever purpose, be it for internal or external consumption, the management of NASA exaggerates the reliability of its product, to the point of fantasy"

-- Brian (imager@home.com), June 28, 1999.


Brian,

Wow-----!!!!! Thanks!

Hey wait a minute--- is that the same IEEE that some guy named Mr. Decker intimated had ulterior motives. Lobbying or something?:)

-- David Butts (dciinc@aol.com), June 28, 1999.


Why did the O rings fail? I saw an analysis several months ago that indicated that they failed because the asbestos was removed from the O rings to comply with EPA requirements. This is the height of incompetence either for Congress to pass a law that could be interpreted in this manner or for EPA to make such a stupid decision to remove the asbestos. Those dangerous asbestos fibers would be dispersed over thousands of square miles and would put millions of people at risk at a concentration of one part per hundreds of billions? The studies indicating that asbestos caused cancer were first noted on steamfitters during WW 2 working on ships where the asbestos contamination was so bad that it was literally snowing asbestos fibers in the work area. Even with that concentration it took 20 or 30 years for SOME of these workers to develop the diseases caused by the exposure. To apply that rule to the space shuttle and to not tell the persons on the shuttle of that decision and the risk is criminal in some Courts. Governments and Politics is a dangerous mix. P.S. Cigarettes are dangerous.

-- Roy (Roy@dumbfounded.gom), June 28, 1999.


Here's the archived thread that discusses Challenger and its relevence to Y2K.

-- Hardliner (searcher@internet.com), June 28, 1999.

Hardliner

I see you had read the Nature Can Not be Fooled article. It was one of the first difinitive articles when getting into Y2K early last year.

Its one of the things that blows me away is how many figure that the systems will keep up as nature trys to ware it down. I'd put my money on nature any time. Entropy is one of the laws that will get you any time. A matter of fact I have seen little on the subject of Entropy and Y2K. It seems to be a perfect fit.

Entropy and Y2K????

-- Brian (imager@home.com), June 28, 1999.


Isn't the Second Law of Thermodynamic the Entrophy Law. I don't imagine this is very accurate, but doesn't it state that all matter and energy in the Universe is headed irrevocably in one direction, from the available to the unavailable, from the usable to the unusable, from order to disorder and from disorder to chaos. Actually this sounds a little like my life the past few weeks, but it also sounds like y2k to me.

Jeremy Rifkin wrote a very good book entitled Entrophy: Into the Greenouse World, which is well worth reading. If y2k is just a bump in the road, we'd do well to worry about global warming, and the loss of natural resources, plus the population hitting 6 billion this July 17.

-- gilda (jess@listbot.com), June 29, 1999.


Sorry, I spelled Entropy wrong twice!!!!

-- gilda (jess@listbot.com), June 29, 1999.

Just to clarify:

1. Entropy(n.) - The tendency of all closed natural systems to degrade from order toward chaos and disorder.

2. Second law of thermodynamics - The entropy of a closed system tends to increase with time.

-- Mac (sneak@lurk.hid), June 29, 1999.



Brian,

My money's on Nature as well. it's a sure bet.

As for entropy, that's a sure bet too, but as it relates to Y2K, I think it operates a lot slower than we're likely to see the Y2K software logic problem unfold.

Gilda,

Yep, you've got entropy pegged, but as I remarked to Brian, I think we're gonna have to deal with the results of our own shortsightedness long before entropy gets us.

As for the Greenhouse effect, the jury's still out for me. I'm sure that it's real, but I'm not sure that it's not simply the tail end of the last Ice Age. Again, I suspect that we'll have other things to deal with first and the population may not be the problem that it might be. I guess I'm going to have to cross the bridges as I come to them. Right now, my main concern is doing what I can to be sure I'm in the best position I can be vis a vis Y2K.

-- Hardliner (searcher@internet.com), June 29, 1999.


David,

Thanks for starting this thread!

Gayla and Brian,

Thanks for those references!

Gilda,

Re spelling:

The good news is: you're consistent!

The better news is: you noticed and corrected the mistake!

;-)

Gilda and Hardline,

Re GLobal Warming:

There are at least some similarities between GW and Y2K: both topics have complicated technical aspects, major implications, and major disagreements among observers.

Among the noticeable differences: unlike Y2K, many politicians and media folks would qualify as "doomers" on the topic of GW.

For now, I concur with Hardliner; let's get through Y2K.

Jerry

-- Jerry B (skeptic76@erols.com), June 29, 1999.


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