Pollyannas should get MORE THAN EQUAL time. After all, the monkey is on their back

greenspun.com : LUSENET : TimeBomb 2000 (Y2000) : One Thread

False beliefs occur on both side of the Y2k debate. IMHO, the most acceptable approach is to remain neutral to the emotional "pull" of any argument so that we can remain free to be persuaded by facts and logic. In that regard, remember that we are not STARTING from a neutral position; THE NETWORK IS BROKEN. Therefore, the onus is on the Y2k optimists to prove their points. The pessimists should sit back and wait. Their job is to give evidence that the optimist's arguments are invalid, but even "doubtful" will do.

If we pessimists can stay "on track", the monkey will remain squarely where it belongs. This "weight of the evidence" approach puts a heavy burden on the optimist's. Be patient, the optimists have a weak foundation because the SYSTEM IS BROKEN; THEY MUST PROVIDE CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT ENOUGH WORK HAS BEEN COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY TO AVOID DISASTER. For example, how much SELF-REPORTING (as opposed to third party evaluation) has been used to provide "evidence" that Y2k remediation projects have been completed successfully? I believe Senator Bennett estimated about 85% of the "success" he has witnessed has been based on self reporting.

Roger Altman

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), March 30, 1999

Answers

Doctor - "A monkey on my back" is a reference to heroin addiction.

Otherwise, I personally, am beyond giving a hoot who gives what evidence about whatever. It seems to be little more than a mental exersize. This is going to play itself out real soon. Anyone who can't see the obvious has a monkey in each eye.

Prepare, people, or suffer the consequences!

-- ain't (got@monkey on my.back), March 30, 1999.


Roger --- I agree with 90% of what you say (go for it!), but IM(own)HO, this idea that emotion doesn't play its own legitimate role in argument is a foolish and irrrational, if you will, canard of our era.

Or, to put it another way, the idea of the passionless rationalist as somehow "neutral" and thereby able "to be persuaded by facts and logic" is a very incomplete picture of the way that human beings acquire real knowledge. I don't have to tell you that even science has become intensely aware of the role that the observer plays, qua observer, in "shaping" what is perceived. Also witness the largely destructive but perhaps relevant role of deconstructionism with respect to your point.

As witness many of the threads on this forum about "becoming a GI". "reason", in the Baconian-Cartesian sense, played a role, but only a role. Sometimes a very minor role.

I was classically trained in the Great Books at St. John's College, studied theology in a PhD program and later spent 20 years cranking code and/or managing coders. Still doing the latter. Consequently, I have a rough understanding of reason's role.

Reason is cool but it's only part of the game we humans play and, arguably, it has been as destructive or more destructive than the so-called emotional part of the game. And far crueler in the end.

Finally, with all due respect, this is not a forum about debating Y2K but about preparation. As you say, the network is broken. What's the point of the endless argumentation with people who equate preparation with panic?

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), March 30, 1999.


doomsayer fallacy #1

The network is broken. aka The system is broken. aka The code is broken.

There is no network to break. There is no system to break. The code is not one big system.

The burden of proof is on you, doomsayer. Prove that it is all so interconnected.

-- doomslayer (proof@your.side), March 30, 1999.


Roger --- ROFLMAO. Case closed.

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), March 30, 1999.

Doomslayer must be from GNIAFBI. This is typical over there. God help us came May 15, when they will have no place to play. We are about to be overrun by morons. <:)=

-- Sysman (y2kboard@yahoo.com), March 30, 1999.


Roger, the network is not broken. You must back up that statement, if you think it is broken. Exactly what is broken about it?

Sysman, what a more interesting place this will become when the GNIABFI folks come over.

-- Maria (anon@ymous.com), March 30, 1999.


I guess we'll see Maria. I don't mind a good intellectual debate. We can all learn from that. Most of what I see at GNIABFI is kindergarten level name calling and non-sense. <:)=

-- Sysman (y2kboard@yahoo.com), March 30, 1999.

Why even bother with pollyannas? Let them do the hard work that we have all done to come to our conclusions. Y2K is not the welfare state. The DGIs are the people that WILL be at your doorstep. Let's start now and encourage self-perservation. I know it's fun, though, to refute the stupidity and fuzzy logic.

-- PJC (paulchri@msn.com), March 30, 1999.

One constant in the human condition is that people often tend to put the burden of proof on the other guy's opinions, not on their own. Dr. Altman's post is an example of that.

Both "sides" of the debate are presented with the same basic problem: predicting the future is difficult at best and impossible in most cases.

The pessimists have the additional problem of trying to predict the impact of remediation efforts in the absence of good, hard data regarding those changes. Furthermore, the state of remediation is a constatnly moving target. It's difficult (in fact, impossible) to keep up.

For their part, the optimists are often tasked with the equally impossible challenge of proving a negative. This is what Dr. Altman is asking for. "Tell me little bad will happen, and I'll tell you you are an idiot" is his basic message.

Dr. Altman suggests that there is a burden of proof to be satisfied. Outside of the personal preparation decisions each person must make for themselves, that is simply not so. Other than certain physical phenomenon like the moon's position realtive the earth and sun at midnight, January 1, 200 the future cannot be proven, only guessed at. With a careful examination of the evidence (all the evidence), one can make more reasoned guesses, but that is the best one can hope for.

[Personal opinons and inflamatory comments ahead.]

The fact of the matter is there is both positive and negative evidence to be found in this issue. Anyone who finds that surprising hasn't followed complex issues much, because this is the general situation of life. The only thing any of us can do is read what is there, analyze the merits of the information and make our own decisions. To take the position that "It is up to you to prove the unprovable and up to me to snipe at your guesses" is an intellectual laziness unworthy of anyone who has earned the right to prepend "Dr." on to their name. It is langauage heard more often on the playgrounds of elementary schools than the halls of universities. Shame, Roger. Shame.

-- Paul Neuhardt (neuhardt@ultranet.com), March 30, 1999.


"monkey on our backs" is a pretty good analogy. we in the industrialised world are indeed junkies. we are electrical grid junkies, oil junkies, etc.

-- jocelyne slough (jonslough@tln.net), March 30, 1999.


St. John's in Annapolis. That explains a few issues, but my experience with the St. John's crowd (particularly the croquet players) was relatively good. While they tended toward intellectual snobbiness, they were polite.

What happened?

By the way, if you still live in the neighborhood, please drop a line. I am more than willing to debate at the Middleton Tavern where I can at least avail myself of a decent draught between rounds.

-- Mr. Decker (kcdecker@worldnet.att.net), March 30, 1999.


Decker --- "they tended towards intellectual snobbiness." Coming from you, I'm speechless. If you were one of those Navy boys, we always whipped your behinds anyway at croquet, as I remember? Our only intercollegiate sport, so, of course we excelled.

Yes, I fondly remember the Middleton tavern, but am not in the area, or I might just come down and drink you under the table.

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), March 30, 1999.


Speechless! (Hardly). And no, good sir, I did not attend the Naval Academy... my days were spent in the "brown water" version of the U.S. Navy as a working sailor (and moved into other areas). We can agree that turning an elbow at the Middelton Tavern is well worth the time. I'll pick up the check and make sure you are poured into a taxicab for your ride home... and then growl and prowl the night like a true sailor.

-- Mr. Decker (kcdecker@worldnet.att.net), March 30, 1999.

Big Dog, that's not Mr. Decker.

-- Maria (anon@ymous.com), March 30, 1999.

Maria --- How many "Mr. Decker's" are there? Isn't one more than enough?

-- BigDog (BigDog@duffer.com), March 30, 1999.


Roger (and others of similar views), if you look at the top of the main page of this forum, you'll see a link labeled "About." This is what it says when you click through:

BEGIN CUT AND PASTE

About the TimeBomb 2000 (Y2000) Forum

(to which you can return)

This forum is intended for people who are concerned about the impact of the Y2000 problem on their personal lives, and who want to discuss various fallback contingency plans with other like-minded people. It's not intended to provide advice/guidance for solving Y2000 problems within an IT organization.

END OF CUT AND PASTE

Pollyannas don't fall into the "like-minded" category. It's Ed's forum, Ed's goal statement. Until he changes it, I'm very happy with this forum the way it is. Those who find satisfaction engaging in elegant verbal fencing should find a forum with an accommodating mien. Perhaps the Jesuits have one, or the Oxford or Cambridge Debating Societies.

-- Cranky Old Git (anon@spamproblems.com), March 30, 1999.


Paul:

My first question is what ever happened to the old Paul I liked to debate so much? Common Paul. Name calling and the ol' straw man approach is WAY beneath you!

OK, here's part of what you said:

"For their part, the optimists are often tasked with the equally impossible challenge of proving a negative. This is what Dr. Altman is asking for. "Tell me little bad will happen, and I'll tell you you are an idiot" is his basic message."

It seems you are muddying up the water unnecessarily (or necessarily depending on how cynically one views your statements). Using my original example: If THIRD PARTY evaluation were behind 85% of the remediation claims instead of 15%, AND there were INDEPENDENT evidence that about the same percentage were successfully completing data exchange tests, I would re-think my passimistic views. Never mind "proving the negative" crap, I don't see ANYTHING approaching this level and quality of evidence. In light of this fact (you aren't saying this is not a fact, are you?), self preservation requires me to prepare for all hell to break loose!

Paul you can obfuscate the debate all you want, but, for me, the bottom line will never change: Where's the beef?

Roger

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), March 30, 1999.


BigDog:

Point well taken.

I know that a passionless debate can also become a mindless one. But if I had to choose between a logical discussion and an illogical one, I know which one I'd choose. I'm trying to KISS this debate without getting bogged down by having it become a debate about the "debate".

Roger

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), March 30, 1999.


Cranky:

I can understand your take, but did you ever consider that each converted DGI to a GI may be one less casualty, AND one less knock on YOUR door? Maybe that's why Ed himself spends so buch time on this very issue.

Roger

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), March 30, 1999.


Sure. I used to believe that. But in the many months I've lurked around and participated in this forum, I've NEVER seen a DGI who became a GI. Maybe I missed one, I'd be happy to be corrected. Actually, I think they're more properly WGIs (Won't Get Its).

-- Still Cranky Old Git (anon@spamproblems.com), March 30, 1999.

Roger,

<>

Been busy. At work, I've been taking a centralized system and distributing it out into over 100 locations. At home, I've got two daughters, ages two and four that keep me running. As a result, I haven't spent much energy here other than lurking in several months. Moreover, the signal to noise ratio here has gotten so high that I find it harder and harder to work up the enthusiasm for active participation. However, when I saw your post I really felt I had to respond, in part because I have also enjoyed our past debates. As for my positions and posts, they really haven't changed that much over the last year.

<>

There's no "straw man approach" here. I'm serious. To sit back and say "I'm gonna believe in only negative results until somebody proves something different" is no better than saying "I'm gonna believe in only positive results until somebody proves different." Since I've seen you repeatedly criticize the latter position, I find your taking the former disappointing to say the least. I stand by the comment that it represents intellectual laziness unbecoming anyone publicly sporting the honorific "Doctor."

<< If THIRD PARTY evaluation were behind 85% of the remediation claims instead of 15%, AND there were INDEPENDENT evidence that about the same percentage were successfully completing data exchange tests, I would re-think my passimistic views. >>

True, there is very little third party evaluation of systems going on out there now, but do you know why? Because there never has been in the past. Independent verification and validation (IVV) is new to computing practice and is not widely used by anyone outside of a few select industries. Aerospace and pharmaceuticals come to mind, and even there the record is often spotty. (BTW, the so- called "systems audits" that the Big Six accounting firms sell at exorbitant prices are not, in my experience, of any real value. I've been audited by several, and the results have always come down to one thing: process is all and result is trivial. A bunch of book-smart and street-stupid kids read a process list from their dog-eared textbook and write you up every time you deviate from it. Your having worked out of a different text or having customized your process to fit the demands of your industry or environment is no excuse. The results of my development and testing processes have never been commented on, but my methods of conducting development and testing always have been. Positive results have always been irrelevant. Should you manage to have a successful implementation in spite of having not followed the true and holy path it is generally credited to good luck and not to skill or competence.) Back on point, should IVV be a bigger part of systems' development? There is no question in my mind that it should. But demanding it now in Y2K projects creates several problems that make your position untenable.

1. As you have already mentioned on this thread, it's too late for that now. To say that you require independent verification before you will change your mind is to say that your mind is unchangeable. If that is the case, fine, but say so directly. Don't hide behind conditions you know full good and well can't be met in order to preserve the pretense of an open mind.

2. Who do you trust to be both independent and competent? The government? Yeah, right. How about the people already out there selling these services? Well, you know how I feel about them. Somebody else? Who, and how can you tell whether or not they are any good at the process (i.e. who validates the validators)?

3. I'm willing to bet that you never once demanded independent validation of systems' behavior before Y2K outside of your workplace. Before Y2K, did you ever ask to see the systems' audit results at your bank or utilities? How about the suppliers of merchandise to your local grocery store, or publicly traded company you owned stock in? The airlines your flew or the medical practices that treated you? And yet, you flipped light switches expecting them to work and you went to the store expecting there to be food to buy. You flew, you bought stock and you accepted medical treatment, all with little or no thought to the systems behind those actions. Maybe we should question the reliability of systems more actively, and it is possible that more people doing so will be one side effect of Y2K. However, don't suddenly develop religion about public verification and act like it is the only way to live if you yourself have not asked for it until now. That is like getting a temperance lecture from someone whose breath still stinks of whiskey.

<< Paul you can obfuscate the debate all you want, but, for me, the bottom line will never change: Where's the beef?>>

That's my point. For as long as there have been systems there have been system failures, some of which cost lives. Such is life. This includes mechanical as well as electronic systems. Some failures were foreseeable and some were not, and if you think about it for more than the briefest of moments you know that to be so and you have always known it. And yet, despite that knowledge, you probably lived your life expecting that most systems would work unless you had specific experience or evidence to the contrary. Now here you are, painting all computer systems with the broad brush of unreliability and demanding proof of correctness while finding a way to casually disregard almost all such evidence that might be available. Roger, you (and almost everyone else here, I'll wager) have been chewing on this burger an awfully long time to start whining about the size and make-up of the patty now. Glass houses, stones, and such forth.

-- Paul Neuhardt (neuhardt@ultranet.com), March 30, 1999.


Along these same lines, how many people would it take to do a satisfactorily complete audit of every utility? Where would these independent auditors come from? The pool of suitable expertise only exists within the utilities themselves. We'd have two choices: a self- audit (already decried as worthless) or an incompetent audit.

Yet Roger wants IV&V performed on EVERY remediation project, across all industries, all suffering from the same problems as utilities. As Paul says, this amounts to hiding a closed mind behind an impossible demand.

We can't even come up with a general definition of a critical system. All systems have some degree of importance to the organization, and these tend to be interconnected to the point where it's meaningless even to try to rank order them. Even if they weren't so interconnected, a critical system to an accountant is likely to be quite different from a critical system to an engineer. There can never be a clear dividing line between critical and non-critical.

(Also, I kind of wonder if the system becomes more broken if you shout)

-- Flint (flintc@mindspring.com), March 30, 1999.


My interest in other people's prediction-posts depends on how much "possible-expert" status they seem to have, whether economic or computer or utility or etc. If they try to sell anything related to their predictions I add a few grains of salt. This includes working directly or contractually for companies with an interest in "selling" a slant on Y2K. Can't dismiss everyone in those categories though, because there'd be nobody left to listen to. However, the optimists that seem reasonable are rare, probably because they get tired of insults. The most active ones - Norm/Y2Kpro for instance - are useless, probably because they enjoy insults. Norm only knows how to cut and paste and Y2Kpro is a joke. Nothing from them is of value. I appreciate optimistic posts when there is more to them than blind faith, as I appreciate posts from truly pessimistic when there is more to them than paranoia. I'm not convinced about Y2K. Anybody that is fully convinced is likely an idiot. In the balance of alarming and reassuring "news", I am concerned enough to prepare. I'm preparing for a world-wide depression that we'll pull out of eventually. I can imagine it being over-hyped and just turning out to be a modest recession and I can imagine it being worse than a global depression. My preparations are a balance of concern & convenience, leaning towards the former. I give my opinion freely when the subject comes up, but usually only with people who know me fairly well. Don't expect DGI's that are strangers to give my opinion any weight. But one way to prepare is to encourage others to prepare. It doesn't cost me anything to be thought a fool. How foolish we are now will be evident later. Not sure if I could turn away women or children, even if they were strangers, but I know I'm not going to turn people I care about away, so they are the ones I talk to most.

-- Steve Hartzler (s.hartzler@usa.net), March 30, 1999.

I would like to thank Paul and Flint for helping to make my case. I agree that at this late date it is impossible to reach a level of assurance which would guarantee that enough systems will operate reliably. And I would also agree that we probably NEVER had sufficient and reliable checking to do this sort of thing in the past, but this type of checking was never needed in the past. Here's why:

Prior to Y2k concerns, each system under development invariably had the old version to fall back on when the new one failed to operate properly. So we could buy time (albiet at a price) until we worked out the bugs of a new system. Even if we screwed-up royally, the systemic mischief even multiple and simultaneous failures could cause were generally negligible to the overall interdependencies established at that time. Unfortunately, we do not have this luxury now due to the potential for millions of simultaneous failures as we approach and move into the next millennium.

In other words, we were NEVER faced with a simultaneous deadline wherein MILLIONS OF SUBSYSTEMS will have to work well enough on their own and in concert to sustain "systemic" resilience. In the past, each important component of what I'll refer to as the 'network', evolved over time. Sort of like cyber-Darwinism. At any point, whatever operable "system" we had was never threatened by the failure of any one or even many of its continuously evolving components. This situation is definitely NOT true with Y2k.

So, I say again, the monkey is on the backs of the optimists to DEMONSTRATE that we will have systemic integrity. I say that's impossible, and both of you agree with me. CASE CLOSED.

Roger

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), March 31, 1999.


Dr. A, was this you who wrote to Westergard last July at http://www.y2ktimebomb.com/Special/Opinion/Readers/altman9822.htm?

"Over the last few months I have encouraged people to use the Internet to learn more about the Y2K problem, giving them suggested websites to speed up the learning process. In one case, I even offered to teach a non-computerized neighbor how to access the Internet through our local library. With one or two exceptions this approach has not worked. Recently, however, I stumbled across something that does seem to get results. This approach to Y2K education does require the student to have access to a computer but not the internet.

The approach is as simple as it is effective. First, I strike up a conversation about the millennium bug problem and ask their opinion (nowadays, everyone has an opinion on everything) about its severity. In every case I've encountered, they tell me that they think it won't be so bad. Then I say that some of the information I've found comes from very credible people who don't agree with the same scenario. I then ask them if they would like me to e-mail them some of this material. So far, everyone I have spoken to has said yes. I then proceed to send them only the best stuff from the best people. They either become a member of the informed or stop speaking to me altogether in denial of the situation.

Roger Altman"

If this is you, then have you kept after the people who won't speak to you to try and prove your point? Also I would like to know if you are or are related to the Roger Altman who was forced to resign from the Treasury Dept as part of the Whitewater scandal.

-- only (littleoleme@checking.com), March 31, 1999.


Only:

Yes, I'm that same "Westergaard guy".

I usually try to carry the people on my list indefinitely. Occasionally though, I'll ask them to respond in some minimal way, telling them that if I don't hear from them one way or another (they don't have to agree with me to stay on my list) within, say, a month, they'll be dropped. That way I can maintain a list of only interested participants which doesn't get too large.

Most people who have remained on my list for several months have prepared by at least storing extra food and water. One even bought a generator, but he has special needs. Overall, I guess it's worth the effort. But no one to my knowledge has prepared adequately, including those who think thing we're going to have real problems.

No, I'm not the THAT FOB, Roger Altman, but I'm sure the poor guy is "surviving".

Roger

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), March 31, 1999.


Thank you for your comments and process description Dr A.

Going back to the original posting, notice that "completed" systems and companies are now no more 1-2% of all systems. Thus, people who are "assuring us" that "all services and systems will be working okay" next year are assuming that so much of the remaining 99% of everything will be fixed, (correctly fixed), tested, (correctly tested,) and the resulting test results properly re-corrected and re-tested in time.

It is my experience that a substantial fraction of these 99% of all services and systems will be finished, but NOT be correctly finished, most will be tested, but NOT be fully or correctly tested, and that the test results will NOTbe incorporated back into re-testing and re-repaired systems.

It's not just the program, or the embedded chips, or the governemtn service - it's the whole system and the whole process that must be tested, and re-tested, and re-tested.

-- Robert A Cook, PE (Kennesaw, GA) (Cook.R@csaatl.com), March 31, 1999.


Cranky:

To save face, they'll never give an inch publicly. What they do privately to prepare may be another question.

Personally I've had some success. But then again, as you can tell, I'm a relentless SOB, and those who don't walk away early (from my non-stop Y2k harangue) usually choose to do SOMETHING to placate me, or risk going crazy.

Roger

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), March 31, 1999.


Roger,

<< I agree that at this late date it is impossible to reach a level of assurance which would guarantee that enough systems will operate reliably. >>

So say it! Go ahead, say it directly: "I, Roger Altman, cannot be convinced that the end result of Y2K will be anything less than disasterous." Don't keep pretending that you can be convinced if only someone could come up with the evidence.

<< Prior to Y2k concerns, each system under development invariably had the old version to fall back on when the new one failed to operate properly. >>

God, talk about optimistic! Yes, that is the way it should be, but it certainly doesn't match with my experience. History is replete with examples of system people throwing out the baby with bath water and making it virtually impossible to go back to the old system once the switch is thrown on the new one.

<< Even if we screwed-up royally, the systemic mischief even multiple and simultaneous failures could cause were generally negligible to the overall interdependencies established at that time. >>

Which time would that be, exactly? In case you hadn't noticed, there have been a lot of system implemented over the last twenty to thirty years. These interdependencies you are worried about have been there and been extensive for a long time. They damn sure didn't just spring into existence. The fact that they will be there in 8 months, while true, is neither news nor relevent.

<< At any point, whatever operable "system" we had was never threatened by the failure of any one or even many of its continuously evolving components. >>

Bet me. Suppose the terrorist bomb at the World Trade Center had instead been directed at the New York Stock Exchange and had managed to disable that one exchange's ability to conduct business for even a couple of days. What do you think the effect on the world's other markets and our own economy would have been? Remember the one satellite failure that took out most of the country's pagers for a day? Remember the multi-state blackouts that have occured over the years because the links between power providers were not capable of managing the results of what should have been considered minor failures? No, this "network" of yours didn't evolve recently. It's been there for years, and you have depended on it each and every day without thinking about it. You can claim to distrust it now that you have examined it, but there is little credibility to the position that it didn't exist before.

<< In other words, we were NEVER faced with a simultaneous deadline wherein MILLIONS OF SUBSYSTEMS will have to work well enough on their own and in concert to sustain "systemic" resilience. >>

Hogwash. The condition of those systems having to work well in concert has existed every moment of every day they have been in operation. If it didn't, your "network" would not be in operation today and this whole discussion would be a moot point. Again, you know that, you just aren't thinking about it.

I think the point you were trying to make was that this is the first situation where we have been able to identify a block of time where the possibility of failure is known to be higher than normal for many systems. It would be stupid to argue against that point. But that doesn't imply that the possibility of systemic impacts of single or multiple failures hasn't existed before.

<< So, I say again, the monkey is on the backs of the optimists to DEMONSTRATE that we will have systemic integrity. I say that's impossible, and both of you agree with me. CASE CLOSED. >>

Again, you resort to saying that anyone who disagrees with you must do the impossible to have any credibility. It was schoolyard behavior then, and it's scholyard behaviour now. As for agreeing with you, we should make a careful distinction here. While Flint and I agree with you that the demonstration is not possible, I for one do not agree that the outcome of integrity is not possible. Flint will have to speak for himself on that one.

-- Paul Neuhardt (neuhardt@ultranet.com), April 01, 1999.


Where's E. Coli when you need him. He always kept Paul Neuhardt in line.

-- none (none@none.none), April 01, 1999.

Paul:

Man, you've gotten so defensive since our last dabate, what with name calling and 'straw man' tactics. Must be shell-shock from taking on so many doomers at once. Lighten-up guy. I'm trying to learn something here. I have NO agenda. Trust me.

Do I understand that the crux of your argument is that we've been faced with many Y2k-like situations in the past and the 'network' has survived each and every assault?

Let's try to make this a learning experience. You may feel more comfortable emailing me directly. Then maybe we can avoid all this posturing BS.

Your old (debating) pal,

Roger

r

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), April 01, 1999.


Sir's Roger, Paul, Decker, Flint, and doomslayer -

I added a list of test criteria needed to demonstrate that the basic infrastructure systems we rely on in the US and Canada will operate next year to Mr. Decker's "What would be needed to show.." thread.

Rather than repeat it here - please review it and add your comments. My experience in testing systems is that we must either test them now, or test them later (after they have failed). You cannot extrapolate from a working condition (now) to a future condition using only "logic dictates" mental exercises - the control and integration process is too much unknown for that to be used.

True, they have not failed yet. This is only because they have not been tested under those conditions - yet. I cannot assure you they will fail next year, and I will NOT assure you that they will absolutely fail.

But I absolutely will not extrapolate from today's conditions (known) to tommorrow's (unknown) conditions, and ASSUME they will keep working satisfactorily.

Regretably, I have no immediate travel plans to our Annapolis office, but will join you in toasting that fair city with a cup of coffee, held up in your direction, at my next chance.

-- Robert A Cook, PE (Kennesaw, GA) (Cook.R@csaatl.com), April 01, 1999.


Those test criteria are is this thread:

http://greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=000fhz

-- Robert A Cook, PE (Kennesaw, GA) (Cook.R@csaatl.com), April 01, 1999.


Roger,

<< Man, you've gotten so defensive since our last dabate, what with name calling and 'straw man' tactics. Must be shell-shock from taking on so many doomers at once. >>

It's not defensive. I'm just appalled at some of the things that have been flying around here lately and I decided to blow off some steam. As for all the doomer's, bring 'em on. I like a challenge. If my opinions can't stand up to the challenge then I either need to change them or discard them. (BTW, where are Will Huett and E. Coli these days, anyway?)

<< I have NO agenda. Trust me. >>

I will, even though I'm not sure I'm buying the no agenda line just yet.

<< Do I understand that the crux of your argument is that we've been faced with many Y2k-like situations in the past and the 'network' has survived each and every assault? >>

No. The argument I'm making is that the need for interoperability has existed long before Y2K bacame an issue, and for you to say that Y2K has suddenly created that need is, well, ridiculous. The only real challenge that Y2K is adding to what is already a complex systems environment is that there is an increased risk of multiple failures occuring within a short time frame. Don't get me wrong: that is no trivial challenge. But neither is it a new one in any measure other than scope.

<< Let's try to make this a learning experience. You may feel more comfortable emailing me directly. Then maybe we can avoid all this posturing BS. >>

Maybe, but then everyone else would be deprived the pleasure of sniping at me and I at them. :-)

Seriously, I do feel that if I havestrong ideas and opinions it is in my own best interest to allow others to challenge them. Over the last year+ this forum has provided no small amount of challenge to my thoughts and positions on Y2K. I would like to continue to benefit from that expierence.

Paul

-- Paul Neuhardt (neuhardt@ultranet.com), April 01, 1999.


Paul:

Good exchange. Let's go from here. This is what you said, in part:

"The only real challenge that Y2K is adding to what is already a complex systems environment is that there is an increased risk of multiple failures occuring within a short time frame. Don't get me wrong: that is no trivial challenge. But neither is it a new one in any measure other than scope."

After reading that, several questions came to mind (here again, I'm not trying to trap you in any way, but I DO want to know just what the devil you're getting at):

1) According to what you said, Y2k does not represent a NEW challenge. Therefore, please tell us about some of the the most serious challenges you know about prior to Y2k.

2) You tell us that it's the scope of Y2k that makes it worse than prior systemic challenges. What evidence do you have to support your conclusion? Can you quantify just how bad it will be? If you can't, then how do you know it will be worse than those of the past?

I'm interested in learning how you think, but please try to stick to the subject matter, and answer the above question as succinctly as possible. You raised these points, no one else. So I think these questions are fair.

Roger

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), April 01, 1999.


Roger,

<< 1) According to what you said, Y2k does not represent a NEW challenge. Therefore, please tell us about some of the the most serious challenges you know about prior to Y2k. >>

Not my point, my friend. I'll try again, okay? Either the interdependencies between systems exist or they don't. We agree that they exist. If failures caused by Y2K problems represent a potential threat, then so do failures not caused by Y2K problems. Agreed? And I mean any failures, from bugs to power outages to terrorist acts to plain bad luck. I already cited a few examples of far-reaching failures (one satellite knocking out pager service for most of the country in '98, a tree falling in Idaho taking out power in a dozen or so states in the summer of '97, etc.). So, the potential for failures exists now, and so does the risk. Again, the issue here isn't the risk of failure because we have already experienced failures in many components of 'the network." It's the scope of that risk that is at issue.

<< 2) You tell us that it's the scope of Y2k that makes it worse than prior systemic challenges. What evidence do you have to support your conclusion? >>

Nice segue. Thanks. Let's look at the two examples from my last paragraph, the satellite outage and the power outage. Both were widespread in impact. Both were costly. Neither was unique to their type of system (i.e. there have been other wide-spread power outages and other satellite failures). Both types of systems are always at some risk of failure, and do occasionally fail. However, the sets of possible failures for those two types of systems are largely independent of each other. In other words, under the conditions that have existed in the past, if the satellite had failed during the same time frame as a regional power outage it would almost certainly have been coincidence.

Not with Y2K. Now, we can see that there is a risk of both power outages and loss of satellite service from the same basic problem: failure of computer systems to correctly handle date arithmetic spanning 1/1/2000. Sure, either system could be taken down at any time by software bugs, but this is likely the only bug that could be common to the controlling systems of both electrical power distribution and satellite-based telecommunication services. Before, each system had potential failures that were local in scope. Now there is a potential failure type who's scope encompasses both. To go one step further, failures in health care delivery systems are largely independent of both commercial power outages (due to requirements for local power generation capability) and satellite-based services. Again, the potential software failures have little in common with either of the other two systems. And yet, they too have the potential for Y2K failures and thus expand the scope of Y2K. The example can be carried forward however many times you want to.

<< Can you quantify just how bad it will be?>>

Exactly as well as you can, which is to say not at all. There are way too many variables, not all of which can be known. In fact, most of them can't be known. It's all a guessing game.

<< If you can't, then how do you know it will be worse than those of the past? >>

I don't know, but I assume that it will be worse simply because the potential for failures in multiple systems during a short time frame is higher. So do you. As I see it, where we differ is in our expectations regarding the volume and impact of failures and in how we choose to react to those expectations.

Expectations (hideously simplified, BTW): I am willing to believe some (not all, but some) of the reports that systems are being remediated and that the number of Y2K problems left is diminishing every day. That doesn't appear to be the case for you. You seem to be unwilling to believe all but a very few such reports.

Furthermore, I do not expect some horrible "cascade effect" of failures throughout what you describe as "the network." The ripple-effect theories are great and there is much to be gained by studying them, but most people overlook the fact that without a critical mass of ripples working in concert problems never turn into giant waves that do real damage. I see ripples in the water now. As Y2K plays itself out, I see lots of ripples and a few waves of note but a failure to reach critical mass and start causing serious erosion. Why? Because I believe that progress is being made despite my inability to verify that progress. Heck, they built those systems without me, they can probably fix them without me as well. Basically my position is "surf's up" for a while, but this too shall pass. Unless I seriously misread you, you are looking for prolonged pounding surf , causing serious erosion and damage largely because you can't verify how well constructed the sea wall is.

Reactions: Believe it or not, I would call you the optimist and myself the pessimist. You seem to feel things work well now and expect trauma caused by impending failures. Your current optimism is being shaken by the expectation that Y2K failures will upset the current balance of the world, and the result is a strong to severe pessimism. On the other hand, I don't see things working that smoothly now so I expect things to fail from time to time and I am not surprised when they do. On the other hand, things work well enough to get by on so I don't worry about it too much. So long as the failures are not both global and prolonged (which I've already said I don't expect) I treat Y2K as a simple exaggeration of the failures that occur all around us every day anyway. My pessimism was, is, and will remain moderate.

-- Paul Neuhardt (neuhardt@ultranet.com), April 01, 1999.


Good arguments Paul - but I disagree with your conclusion becuase of the combination of "ripples" - the sympathetic addition of several waves - with an unprepared public (with many sections of it now dependent in whole or inpart on the sontinued services from the national and local government bureacrats) and a "blind" leader not trusted by the vast majority of the public - and not at all concerned about the country's welfare or progress - will combine (could combine) with even minor ripples to cause a real mess.

As an example - consider small ripples in a bathtub occupied by a 6 month old baby - if the water were 2" the baby could lay on his back - and if not rolled over - will not drown or spill water. Same bathtub - but if the water were at the tub's edge - the baby has to be constantly held upright with its head above water - no washing can be done since both hands are engaged in a critical task, and the slightest ripple spills water over the tub onto the floor.

Your concept of a certain degree of existing software-induced troubles is correct - until some unknown (critical mass) of troubles is reached at which point the system fails. Unfortunately, I don't know the degree of troubles needed to hit critical mass, and (now) have much, much confidence in the resilaint nature of the general public, the national media, and the government.

-- Robert A Cook, PE (Kennesaw, GA) (Cook.R@csaatl.com), April 01, 1999.


Good arguments Paul - but I disagree with your conclusion becuase of the combination of "ripples" - the sympathetic addition of several waves - with an unprepared public (with many sections of it now dependent in whole or inpart on the sontinued services from the national and local government bureacrats) and a "blind" leader not trusted by the vast majority of the public - and not at all concerned about the country's welfare or progress - will combine (could combine) with even minor ripples to cause a real mess. As an example - consider small ripples in a bathtub occupied by a 6 month old baby - if the water were 2" the baby could lay on his back - and if not rolled over - will not drown or spill water. Same bathtub - but if the water were at the tub's edge - the baby has to be constantly held upright with its head above water - no washing can be done since both hands are engaged in a critical task, and the slightest ripple spills water over the tub onto the floor.

Your concept of a certain degree of existing software-induced troubles is correct - until some unknown (critical mass) of troubles is reached at which point the system fails. Unfortunately, I don't know the degree of troubles needed to hit critical mass, and (now) have much, much confidence in the resilaint nature of the general public, the national media, and the government.

Robert,

<< but I disagree with your conclusion becuase of the combination of "ripples" - the sympathetic addition of several waves - with an unprepared public (with many sections of it now dependent in whole or inpart on the sontinued services from the national and local government bureacrats) and a "blind" leader not trusted by the vast majority of the public - and not at all concerned about the country's welfare or progress - will combine (could combine) with even minor ripples to cause a real mess. >>

The problem with the ripple anology is that it is too accurate here. Sure, you can get sympathetic waves that combine into a wave with much higher magnitude. Refineries fail, therefore trucks have no fuel and food shortages ensue.

You can also get waves that cancel each other out or reduce the magnitude of both. Power plant A has a failure in its distribution system that makes it redirect more power away from the local service area than it is supposed to, causing local brownouts. Station B in the next state has the same problem. However, the excess power from station A can be redirected to the area covered by B and vice versa. Net effect: full power to both areas even though it is by unconventional methods.

<>

Having had recent experience bathing 6 month old babies, I can assure you that a baby can be washed with hand and supported by the other if need be. Okay, the baby has to be supported by bringing the arm and torso into play as well, but it's doable. It's messy, sure. Even inefficient, and it wouldn't be my first choice of methods. But it is possible, and that's something important to remember in system failures: There is often another way of accomplishing the basic task at hand, even if it is messy and doesn't perform up to the standards that you would normally set. As for water on the floor, a little never hurt and can be cleaned up later. You would almost have to be trying to slosh onto the floor in order to dump harmful amounts out of the tub.

I think we agree that the real problem with Y2K isn't system failures per se. System failures happen all the time now. Furthermore, I think we agree that the real issue is that there is some level of simultaneous failures that becomes harmful. To go back to your baby bath analogy, bathing the child in the full tub may not be possible if one arm of the bather is broken and in a cast. We just don't know where that level is or what the critical combination of failures might be. Furthermore, we cannot know. The true differences between us all here is how we choose to deal with not being able to know.



-- Paul Neuhardt (neuhardt@ultranet.com), April 02, 1999.


Robert,

<< but I disagree with your conclusion becuase of the combination of "ripples" - the sympathetic addition of several waves - with an unprepared public (with many sections of it now dependent in whole or inpart on the sontinued services from the national and local government bureacrats) and a "blind" leader not trusted by the vast majority of the public - and not at all concerned about the country's welfare or progress - will combine (could combine) with even minor ripples to cause a real mess. >>

The problem with the ripple anology is that it is too accurate here. Sure, you can get sympathetic waves that combine into a wave with much higher magnitude. Refineries fail, therefore trucks have no fuel and food shortages ensue.

You can also get waves that cancel each other out or reduce the magnitude of both. Power plant A has a failure in its distribution system that makes it redirect more power away from the local service area than it is supposed to, causing local brownouts. Station B in the next state has the same problem. However, the excess power from station A can be redirected to the area covered by B and vice versa. Net effect: full power to both areas even though it is by unconventional methods.

<>

Having had recent experience bathing 6 month old babies, I can assure you that a baby can be washed with hand and supported by the other if need be. Okay, the baby has to be supported by bringing the arm and torso into play as well, but it's doable. It's messy, sure. Even inefficient, and it wouldn't be my first choice of methods. But it is possible, and that's something important to remember in system failures: There is often another way of accomplishing the basic task at hand, even if it is messy and doesn't perform up to the standards that you would normally set. As for water on the floor, a little never hurt and can be cleaned up later. You would almost have to be trying to slosh onto the floor in order to dump harmful amounts out of the tub.

I think we agree that the real problem with Y2K isn't system failures per se. System failures happen all the time now. Furthermore, I think we agree that the real issue is that there is some level of simultaneous failures that becomes harmful. To go back to your baby bath analogy, bathing the child in the full tub may not be possible if one arm of the bather is broken and in a cast. We just don't know where that level is or what the critical combination of failures might be. Furthermore, we cannot know. The true differences between us all here is how we choose to deal with not being able to know.

Paul

-- Paul Neuhardt (neuhardt@ultranet.com), April 02, 1999.


Paul:

In your last email to me you said in part:

"I don't know, but I assume that it [Y2k] will be worse simply because the potential for failures in multiple systems during a short time frame is higher. So do you. As I see it, where we differ is in our expectations regarding the volume and impact of failures..."

Do you real think that we differ in out assessment in the volume of failures? For example, check-off which of the following you believe will be ready enough to avoid major problems,

IRS FAA MADICARE/MEDICAID rail transportation truck transportation food distribution state government (which states) local government (general opinion here) large corporations small and medium size businesses water purification plants sewage plants electrical generation electrical transmission electrical distribution telecommunications foreign crude production domestic crude production ocean going tankers domestic docking facilities foreign docking facilities foreign oil pipelines domestic oil pipelines foreign gas pipelines domestic gas pipelines airports hospitals

Surveys are available that provide SOME information so please don't give me the cop-out reply "it's impossible to know" I've been making an effort to stay abreast of the rate of Y2k remediation efforts in as many important areas as possible. Have you been doing the same thing? If you have, please give me your assessment in as many areas as possible. The above list is just to get you started. Feel free to add to this list if you have more information.

You've accused me of mental laziness. Now is your chance to show forum participants that you're not just an armchair "Y2k philospher", but have done and continue to do your homework.

Go to it Paul.

Roger

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), April 02, 1999.


Roger,

Let's see, on March 30th you decry the quality of information available with comments such as the following:

<< For example, how much SELF-REPORTING (as opposed to third party evaluation) has been used to provide "evidence" that Y2k remediation projects have been completed successfully? >>

<< I don't see ANYTHING approaching this level and quality of evidence. >>

On March 31st you make an even stronger statement regarding your belief in the impossibility of providing satisfactory evidence of positive results (added emphasis mine):

<< So, I say again, the monkey is on the backs of the optimists to DEMONSTRATE that we will have systemic integrity. I say that's impossible, and both of you agree with me. CASE CLOSED. >>

Then, On April 2nd you make an about-face with the following (again, added emphasis mine):

<< Surveys are available that provide SOME information so please don't give me the cop-out reply "it's impossible to know" >>

Pick a position and roost, will you? Either it is or it is not possible to know the outcome of Y2K issues. Which is it? You're beginning to sound like the guy in the old Monty Python skit "The Argument Clinic" who reduced the concept of arguing to simply taking a stand in opposition to whatever the other person says.

Now, as for your latest post:

<< Do you real think that we differ in out assessment in the volume of failures? >>

Of course I do or we wouldn't be having this discussion. In your original posting you shouted "THE NETWORK IS BROKEN" and "the SYSTEM IS BROKEN." I hold no such beliefs. First off, the 'network' is only broken if it doesn't work. It works as well right now as it ever did, so I believe your use of present tense regarding it's failing condition is inaccurate. Second, I hold no expectation of widespread failures in most critical systems. Many service denegrations, almost certainly. Some isolated failures, probably. Widespread failures resulting in an infrastructure collapse, no. Damage I'll agree with, failure I just don't see.

<< For example, check-off which of the following you believe will be ready enough to avoid major problems [long list follows] >>

In general, all of them. Do I really expect 100% of the operators in these industries to avoid major failures? No. But I do expect that enough of them will to avoid the failure of an entire industry area (i.e inability to perform or deliver goods for a protracted period of time). I do expect most of them to have minor problems (i.e. problmes that decrease functional capacity or quality without totally preventing operation). But as I've already mentioned, I expect them all to have occasional problems (both major and minor) now. I simply expect the incidence of those problems to increase in the months immediately surrounding 1/1/2000.

<< I've been making an effort to stay abreast of the rate of Y2k remediation efforts in as many important areas as possible. Have you been doing the same thing? >>

Nope. I've only been following a few areas (healthcare, retail and electrical power). Why? Well, for starters I just don't feel it's worth the investment of my time. Since I'm unconvinced that the risks to my survival are significantly elevated by Y2K, I follow the issue more in terms of those areas that are of some particualr interest to me for one reason or another. I devote the rest of my time to my life's other activities, all of which I firmly expect to be able to continue largely unimpeeded by the outcome of Y2K.

Secondly, outside of the areas I have any practical experience in (healthcare, insurance, retail and software development) I don't have the expertise to evaluate much beyond the "yes, it's fixed/no, it's still broken" level. Foreign oil transportation systems (pipelines, tankers, etc.)? I wouldn't know good information from bad, so I don't try to make the distinction. I rely on this forum and others (both electronic and print) to raise significant issues to my attention. I am working on the assumption that if serious problems arise in the ability of foreign oil suppliers to ship their product to the U.S. I will hear about it. If the issues are discernable in advance I am relying on the media and cyber-space denezins of forums I examine to discover and report them. If the issues are not discernable to those people in advance, then I'm pretty sure that they aren't going to be discernable to me either and I would be wasting my time in a virtual snipe hunt by looking for them.

<< If you have, please give me your assessment in as many areas as possible. >>

Well, if you insist. I haven't been retaining records of what I've read, prefering largely to examine, assess and move on. (I'm just seeking information, not researching a book for crissake!) Therefore, it will take me some time to assemble specific examples that are citeable. As I have house guests for the holidays, I ask your patience for a few days while I assemble some backup that others will also be able to reference. In the mean time, how about sharing some of that research you've been doing in, let's say, health care. I'll agree to start there as well.

<< You've accused me of mental laziness. Now is your chance to show forum participants that you're not just an armchair "Y2k philospher", but have done and continue to do your homework. >>

Well, I've already commited to supplying some of the reference materials I've used to form my opinions, so we've covered the second sentence as well as we can for the time being. Now, let's put the comments I made about intellectual laziness in perspective. It is easy to sit around collecting and memorizing facts. Any "Rain Man" idiot-savant can do that. It requires only a little education to be able to draw simple conclusions from simple sets of facts, although woefully few people do so anymore. What takes effort, real intellectual effort, is to agressively seek and defend a position based not just on simple facts but on your analysis and evaluation of the implications of those facts.

Based on that, I continue to maintain that the position you took in the orginal post on this thread (and which you have not left during the subsequent discussion) shows a near-total lack of intellectual effort. You cling to the position that there is no burden on you to defend your position, only a burden on others to talk you out of it. You then make it impossible to do so by stating that you will only accept proof that you freely admit is not obtainable. That is not the type of analytic synthesis that is supposedly required to earn a doctorate but the mental equivilent of sticking your fingers in your ears and singing "I can't hear you, I can't hear you" when people talk. To then come back and deride me for not providing the backup you will not accept adds the element of being two-faced, but we won't get into that now.

-- Paul Neuhardt (neuhardt@ultranet.com), April 02, 1999.


Paul:

I have no problem riding out your barrage of insults, but at the end of the day YOU were the one who said there is a difference in our assessment of the volume of (expected) Y2k related failures. So I continue to wait patiently for you to back up your own words. Just how did you arrived at this conclusion. In the meantime, all I can do is, ask these questions again:

If you real think that we differ in out assessment in the volume of expected Y2k failures, why not provide us with a list of those organizations that YOU believe will be ready enough to avoid major problems? Your reasons why would also be greatly appreciated?

Have a great holiday. No doubt you need a break.

Roger

-- Dr. Roger Altman (rogaltman@aol.com), April 02, 1999.


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