This quote is for all the polly's that believe the US is an island: "Maritime transportation is a very big part of our national economy," Deptula said. "Problems associated with that have a large impact." How many times have you read the crap over at the duhbunkie site about who needs these overseas countries? They are very good at pointing out such places as Nepal or Ethiopia. I guess the big picture is too big for their little minds.

http://www.latimes.com/CNS_DAYS/990615/t000053664.html

Hoping to avoid potential cargo delays and economic ripple effects associated with a potential year 2000 computer failure at the region's ports, the U.S. Coast Guard is conducting a series of exercises to test both its own preparedness and that of ocean freighters and port facilities for problems stemming from the much-anticipated calendar rollover. One exercise will involve setting the systems clock on one giant cargo vessel forward to Jan. 1, 2000, to see what happens, said Lt. Daniel Deptula of the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Office in Long Beach. The ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles are also participating in the exercises. "Maritime transportation is a very big part of our national economy," Deptula said. "Problems associated with that have a large impact." Even if the computer aboard the American President Line freighter successfully reads the year 2000 instead of 1900, the Coast Guard will still run through a drill created to help the nation's maritime police assist vessels hypothetically stricken by Y2K-related engine failure. Other exercises will involve responding to a hypothetical scenario in which an embedded chip within a valve control system aboard an oil freighter malfunctions and triggers an oil spill. And they will test the Coast Guard's "non-computer" contingency plans in case of collapse of the ports' vessel traffic management system. Results of the exercises and the Coast Guard's Y2K preparedness guidelines are scheduled to be presented to the public today at a dockside news conference. Also today, Richard Thomas, senior vice president of American International Group casualty underwriting, will discuss his company's Y2K preparedness and offer tips on how other businesses can prepare. His remarks are scheduled to conclude a luncheon meeting of Town Hall Los Angeles.

-- y2k dave (xsdaa111@hotmail.com), June 16, 1999

Answers

[ For Educational Purposes Only ] URL too-soon worthless

6/16/99 -- 10:41 AM

Coast Guard prepares for Y2K computer bug

LOS ANGELES (AP) - If seafarers don't prepare their ships' computer systems for the Y2K computer bug, they may be forced to drop anchor outside a harbor or reduce speed on the nation's waterways come New Year's.

Coast Guard officials made the announcement Tuesday after finishing a two-day test of systems at the nation's busiest harbors - the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.

The Coast Guard also outlined its plans to keep the country's ports open on Jan. 1, 2000.

The guidelines, which emphasize preparation and contingency plans, will be presented to the United Nations next week in hopes that other countries will adopt them, said Adm. George Naccara, the Coast Guard's director of information and technology.

The Coast Guard has been working on its Y2K plans for about two years, Naccara said, to keep ports across the country safe and to ensure minimal interruptions to the maritime industry.

``Our No. 1 concern is safety and the movement of people on the waterways,'' Naccara said.

To prevent collisions, oil spills and traffic jams, the Coast Guard will monitor vessels as they move in and out of ports in the hours before and after the new year.

The Y2K bug may strike then because many older computers are programmed to list years in a two-digit format. Computers that have not been updated will interpret the ``00'' of the upcoming year as 1900, causing glitches in some systems.

The Coast Guard will check its database of vessels to see if a ship has contingency plans and if its computer systems, which could effect everything from ship navigation to communications, have been fixed. Vessels deemed high-risk will face restrictions on their operations.

In some instances, a ship may be forced to anchor outside a harbor if the vessel is believed unsafe. Other restrictions include slower speeds for ships in a harbor; one-way traffic lanes to reduce the chance of collision; and extra tugboats to help with maneuvering.

To check its own readiness, the Coast Guard tested its systems and those of three companies operating in the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports to simulate Y2K worst-case scenarios that included an oil spill, engine failure on a cargo vessel and telecommunications problems.
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-- Ashton & Leska in Cascadia (allaha@earthlink.net), June 16, 1999.

Washington Post had a remarkably good article about how the test was done:

Steering a Vessel to Avoid Moby Glitch Y2K on Its Radar, Ship's Crew Drills

(No link availlable, see WorldNetDaily.com for link)

Two comments: the rudimentary engine order telegraph drill described is simple and very easy compared to steering (by "hand" using an EOT) continously for several days to get a ship back to port safely. I've had to do similar exercises, and thay are VERY hard over a long period of time. Most newer ships built overseas simply do not have enough men to station people at all the needed spots to "replace" the automated monitorign systems. They used to (in the 1960's and 1970's) but no longer.

They may have done more thorough testing that was not written, but if they were at this level of they were not very thorough. (Setting the clock ahead was a good idea - which clocks, and on which systems overall? Was it prudent to do that test (which was apparently successful) so close to shore?)

Also - note that this single ship HAD ALREADY been remediated and declared compliant - again, where is the test of unrepaired systems? What will happen when a non-US registered ship (not responsible to the ABS and USCG and DOT) fails to repair, test, or become compliant? nothing? or everything?

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Kennesaw, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), June 16, 1999.

By the way, one ship does not a fleet make compliant.

Mr Decker - Never said the problem could not be solved, it just now has to be implemented worldwide. Don't evenhave to do it "everywhere" - just do it only in every vessel and oil tanker and car hauler and containership and tug and natural gas carrier and collier you want to be able to operate safely coming in and out of a US harbor. Or do you want the rest run aground too?

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Kennesaw, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), June 16, 1999.

Robert:

Your reaction to each test you read about is becoming exasperatingly repetitive. It's like you read that three people were tested, and all three were found to have two legs. On the basis of this test, you always come to the conclusion that these three people were ALL anomalies, that nobody else has two legs and that they'll all fall flat on their faces.

Robert, these reports are examples of testing. You yourself admit that we don't know what might befall unremediated ships, and that it might be nothing! And on the basis of this total lack of information, you have them running aground, you have tests being dangerously close to short, you conclude that if the report uses one ship as an example, this is the ONLY ship remediated or tested.

We don't know what risks will be faced by any given unremediated ship. Why automatically assume *everyone* you haven't read about is willing to lose those ships?

-- Flint (flintc@mindspring.com), June 16, 1999.

Because all ships must be individually repaired, repairs on one have nothing to do with repairs on any other - and because the other countries ARE NOT doing this level of testing (if one, two, or three, or a dozen - it doesn't matter - every ship is different (even in the US) and the results from one ship truly are meaningless and CANNOT be applied to any other.

Also, the marine industry publications are much. much more pessimistic about the number of affected control and monitoring systems (embedded systems affected have been reported as high as 27% on the Japanese and Korean ships that make up 50% of those recently built!

Most ships are registered (controlled) under flags of convenience to allow cheap, easy compliance to lax standards: Panama, Liberia, Greece, Bulgaria, Poland, Portugal, Lebanon, Malaysia, etc. These countries are themselves not ready - or worse, not even started yet. The ships do don "sail" from these "ports" - they never go to these countries. Inspections and testing are hit and miss - often tanks rust through and the ships break up (some 20 per year are lost now at sea) from neglect by owners already and incompetence.

Now, you want to go require these ships be compliant against computer failures when their hulls are falling apart and the registratiion authorities don't care? They aren't ready - and the "tests" reported above are only valid in one ship.

I stand by my earlier statement. A true statement repeated in no less true. The administration is following its standard practice of exaggerating compliance of an industry based on one limited test. Therefore, I will repeat the effective observations.

When the Coast Guard begins stopping ships from entering US ports because they are not compliant - we will see a massive trade "embargo" - ships and ship owners will them fly out helicopters to "certify" computers (some falsely, some hurriedly and incorrectly) - and we will likely have maritime failures in our ports. Trade slowdown at a minimum.

Now, please slao show me where there is any indication that this test had been done before, and been done everywhere on each ship registered in the US. There is only one APL container ship mentioned , one voyage, one harbor - the one in theWashington Post story - and "one" press rally immediately scheduled when it docks.

One test = one press release = y2k success everywhere with this administration. The Coast Guard is testing its "planned" responses - again, these must be customized for every harbor. The Coast Guard is not ready yet either - but you won't read that from this administration.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Kennesaw, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), June 16, 1999.

Oregon is still suffering from the New Carissa grounded on its beaches. Oil still killing sea life. .alphabet stew still cutting up the ship. Groundings still increasing. Environmental tally starting to make ripples on the .gov .biz .mil planning radar.

-- Ashton & Leska in Cascadia (allaha@earthlink.net), June 16, 1999.

An article about the Coast Guard and Y2K:

http://www.govexec.com/tech/articles/0199mantech2.htm

"Be Prepared for Y2K Surprises"

-- Linkmeister (link@librarian.edu), June 16, 1999.

Robert:

You have much more information than I do, and you raise some points I need help with.

For example, with respect to fixes made and tested through remediation, you say "it just now has to be implemented worldwide. Don't evenhave to do it "everywhere" - just do it only in every vessel and oil tanker and car hauler and containership and tug and natural gas carrier and collier you want to be able to operate safely."

OK, in that case, it seems very clear that fixes are transferable, needing only to be implemented on everything else. But then you say "repairs on one have nothing to do with repairs on any other." So now you're saying these repairs are NOT transferable? Can you give me some estimate of how transferable these repairs are in real life?

As for losses, you write "often tanks rust through and the ships break up (some 20 per year are lost now at sea) from neglect by owners already and incompetence. Their hulls are falling apart."

Now, it doesn't take too many years like this before the average ship is 5 years old (losing 1/5 per year every year). And your description seems to fit old ships much better than new ones, implying that this 20% loss rate is weighted toward older ships that are falling apart.

The only possible conclusion (at least without doubting either your loss rate or your description of ship condition) is that new ships fall apart within 10 years or less. Is this really true, or did you exaggerate somewhere? And if it is true, why would people buy these ships?

(I've also read somewhere that the ships that are falling apart are often 30+ years old. Which is totally inconsistent with a 20% yearly loss rate!)

Now, you write "embedded systems affected have been reported as high as 27% on the Japanese and Korean ships that make up 50% of those recently built!" First, a reference for this number would be nice. Second, the nature of the noncompliance becomes really critical if 27% of embedded systems are noncompliant. Do you know what percentage of this 27% is critical?

Finally, you write "One test = one press release = y2k success everywhere with this administration."

Now, even recognizing that this is hyperbole, you should realize that you are creating a similar equation, that One press release = one test = y2k success only upon press release. Certainly I'll concede that the administration is hyping good news when they can. But your assumption that every success gets its own press release, and that therefore you can measure degree of success by counting press releases, is a false assumption.

And as I wrote elsewhere, you take this false assumption and use it as an input to your next link in the chain - that everything you haven't read a press release about is guaranteed to fail. And from there, it's only a small step (eagerly swallowed around here) that all these failures will be critical, resulting in the certainty of major difficulties.

And gullible people like Riversoma read this and START with the axiom that all imports will cease, and extrapolate wildly from there.

I'm willing to grant that ships will have problems, and so will ports. I'm willing to agree that maritime activity will be reduced to some degree, and won't claim that this reduction will be invisible, or won't produce macroeconomic effects. Available evidence strongly suggests that maritime activity will suffer a slowdown of some unknown amount. Your information fails to establish any more than this.

Milne can shout all he wants about NOT ONE DROP of foreign oil reaching the US. Riversome can take Milne's rants as congenial gospel. I'm not concerned with people like them. But you, Robert, ought to know better. Your inconsistent statements and worst-case assumptions without sufficient evidence are something you ought to stop and think about. I know you can do it.

-- Flint (flintc@mindspring.com), June 16, 1999.

[...it seems very clear that fixes are transferable, needing only to be implemented on everything else.]

No, repairs are not transferable. Most ships are built one-at-a-time, a very few are built in sets of perhaps 3 or 4. Unotherwise, every ships is customized for a dfferent owner, for a different service, built by a different yard, designed by a different design team, provisioned by a different vender team, and over the years, maintained by a series of different yeardsa t different countries at different times.

Even those designed alike (Japan is the most consistent) are built at different times, and so equipment models change from ship to ship for those built at the same shipyard.

[ But then you say "repairs on one have nothing to do with repairs on any other." So now you're saying these repairs are NOT transferable? Can you give me some estimate of how transferable these repairs are in real life? ]

[Absolutely, less than 1/4 of the tests can be repeated within those equiped with the same "starting package" - assuming documentation is available. - See above. In general, they are not transferable. Each repair must be independently tested, and every ship needs a unique test procedure. Errors found in one place are not going to be found in another (and vice versa) - and the test procedure in one ship can't be done on the next, except in very general terms.

[As for losses, you write "often tanks rust through and the ships break up (some 20 per year are lost now at sea) from neglect by owners already and incompetence. Their hulls are falling apart." ]

I've also read somewhere that the ships that are falling apart are often 30+ years old. Which is totally inconsistent with a 20% yearly loss rate! ]

You misunderstood my value - 20-25 ships (of the several thousand in service) per year fail catastrophically and break up at sea - not 20%. You are correct - the average age at scrapping is 30+ years.

[Now, you write "embedded systems affected have been reported as high as 27% on the Japanese and Korean ships that make up 50% of those recently built!" First, a reference for this number would be nice.]

Marine Engineering Log, Feb 1999, May 1999 issues. replacement of components for Chevron for example, runs up to 500,000.00 per vessel, though some are much less than that. 1800 components (they weren't specific about which ones) had to be inspected in one 1982 oil tanker, and 122 failed inspection and had to be replaced (in this case - about 7% failed the inspection. Assume 27% were "suspect" and 7% failed - I'd guess 1/4 of the total were "critical" failures.

[Second, the nature of the noncompliance becomes really critical if 27% of embedded systems are noncompliant. Do you know what percentage of this 27% is critical? ]

See above.

[Finally, you write "One test = one press release = y2k success everywhere with this administration." ]

Yes = this is hyperbole, but true. They did it here, as for the FAA in Denver, as for the USPS in Dallas, as for the IRS in Washington, and tried to do it for the DOD (but got caught!)

Remember that very few vessels now run with engineroom crews. the vast majority use "unmanned" enginerooms, and most have crews of only 9-14 people. They don't carry enough people to do the job continously without the elaborate engineroom and control systems that are most vunerable to Y2K problems. Master Interior Communication panels are vunerable too -several have been found non-compliant. If these fail, you can't use phones and issue warnings, or even monitor conditions on board. Control fires, electric panels, etc.

-- Robert A. Cook, PE (Kennesaw, GA) (cook.r@csaatl.com), June 16, 1999.

Despite what Flint implies...

Any "reasonable" person can see that Maritime shipping... globally... is one of the Y2K hot buttons and key international "critical infrastructure" concerns.

*SOME* Flint... not ALL. How many problems does it take to cause "impact?"

Not many.

Diane

-- Diane J. Squire (sacredspaces@yahoo.com), June 17, 1999.

Diane:

Nobody is denying that there will be 'impact' -- this is not a yes or no issue. What Robert is helping me do is estimage the *amount* of impact. A reduction in shipping of 5% makes an impact, and a reduction of 25% makes a bigger impact. And from what Robert writes, it looks like the 25% is a better estimate. Not good.

-- Flint (flintc@mindspring.com), June 17, 1999.