Pristina Standoff - Moscow To Send Extra 10,000 Men In Secret Deal?

By Anna Blundy in Moscow www.the-times.co.uk 6-16-99

Russian and Serb officials gave a warning yesterday that up to 10,000 Russian paratroopers could be airlifted into Kosovo in the coming days as part of a secret deal between Belgrade and Moscow.

In the latest challenge to Nato's peacekeeping operation, Borislav Milosevic, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Moscow and President Milosevic's brother, described the force as an "indispensable minimum" in order for Russia to reach parity with the other five main Nato contributing forces.

Military experts here said that, despite the collapse of the military establishment, the country still maintained well-equipped and highly trained airborne combat troops. However, there are doubts that such a large force could be mobilised so quickly and a figure of 2,500 soldiers was seen as more plausible. Nine Ilyushin-76 transport planes are standing by at three central Russian airfields to convey Russian paratroopers to Kosovo at four hours' notice, it was reported yesterday. Earlier this year the paratroopers were given full responsibility for peacekeeping duties in a reorganisation of Russia's armed forces, a factor that has no doubt contributed to their readiness for action.

Currently the Russians have some 400 troops in Kosovo, where they hold the airport at Pristina. Yesterday a convoy of 11 Russian vehicles left Bosnia to reinforce them.

The issue of Russia's contribution to the Kosovo peacekeeping force (Kfor) is due to be resolved at talks today between the Russian and American Defence Ministers. However, there are fears that President Yeltsin, emboldened by last week's surprise deployment, may try a similar tactic ahead of the summit of the Group of Seven industrial countries, plus Russia, at the weekend in Cologne.

Leonid Radzikhovsky, foreign affairs expert for Segodnya, commented that while Russia had successfully got one over on Nato, it would be a short-lived victory. He wrote: "The rejoicing is over, and now Russia has to think how to get out of the situation."

Alan Kasayev, Deputy Editor of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, agreed that Russia was now in a no-win situation. "We are in no position to dictate terms to Nato. All we can do is initiate a compromise," he said.

The newspaper's defence correspondent, Reserve Colonel Igor Korotchenko, was optimistic that a compromise could be reached, giving Russia a "zone of responsibility". He said: "That way we would not have to provide the 10,000 troops that would be necessary if Russia were given a sector - something our negotiators are demanding. We could just about find the money for 2,500 to keep the peace in a zone of responsibility."

A Western expert, commenting on the size and capability of the paratroop force, said: "They are the most deployable, certainly. Since the figure of 10,000 has been touted around for some time, I would say that they must have that many troops ready. I suppose if they absolutely had to deploy them it would be technically possible for them to do so. Do they want to do it? My guess is, no."

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 17, 1999

Answers

Yugoslav General Says Army Will Return To Kosovo If Peace Accord Fails 6-14-99

BELGRADE (AFP) - The Yugoslav army will return to Kowovo if the peace accord between Belgrade and the international community breaks down, a senior Yugoslav general warned late Sunday.

"We are five kilometres (three miles) from Kosovo," Tanjug news agency quoted General Nebosja Pavkovic as saying. "If the agreement fails we will return to Kosovo."

Pavkovic commands Yugoslavia's Third Army, which held Kosovo until forced to withdraw under the accord accepted by Belgrade after 11 weeks of NATO bombing.

"We won a great victory, we are proud of it," Pavkovic said. "We are not retreating because we were beaten. "The Third Army and the Pristina Army Corps yielded none of our territory despite the NATO air strikes."

Pavkovic said his forces had had 169 men killed and 299 wounded during the NATO campaign. The death toll was eight more than one he gave Friday.

Yugoslav Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic meanwhile said that the government will ask parliament to lift a state of war imposed after NATO began its bombing campaign against Yugoslavia when security can be guaranteed in Kosovo.

"Security structures as provided for by the UN Security Council resolution must be in place and security must be guaranteed for all citizens," Politika newspaper cited Bulatovic as saying in its Monday edition.

"When this has happened, the government will ask parliament to lift the state of war."

Tanjug news agency earlier reported that Yugoslavia would lift the state of war shortly.

The state of war may be lifted "perhaps as soon as our military and police forces have been withdrawn from Kosovo," Tanjug quoted a member of President Slobodan Milosevic's party as saying.

Yugoslav troops must withdraw from Kosovo by June 20 as NATO-led peace forces are moving into the Serbian province.

Bulatovic said that Yugoslavia -- Serbia and Montenegro -- accepted "a painful compromise in the interest of peace" when it agreed to the G8 peace accord submitted by Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and his EU counterpart, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.

"The aggressors, too, accepted compromises and the UN Security Council resolution protects the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and rules out any possible independence of Kosovo," he added.

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 17, 1999.

It's The Russians, Stupid" - The Bear Is Not In His Cage

STRATFOR Global Intelligence Update Weekly Analysis June 14, 1999

Summary:

NATO continued its policy of trying to turn a compromise into a victory. In order to do that, it has been necessary to treat Russia as if its role was peripheral. It was a policy bound to anger Russia. It was not a bad policy, if NATO were ready and able to slay the bear. But goading a wounded bear when you are not in a position to kill him is a dangerous game. On Saturday morning, the bear struck back. NATO still hasn't gotten him back in his cage.

Analysis:

President Bill Clinton had a sign taped to his desk at the beginning of his first term in office that read, "It's the Economy, Stupid." He should have taped one on his desk at the beginning of the Kosovo affair that said, "It's the Russians, Stupid." From the beginning to the end of this crisis, it has been the Russians, not the Serbs, who were the real issue facing NATO.

The Kosovo crisis began in December 1998 in Iraq. When the United States decided to bomb Iraq for four days in December, in spite of Russian opposition and without consulting them, the Russians became furious. In their view, the United States completely ignored them and had now reduced them to a third-world power - discounting completely Russia's ability to respond. The senior military was particularly disgruntled. It was this Russian mood, carefully read by Slobodan Milosevic, which led him to conclude that it was the appropriate time to challenge the West in Kosovo. It was clear to Milosevic that the Russians would not permit themselves to be humiliated a second time. He was right. When the war broke out, the Russians were not only furious again, but provided open political support to Serbia.

There was, in late April and early May, an urgent feeling inside of NATO that some sort of compromise was needed. The feeling was an outgrowth of the fact that the air war alone would not achieve the desired political goals, and that a ground war was not an option. At about the same time, it became clear that only the Russians had enough influence in Belgrade to bring them to a satisfactory compromise. The Russians, however, were extremely reluctant to begin mediation. The Russians made it clear that they would only engage in a mediation effort if there were a prior negotiation between NATO and Russia in which the basic outlines of a settlement were established. The resulting agreement was the G-8 accords.

The two most important elements of the G-8 agreement were unwritten, but they were at the heart of the agreement. The first was that Russia was to be treated as a great power by NATO, and not as its messenger boy. The second was that any settlement that was reached had to be viewed as a compromise and not as a NATO victory. This was not only for Milosevic's sake, but it was also for Yeltsin's. Following his humiliation in Iraq, Yeltsin could not afford to be seen as simply giving in to NATO. If that were to happen, powerful anti-Western, anti-reform and anti-Yeltsin forces would be triggered. Yeltsin tried very hard to convey to NATO that far more than Kosovo was at stake. NATO didn't seem to listen.

Thus, the entire point of the G-8 agreements was that there would be a compromise in which NATO achieved what it wanted while Yugoslavia retained what it wanted. A foreign presence would enter Kosovo, including NATO troops. Russian troops would also be present. These Russian troops would be used to guarantee the behavior of NATO troops in relation to Serbs, in regard to disarming the KLA, and in guaranteeing Serbia's long-term rights in Kosovo. The presence of Russian troops in Kosovo either under a joint UN command or as an independent force was the essential element of the G-8. Many long hours were spent in Bonn and elsewhere negotiating this agreement.

Over the course of a month, the Russians pressured Milosevic to accept these agreements. Finally, in a meeting attended by the EU's Martti Ahtisaari and Moscow's Viktor Chernomyrdin, Milosevic accepted the compromise. Milosevic did not accept the agreements because of the bombing campaign. It hurt, but never crippled him. Milosevic accepted the agreements because the Russians wanted them and because they guaranteed that they would be present as independent observers to make certain that NATO did not overstep its bounds. This is the key: it was the Russians, not the bombing campaign that delivered the Serbs.

NATO violated that understanding from the instant the announcement came from Belgrade. NATO deliberately and very publicly attacked the foundations of the accords by trumpeting them as a unilateral victory for NATO's air campaign and the de-facto surrender of Serbia. Serbia, which had thought it had agreed to a compromise under Russian guarantees, found that NATO and the Western media were treating this announcement as a surrender. Serb generals were absolutely shocked when, in meeting with their NATO counterparts, they were given non- negotiable demands by NATO. They not only refused to sign, but they apparently contacted their Russian military counterparts directly, reporting NATO's position. A Russian general arrived at the negotiations and apparently presided over their collapse.

Throughout last week, NATO was in the bizarre position of claiming victory over the Serbs while trying to convince them to let NATO move into Kosovo. The irony of the situation of course escaped NATO. Serbia had agreed to the G-8 agreements and it was sticking by them. NATO's demand that Serbia accept non-negotiable terms was simply rejected, precisely because Serbia had not been defeated. The key issue was the Russian role. Everything else was trivial. Serbia had been promised an independent Russian presence. The G-8 agreements had said that any unified command would be answerable to the Security Council. That wasn't happening. The Serbs weren't signing. NATO's attempt to dictate terms by right of victory fell flat on its face. For a week, NATO troops milled around, waiting for Serb permission to move in.

The Russians proposed a second compromise. If everyone would not be under UN command, they would accept responsibility for their own zone. NATO rejected this stating Russia could come into Kosovo under NATO command or not at all. This not only violated the principles that had governed the G-8 negotiations, by removing the protection of Serb interests against NATO, but it also put the Russians into an impossible position in Belgrade and in Moscow. The negotiators appeared to be either fools or dupes of the West. Chernomyrdin and Ivanov worked hard to save the agreements, and perhaps even their own careers. NATO, for reasons that escape us, gave no ground. They hung the negotiators out to dry by giving them no room for maneuver. Under NATO terms, Kosovo would become exactly what Serbia had rejected at Rambouillet: a NATO protectorate. And now it was Russia, Serbia's ally, that delivered them to NATO.

By the end of the week, something snapped in Moscow. It is not clear whether it was Yeltsin who himself ordered that Russian troops move into Pristina or whether the Russian General Staff itself gave the order. What is clear is that Yeltsin promoted the Russian general who, along with his troops, rolled into Pristina. It is also clear that although Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov had claimed that the whole affair was an accident and promised that the troops would be withdrawn immediately, no troops have been removed. Talbott then flew back to Moscow. Clinton got to speak with Yeltsin after a 24-hour delay, but the conversation went nowhere. Meanwhile, Albright is declaring that the Russians must come under NATO command and that's final.

The situation has become more complex. NATO has prevailed on Hungary and Ukraine to forbid Russian aircraft from crossing their airspace with troops bound for Kosovo. Now Hungary is part of NATO. Ukraine is not. NATO is now driving home the fact that Russia is surrounded, isolated and helpless. It is also putting Ukraine into the position of directly thwarting fundamental Russian strategic needs. Since NATO is in no position to defend Ukraine and since there is substantial, if not overwhelming, pro-Russian sentiment in Ukraine, NATO is driving an important point home to the Russians: the current geopolitical reality is unacceptable from the Russian point of view. By Sunday, Russian pressure had caused Ukraine to change its policy. But the lesson was not lost on Russia's military.

Here is the problem as Stratfor sees it. NATO and the United States have been dealing with men like Viktor Chernomyrdin. These men have had their primary focus, for the past decade, on trying to create a capitalist Russia. They have not only failed, but their failure is now manifest throughout Russia. Their credibility there is nil. In negotiating with the West, they operate from two imperatives. First, they are seeking whatever economic concessions they can secure in the hope of sparking an economic miracle. Second, like Gorbachev before them, they have more credibility with the people with whom they are negotiating than the people they are negotiating for. That tends to make them malleable.

NATO has been confusing the malleability of a declining cadre of Russian leaders with the genuine condition inside of Russia. Clearly, Albright, Berger, Talbott, and Clinton decided that they could roll Ivanov and Chernomyrdrin into whatever agreement they wanted. In that they were right. Where they were terribly wrong was about the men they were not negotiating with, but whose power and credibility was growing daily. These faceless hard-liners in the military finally snapped at the humiliation NATO inflicted on their public leaders. Yeltsin, ever shrewd, ever a survivor, tacked with the wind.

Russia, for the first time since the Cold War, has accepted a low- level military confrontation with NATO. NATO's attempts to minimize it notwithstanding, this is a defining moment in post-Cold War history. NATO attempted to dictate terms to Russia and Russia made a military response. NATO then used its diplomatic leverage to isolate Kosovo from follow-on forces. It has forced Russia to face the fact that in the event of a crisis, Ukraine will be neither neutral nor pro-Russian. It will be pro-NATO. That means that, paperwork aside, NATO has already expanded into Ukraine. To the Russians who triggered this crisis in Pristina, that is an unacceptable circumstance. They will take steps to rectify that problem. NATO does not have the military or diplomatic ability to protect Ukraine. Russia, however, has an interest in what happens within what is clearly its sphere of influence. We do not know what is happening politically in Moscow, but the straws in the wind point to a much more assertive Russian foreign policy.

There is an interesting fantasy current in the West, which is that Russia's economic problems prevent military actions. That is as silly an observation as believing that the U.S. will beat Vietnam because it is richer, or that Athenians will beat the poorer Spartans. Wealth does not directly correlate with military power, particularly when dealing with Russia, as both Napoleon and Hitler discovered. Moreover, all economic figures on Russia are meaningless. So much of the Russian economy is "off the books" that no one knows how it is doing. The trick is to get the informal economy back on the books. That, we should all remember, is something that the Russians are masters at. It should also be remembered that the fact that Russia's military is in a state of disrepair simply means that there is repair work to be done. Not only is that true, but the process of repairing the Russian economy is itself an economic tonic, solving short and long term problems. Military adventures are a psychological, economic and political boon for ailing economies.

Machiavelli teaches the importance of never wounding your adversaries. It is much better to kill them. Wounding them and then ridiculing and tormenting them is the worst possible strategy. Russia is certainly wounded. It is far from dead. NATO's strategy in Kosovo has been to goad a wounded bear. That is not smart unless you are preparing to slay him. Since no one in NATO wants to go bear hunting, treating Russia with the breathtaking contempt that NATO has shown it in the past few weeks is not wise. It seems to us that Clinton and Blair are so intent on the very minor matter of Kosovo that they have actually been oblivious to the effect their behavior is having in Moscow.

They just can't get it into their heads that it's not about Kosovo. It is not about humanitarianism or making ourselves the kind of people we want to be. It's about the Russians, stupid! And about China and about the global balance of power.

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 17, 1999.

Haven't read the *very* latest blurb, I know what's going on, do you???

Think, big picture, history, agenda...all going to plan, magnificently...

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 17, 1999.

more courtesy of Jon Jonson

America believes in its own invincibility. We believe that nobody can touch us, that nobody can defeat us. In America we have something called the pursuit of happiness. In Moscow and Beijing they have something called the hydrogen bomb. Imagine, if you will, a contest between two great powers. One is predicated on the pursuit of happiness, the other is predicated on nuclear war.

Late on Monday, a panel of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board released a 57-page report. In essence, the report describes what happens when a country predicated on "the pursuit of happiness" attempts to keep secrets from countries predicated on nuclear war. First, the secrets are stolen. Second, the American department in control of these secrets -- the Department of Energy -- continues to resist all security and anti-espionage measures.

"Perhaps most troubling," says the report, "... is the evidence that the lab bureaucracies, after months at the epicenter of an espionage scandal with serious implications for U.S. foreign policy, are still resisting reforms."

In a country based on the pursuit of happiness, security gets in the way. It is inconvenient. In fact, it is very Nazi-like to suspect people of espionage and treason. The Department of Energy resents its security obligation. Our employees don't fly through the air on broomsticks, they say. So let us take the witch-hunt somewhere else!

This, in brief, is the attitude of our bureaucrats. To some extent, it is the underlying attitude of our whole country. Here we begin to see how and why "organizational disarray, managerial neglect and a culture of arrogance ... conspired to create an espionage scandal."

If only espionage was the worst of it.

Last February I was at a party in Washington. A journalist I knew introduced me to a retired CIA analyst. For purposes of this article I will call him "Fred." As it happens, Fred and I discussed the threat from Russia and China. Fred didn't think there was a threat. As a matter of fact, he bragged that if Russia tried anything against us, "we'd blow them off the map without mussing our hair."

Fred was quite aware of Russia's war preparations. He knew they were building underground cities. He knew they had just deployed a new regiment of mobile ICBMs. He knew their submarines were quieter. But none of it mattered. Fred just rolled his eyes. "They can't do anything to us," he assured me.

The next day I met another former CIA employee, Peter Vincent Pry. Having read Pry's two-volume work, "The Strategic Nuclear Balance," I was interested in his opinion of Fred's statements on American invincibility.

"Fred is a good man," said Pry. "One of the better people at CIA, but. ..."

Pry told me of an incident that happened in the 1980s, "during Fred's watch." It seems the Russians had positioned themselves for a nuclear first strike against the United States. The warning signs were everywhere. Apparently Fred was in charge of the analysis, and he got it wrong. Because of Fred, we failed to raise our alert status or otherwise counter the Russian moves. If the Russians had gone ahead with a strike, we would have been wiped out.

"The CIA has since admitted the mistake," said Pry, "but Fred never did."

People like Fred have constructed a cocoon of illusion around our nation's policy-makers. Their belief in America's invulnerability goes unquestioned. Therefore, Chinese espionage is not important. Everything is fine.

Arrogance never admits its mistakes. It just keeps making them.

The president's panel describes a "culture of arrogance" at the Department of Energy. This same arrogance can be found in many other places, too. It permeates the CIA, the FBI, the Pentagon and most of the federal government.

In "The Gingerbread Race," Andrei Navrozov characterized America's arrogance as "solipsistic." My dictionary says that a solipsist is convinced of his own power and reality, but skeptical of the reality and power of everyone else.

In this context, we have all the good things the rest of the world wants. But it's time to wake up and realize that we are hated and envied for what we have. The butchers of Beijing hate us. The Communists and nationalists in Russia hate us. The Iraqis and North Koreans hate us. Are we to believe that our happiness is the ultimate reality, while the hatred of other countries counts for nothing?

"We'd blow them off the map without even mussing our hair," says Fred.

When a society pursues happiness too long and too successfully, that society becomes soft. And as it seeks comfort in things, it also seeks comfort in ideas. And no idea is more comforting than the idea of invincibility.

President Clinton tells us that his administration has taken "unprecedented steps to reduce the vulnerability of our secrets at the labs.'' In telling us this, President Clinton is seeking to comfort us. He knows that comfort is what the American people want -- not truth. In fact, the truth is often hard and sometimes ugly. It makes people uncomfortable.

So the culture of arrogance marches on.

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 17, 1999.

Yea....I know, I'm just not always willing to put my thoughts in print. These days, there's a fine line which has been drawn in the sand to contain Patriots in our country. Of course, I grew up being told that sort of line could never exist in The United States of America....not HERE. The government has gone to great measures to make that line quite obvious though, and they've done a fine job of it.

-- Will continue (farming@home.com), June 17, 1999.

BTW....that same line I spoke about, reminds me of the line Mr. Decker is continuously attempting to draw in the sand in respects to the levels of preparation some of us choose. I fear some folks may find sand in very uncomfortable places....get it?

-- Will continue (farming@home.com), June 17, 1999.

taken "unprecedented steps to reduce the vulnerability of our secrets at the labs.''

is is is... apparently, or maybe is is not is...apparently... I know a bloke who knows what is is is, and his name is Billy Jeff, but he won't tell you why is isn't is or is is is because he's an inveterate and ignoble liar - I think he mayhap has forgotten... (joke)...

yurp... reduce te vulnerability...

BBBBWWWWWWAAAAAAAAAHHHHHAAAHHHHHAAAAAhahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah ahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha hahahahahahahahahahhhahahaaahhahahahahahahahahahhahahahahahahahahhhaha hahahahahahahahaahahahahhhhhhhaaaaaaaaaahhhhhhhhhhaaaaaaaaaaahhhhhhhhh hhhhhhhhhhaaaaaaaaaaaaaaahhhhhhhhhhhhhaaaaaaaaahahahahahahahahahahahah hhhhhhhhhhhhhaaaaaaaaaahhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhaaaaaaaaaaaaaaahhhhhhhhhaaaaaah hahahahahahaha ha ha ho

poster child "indeed"

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 17, 1999.

Will, You actually don't fear ridicule, do you? I guess the internet makes it so.

-- Someone (smarter@than.you), June 17, 1999.

so, are you taken?

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 17, 1999.

Someone,

cheap shot - very,

ya know people like you are such COWARDS, hiding behind the proverbial dress,....

sad mf

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 17, 1999.

P.S.

and your "handle" speaks volumes...

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 17, 1999.

Looks like we haven't heard the end of the embassy bombing either. From Drudge today:

China Does Not Accept U.S. Explanation Thursday, June 17, 1999 2:18AM ET

BEIJING (June 17) XINHUA - The U.S. explanation of the U.S.- led NATO attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade is " unconvincing," and therefore the Chinese government and people cannot accept the conclusion that the "bombing was a mistake."

The remarks were made here by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan during his meeting Wednesday with U.S. envoy Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering.

Tang urged that the U.S. side must make a satisfactory explanation on this issue.

Pickering arrived here on Tuesday to explain to China the result of the investigation on the U.S.-led NATO attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, which took place on May 8th.

-- a (a@a.a), June 17, 1999.

I don't know....maybe they should let Hillary and Chelsea try to straighten it out, couldn't hurt.

-- Will continue (farming@home.com), June 17, 1999.

Thank you a,

curiouser and curiouser...

-- Andy (2000EOD@prodigy.net), June 17, 1999.

Will: or Jessie Jackson...

-- a (a@a.a), June 17, 1999.

"Arrogance never admits its mistakes. It just keeps making them."

That quote seems to apply to so many things in today's world.

Isn't the phrase, "may you live in interesting times," an old Chinese curse?

Mike ===================================================================

-- Michael Taylor (mtdesign3@aol.com), June 17, 1999.

a: You're killin' me buddy, knock it off. (but keep workin' on that "full Nelson", OK?)

-- Will continue (farming@home.com), June 17, 1999.

uh, check out the new article at the bottom of this thread:

OT: Just heard on local news in NW 6:45pm Korea's engage in naval battle exchange!

Confirmed: North Korea about to go Ballistic

xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx

-- Ashton & Leska in Cascadia (allaha@earthlink.net), June 17, 1999.